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PREFACE
Although I am not Jewish, one of the organizing tools 
of this dissertation will be the dreidel, a toy used in a 
game that has fascinated me since my days at the only 
Jewish high school in New Orleans. As an outsider looking 
in on this ritual which surfaces every Chanukah season to 
delight eager children, I was immediately seduced by this 
tiny inscribed object.
The dreidel came back into my life and my thoughts 
many years later in graduate school when I was confronted 
with the deconstructive process of Jacques Derrida. His 
texts became as seductive as the Jewish ritual which 
intrigued me for so many years. I decided to rewrite the 
two movements, the whirling of the dreidel and the 
whirling of the signifier which signals the deconstructive 
process in order to perform a close reading of Fragments 
d'un discours amoureux by Roland Barthes and to negociate 
a contextual analysis of La Carte postale by Jacques 
Derrida. Both of these texts focus on the deconstruction 
of desire, thus the desire (seduction) I felt when 
spinning the dreidel although it was never a part of my 
culture, closely parallels the play of desire presented in 
these two texts. This inability to actually take part in 
the Jewish ritual follows the path of desire presented in 
these two texts. It is a path in which absence is often
more important than presence, and as we shall see in 
detail, the gap in the garment is more erotic than the 
actual object itself. Finally, the process of mourning is 
involved in the inability to grasp or master an object, 
again, desire becomes a manifestation of absence.
The connection between the dreidel and mourning leads 
us into a discussion of the fort/da game that Freud's 
grandson played in the absence of his mother in order to 
symbolize her return. The dreidel has helped me to return 
to the mother and to the Imaginary where the seduction is 
located; to the discourse of the m/other and to reevaluate 
that discourse. These psychoanalytic vestiges will be 
discussed at length throughout the dissertation.
Another idea that will be developed throughout the 
text is the abdication of mastery. In this context also, 
the dreidel serves as a useful organizing tool since it is 
involved in a game of chance in which, due to the 
unpredictability inherent in any kind of gambling or 
gaming, mastery is excluded. I mention it here with 
regard to various suggestions that came out of the 
discussion during my general exam for the Ph.D. I was 
requested by several members of the committee to provide a 
topic sentence, as if the dissertation had as rigid a 
format as the traditional French "explication de texte" 
which I have always found highly problematic. I was also
iv
asked to take the word "questions" out of my title which I 
did, even though I considered the formulation appropriate 
for the analysis I am performing in this dissertation. My 
cause here is a simple one; I am using this dissertation 
as a learning device, which functions as an exercise to 
help me negotiate this particular intersection of 
literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and feminist 
studies. Mastery of any or all of these fields is not 
possible, nor is it at all desirable.
As we shall see with the dreidel argument, which in 
brief helps to tie together ideas of desire with the 
figure and function of the toy, I am intersecting with the 
various disciplines involved in the same way that 
deconstructive readings rely heavily on intertextuality.
I am delighted with the idea of constant movement as was 
Freud's grandson, and I have only found myself stagnating 
when asked for that elusive topic sentence.
The arguments will not, therefore, be classically 
dialectic; they are marked with the undecidability that is 
the trademark of deconstruction. This lack of the 
traditional linear argument is not due to any lack of 
rigor on my part. It is a conscious strategy I am using 
to deal with these texts; a process that depends on a 
form, like the one suggested by the spinning of the 
dreidel, which does not follow a straight and narrow path.
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Whether this non-linear path leads to knowledge of the 
text is an integral part of the overall problem of 
mastery.
I stress the question of textual knowledge because it 
is an important one in the Derridean schema. Knowledge of 
a particular text does not imply mastery over that text. 
One of the most important points in the deconstructive 
treatment of a text is the fact that the ultimate meaning
of a text is not attainable; in fact it is assumed that
such a meaning, the transcendental signified, does not 
exist. When asked if I am capable of declaring such a 
totalizing or transcendental signified, namely, the topic 
sentence, I must reply that I have indeed not run across 
one, or rather in the context of the dreidel, whirled 
around one. I am equating the topic sentence with the 
transcendental signified in this context because I feel 
both are unattainable and undesirable in this discussion 
which focuses on an alternative form, the ellipsis, a 
structural and literary configuration that will be 
discussed at length in the following chapters.
I am not the first to have such problems with mastery
or a possible lack of knowledge of the material. A
similar question arose for Jane Gallop when she was in the 
process of publishing Reading Lacan, a text which I found 
extremely helpful in my attempt to navigate through these
stormy issues. I am explaining her problem in order to
project her answer onto my dissertation dilemma, and also
to appropriate the friendly tone of her style which I find
quite seductive because it acts to deconstruct her
position of authority. She writes:
An early, partial version of the manuscript was 
submitted by the press to a reader, and the 
reader returned a report that made a great 
impression on me. It began with the point that 
the text was not worthy of publication because 
it demonstrated inadequate command of the
subject matter, adding that I even admitted as
much. Returning to this issue at the report's 
end, the reader suggested that I did not 
sufficiently grasp the Lacanian theory of sexual 
identification (again acknowledging that I 
admitted this) and that I should wait to write 
about Lacan's theory until I was no longer 
confused.1
When confronted with Lacan's texts, an initial period of 
confusion may be essential to the understanding of a text. 
Derrida and Barthes have both been accused of being 
purposefully obscure, although they would refute the 
charge of promoting confusion. However, all three find 
the question of mastery highly problematic. Furthermore,
I would never trust anyone who claimed such mastery.
Gallop goes on to say that the reader assumed that 
her reading was incorrect because it did not speak from a 
position of mastery. This is a position that I, like 
Gallop, would prefer to avoid, and in its place I would 
like to substitute the strategic use of the position of 
difficulty which allows for "the insufficient command" of
the material to be an essential part of the general 
project•
Another reason I am rejecting the traditional 
positions of mastery is that they may be described as 
phallocentric, or to adapt Derrida's term, 
phallogocentric. My last chapter on the chiasmus of 
feminine writing will discuss sexual difference in more 
detail, but at this point I will state that in the 
man/woman relationship as well as the teacher/student one 
the illusion of the "subject presumed to know" is to be 
deconstructed. When this relationship is deconstructed 
the phallic illusions of authority are called into 
question. The deconstruction of authority will be 
examined in the chapter on autobiography in which the 
proper name is rewritten as an element of textuality 
rather than as a seal of authorial intent.
I realize I have already fallen into the trap; by 
saying I am refusing mastery I am actually involved in a 
play for mastery. Furthermore, by referring to Gallop I 
am using an authority— whether or not a phallic one is 
another question— in order to legitimize an attack on 
authority. She has done it with another "master," Jacques 
Lacan. However, on both our parts, this strategy is 
necessary. She explains the dilemma of the feminist 
confronted with such giants:
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Simply to refuse authority does not challenge 
the category distinction between phallic 
authority and castrated other, between "subject 
presumed to know" and subject not in command.
One can effectively undo authority only from the 
position of authority, in a way that exposes the 
illusions of that position without renouncing 
it, so as to permeate the position itself with 
the connotations of its illusoriness, so as to 
show that everyone, including the "subject 
presumed to know" is castrated.2
The idea of universal castration appeals to me as a woman
since we are the ones who are presumed to be inferior due
to the physical castration that defines us biologically.
However, Lacan, like Freud, expands the category of those
castrated to include all thinking beings since he insists
that everyone, regardless of his or her organs, is under
the threat of castration. This castration is not sexual,
it is linguistic in that we are not in complete command of
language; furthermore, a mastery of language is
impossible.
So, we have come full circle, back to the
impossibility of mastery, or perhaps the circle is truly
an ellipse which is the trajectory of the dreidel which so
fascinates and seduces me. The dreidel will be discussed
periodically throughout the text since it serves as the
organizing tool for this gaming with Barthes and Derrida.
Gaming is an appropriate term for this process of analysis
since it is dependent on the dreidel for its structure
which, as will be explained in greater detail in the
following chapter, is set up as a game of chance that 
parallels the structures of desire deconstructed in the 
two texts in question.
Notes
1 Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985) 18-19.
2 Gallop, Reading Lacan 21.
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................  ii
P R E F A C E ................................................... iii
A B S T R A C T ................................................. xii
INTRODUCTION ..........................................  1
CHAPTER I: WRITING AS P L A Y ..........................  21
CHAPTER II: AUTOBIOGRAPHY..............................  55
CHAPTER III: BARTHES AS DECONSTRUCTIONIST ...........  96
CHAPTER IV: E L L I P S I S .................................... 129
CHAPTER V: THE CHIASMUS OF FEMININE WRITING ......... 150
C O N C L U S I O N ............................................... 174
WORKS CONSULTED...........................................181
V I T A ...................................  193
xi
ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the way in which Roland 
Barthes and Jacques Derrida rework the psychoanalytical 
constructions of desire through what can be referred to, 
short of a better word, as play or gaming. Play takes 
many forms in these two texts; etymological play and 
structural play are two of the more prominent 
manifestations of this gaming.
In an effort to analyze and at the same time emulate 
this play and its use by these two authors, I introduce 
the idea of the dreidel which functions as a device which 
objectifies the discourse of desire. It also serves as a 
physical example of the phrase "tourner autour," one of 
the main notions presented in La Carte postale and more 
recently Derrida's "autobiography" Jacques Derrida, 
coauthored with Geoffrey Bennington. Along with the idea 
of turning is the figure of intersection. Using this 
textual device of chiasmus, I am working at the 
intersection of literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis and 
feminist studies in order to analyze the deconstructions 
of desire in these two texts.
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation involves a reevaluation of the 
discourses of desire developed by Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida. The subject involved in the discourse of 
desire is always divided by the other, whatever form the 
other may assume in a given context. Various forms of 
this other to be analyzed in the course of this text are 
the lover or parent, mother or father, and the unconscious 
which prohibits the formation of a unified subject. This 
movement of the subject is paralleled by that of writing 
which is always already divided due to the notion of 
adestination, a Derridean non-concept that will be 
discussed at length. The two texts I have chosen to 
analyze are Fragments d'un discours amoureux by Barthes 
(hereafter referred to as Fragments) and "Envois" in La 
Carte postale by Derrida.
In Fragments Barthes presents a series of figures in 
alphabetical order which examine the subject in love who 
is unsure of how her/his discourse of desire will be 
perceived by the other. The other is expected to complete 
the discourse, thus situating him/herself in the ellipsis 
that defines the dialogue and parallels the absence which 
creates the desire. Context is the deciding factor in 
these figures, and the lover is not gender specific. 
Barthes calls on Freud and Lacan as well as close friends
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at various intervals to comment on the figures presented. 
In this way the "authorities" on the psychoanalytic 
discourses are incorporated, but they are not valued over 
the other commentaries.
Derrida's "Envois" in La Carte postale presents a 
love story through a series of postcards sent to the 
other. The lovers move, in an elliptical fashion through 
the dance of desire, in which, as in Barthes' figures, the 
gender is to some extent undecidable. Derrida draws on 
psychoanalytic theory and his own notion of adestination 
in this elaborate analysis of desire.
It is important to keep in mind the parallel 
constructions of gender and writing which surface 
throughout this analysis of the discourses of desire of 
these two authors. The coupling of these two texts is not 
a new idea, however the examination of their treatment of 
desire, with an emphasis on the deconstructive aspects of 
this treatment, has not been taken up by other critics.
A survey of the literature reveals only two writers 
who examine this combination of texts. Linda Kauffman has 
a chapter entitled "Dangerous Liaisons: Roland Barthes' A 
Lover's Discourse and Jacques Derrida's The Post Card" in 
Special Delivery and Stephen Ungar treats the two texts in 
his article "Forwarding Addresses: Discourse as Strategy
in Barthes and Derrida."1 It will be useful to outline
their respective emphases here.
The Kauffman article concentrates on two main points
the reasons for the return of Barthes and Derrida to
epistolarity and the production of Woman in the text.
However her discussion is not limited to these points; it
often focuses on the differences and similarities of styl
and narrative. Often her insights are pertinent to my
discussion as she examines the use of stylistics in the
service of epistolarity. Concerning the style used in
"Envois" she writes:
The technique highlights the extent to which 
epistolarity is written "under erasure" of one 
sort or another: internal or external 
censorship, postal inefficiency or political 
surveillance, or a sheer surplus of writing that 
nonetheless seems meager: "A correspondence: 
this is still to say too much, or too little.
Perhaps it was not one (but more or less) nor 
very correspondent. This remains to be decided"
(PC, 3). . . . These few words speak volumes,
evoking the text's indeterminacy, his own lack 
of intentionality as letter writer, and his 
willingness to allow writing-to-the-moment to 
lead him to as yet unknown discoveries.
However, despite her apparent acceptance of the post-
structuralist penchant for fragmentation, Kauffman is
constantly searching for the elusive totalizing narrative
She admits that her questioning is naive and yet one gets
the impression that the following quote indeed contains
the important questions for her: "Are we reading an
authentic correspondence? Was there a real love affair?
To whom are the letters addressed? If the addressee is
female, who was Derrida's mistress? What happened?"3
These questions, while interesting to the reader,
tend to indicate her neglect of the issue of the divided
addressee, whose gender is less important than the fact
that the postcard, or letter for that matter, may not
reach its destination. Adestination is necessarily
mentioned in Kauffman's account but it tends to be
overshadowed by her need for a linear narrative.
Reversing this hermeneutic movement in her writing,
her treatment of Barthes is less like a detective
unearthing narrative clues, mostly because Barthes is more
specific about his audience. Barthes warns his addressee
at the beginning of Fragments:
Hence I cannot give you what I thought I was 
writing for you— that is what I must 
acknowledge: the amorous dedication if 
impossible (I shall not be satisfied with a 
worldly or mundane signature, pretending to 
dedicate to you a work which escapes us both).
The operation in which the other is to be 
engaged is not a signature. It is, more 
profoundly, an inscription: the other is 
inscribed, he inscribes himself within the text, 
he leaves there his (multiple) traces. (ALP, 79, 
as quoted in Kauffman, 94).
Apart from her emphasis on narrative, Kauffman's treatment
of the place of woman in the two texts becomes useful to
my argument. Here, unlike in the discussion of the
narrative strategies, she has understood the importance of
undecidability. She writes: "Thus to argue that Derrida
and Barthes write "from the place of Woman," one must 
acknowledge that that place is unlocatable, unstable, 
oscillating.1,5
Undecidability, another of Derrida's key terms, is 
often misinterpreted as indeterminacy. In Limited, inc. 
Derrida makes the following distinction which is important 
for the arguments I will develop concerning play. He 
writes:
Je crois n'avoir jamais parle de "indeterminacy" 
gu'il s'agisse de "meaning" ou d'autre chose.
L'indecidabilite, c'est autre chose. Tout en 
renvoyant a ce que j'en disais plus haut et 
ailleurs, je rappelle que 1'indecidabilite est 
toujours une oscillation determinee entre des 
possibilites (par exemple de meanings mais aussi 
d'actes). Ces possibilites sont elle-meme tres 
determinees dans des situations strictement 
definies (par exemple, discursives - syntaxe ou 
rhetorique - mais aussi politiques, ethiques).
Elies sont pragmatiquement determinees.6
Derrida's argument for "determined" meanings parallels my
own argument for structural play as opposed to freeplay.
Both positions involve attention to context and form in
the development of a rigorous argument. These ideas will
be developed in further depth as the dissertation
progresses.
Returning to Kauffman, her use of undecidability as 
related to the question of woman indicates a refusal to 
define woman as the other with a fixed role. With regard 
to desire she explains that both Derrida and Barthes have 
"appropriated" the role of the other by passively waiting
to learn the outcome of the play of desire. Although, as 
I develop below, I question her use of the term 
"appropriated," (does it indicate a positive or negative 
action on the part of these two authors?) I agree 
wholeheartedly when she tells us: "indeed one of Barthes' 
and Derrida's major motives for writing from the place of 
the feminine is to subvert the phallic dominance that 
orders and tyrannizes discourse from Socrates forward."7
In general, her discussion of the construction of 
gender in the two texts moves the discussion into a 
direction I will be following throughout the dissertation 
For example, she writes of the Influence of the mother in 
both texts:
Barthes and Derrida both record their desire not 
just for the lost mother, but for preoedipal 
verbal states, which are figured as maternal in 
the Imaginary. Derrida alternately fantasizes 
about suckling the breast and having the 
capacity to breast-feed. At times he associates 
the mother with language itself; he is the 
devouring, vengeful son of a phallic mother:
"Our mother language sucks everything, the dirty 
vampire, I'll get her back for it" (Kauffman,
117-118, cf.PC, 228).
Finally, the last section of her article discusses 
feminist critiques of Barthes and Derrida. She presents 
the usual charges leveled against the writers,8 such as 
the tendency toward the appropriation of woman and their 
subsequent misrepresentation, then concludes as I will 
also that these two texts are remarkable in their stress
on accepting otherness without victimizing the other. As 
a feminist she approves of their endeavors: "Derrida and 
Barthes open up a space that feminists should be urged to 
keep from closing again, for if feminism and theory have 
taught us anything, they teach us how seamless the act of 
recuperation can become."9
The Ungar article is less relevant to my work mostly 
because it stresses a progression in the work of Barthes 
and Derrida to which I do not subscribe. Ungar's goal is 
to trace a transition from a theoretical discourse on 
writing in the early texts of these authors to a more open 
"pursuit of figuration"10 in the two texts under 
discussion. This historicist perspective is one I wish to 
challenge, especially in the case of Roland Barthes, who 
is often accused of appropriating the discourse of the 
day. My chapter on Barthes as deconstructionist argues 
that there were no radical changes in his thought over the 
years, but rather merely stylistic shifts.
Aside from these two analyses there are numerous 
studies which deal with the texts separately. Gregory 
Ulmer's books, Applied Grammatoloav and Teletheorv. have 
been instrumental in the construction of this study. In 
particular, his treatment of the various "conceptual" 
objects of deconstruction set me on the road to the
development of the dreidel as my "object of desire and 
deconstruction."
Ulmer provides us with a detailed descriptions of the 
postcard, the shoe, the umbrella and the matchbox, all 
items he calls "the abject objects of the contraband 
within the picto-ideo-phonographic Writing."11 Without 
going into his elaborate arguments here, let me merely 
follow his lead and provide a detailed description of the 
object I have chosen to represent the deconstructive 
project.
The dreidel is a top with four squared off sides each 
containing an inscription. Each of the four sides 
contains one Hebrew letter. They are Nun, Gimmel, Hay and 
Shin. These letters form the sentence "Nes Gdal Hayah 
Shorn" which means "A great miracle happened there." The 
"there" mentioned is Israel which was captured by the 
Syrians over 2,000 years ago. The Jews were enslaved by 
the Syrians until they retaliated and defeated them under 
the leadership of Judah Maccabee. The Holy Temple was 
returned to the Jews where they were once again able to 
light the golden Temple Menorah. However, there was only 
a tiny jar of oil, enough for a few hours at most. But, a 
"great miracle happened there" and the few drops of oil 
burned for eight full days and nights. The Jewish 
celebration of Chanukah commemorates this great miracle.
Along with this legend is the ludic side of the - 
dreidel which parallels the linguistic play emphasized in 
deconstruction, and which is one of the focal points of 
this dissertation. The four Jewish letters make up a 
Chanukah game. Each player places some raisins, candies 
or money into the kitty. The dreidel is spun with the 
following results: Nun means nothing, thus the player 
receives nothing but also loses nothing. Gimmel means the 
player takes all, the most preferable of the results. Hay 
means the player wins half of everything in the kitty.
Shin means the player has lost and s/he is wished better 
luck next time.12
One of the points I want to emphasize through the 
figure of the dreidel is the notion of playing with words 
in a game of chance which functions as a model for 
deconstruction, in particular when deconstruction ventures 
into the realm of psychoanalytic discourses of desire in 
the two texts I have chosen to study. There are also 
parallels between the dreidel's path and these movements 
of desire, both describing the figure of a vortex, such as 
the dervish, seemingly endless and without satisfaction. 
The dervish spins himself into a trance with the dance of 
desire. These ideas will be discussed in detail with 
relation to Lacan's rewriting of Freud's views on desire.
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Lacan also provides the starting point for what I 
will seek to elaborate as a view of writing and desire 
that works more in the name of the m/other than in the 
name of the father. The mother and the other are combined 
in this ellipsis in order to emphasis their status as non­
subjects, and thus non-dominating forces. This movement 
from the father to the m/other is emphasized by both 
Barthes and Derrida. The realm of language has been named 
the Symbolic by Lacan, and it is negotiated through the 
name of the father.
In order to move this argument out of the realm of 
the father and the Symbolic— even though that movement in 
and of itself is paradoxical since language is necessary 
to articulate the position— I have devised a system which 
merely takes to a logical extreme Barthes' reaction to the 
phallocratic power structure in which the name of the 
father is more prominent. This does not mean that the 
father is non-existent, on the contrary, he is ever 
present, but his discourse of authority and power is not 
the only one available. A return to the m/other involves 
a return to the structures of the Imaginary as opposed to 
the Symbolic, (once again Lacan's terminology is essential 
here), although since this is a dissertation which uses 
deconstructive tactics, I do not want to remain at the 
level of the binary opposition. I would prefer to think
11
of the binary in terms of the Derridean schema of A is in 
B and B is in A so that elements of both will be discussed 
at given points throughout the dissertation.13
Accordingly, I would prefer not to think of this 
study as a comparison between Derrida and Barthes.
Instead, following the elliptical pattern of the dreidel,
I have found that on questions of writing and desire, the 
views of the two writers merge at given points as the 
letters of the dreidel become blurred during the spin 
cycle, only to reaffirm the differences when the motion 
stops.
Both writers offer radical views on the place of the 
m/other in the discourses of desire, and perform 
manipulations of the psychoanalytic discourses of desire 
within the narrative structure. These narrative 
structures will be discussed in detail as will the various 
psychoanalytical points which inform them. In addition, 
the dissertation will privilege the tropes of ellipsis and 
chiasmus as presented in the works of Barthes and Derrida, 
respectively.
Chapter I, "Writing and play in the works of Derrida 
and Barthes" provides the background information on these 
two authors necessary to understand the subsequent 
arguments presented.
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In the first section on Derrida, his radical way of 
thinking about play is introduced through a discussion of 
the Phaedrus in "La Pharmacie de Platon" and a discussion 
of Saussure from De la qrammatoloaie.
In the article on Plato's Phaedrus the pharmaceutical 
metaphors are extended by Derrida in an extensive wordplay 
with the word pharmakon which becomes pharmakos, the word 
for scapegoat which never actually appears in the text. 
Aside from introducing the reader to the notion of 
wordplay in Derrida, this section also demonstrates the 
idea of intertextuality which extends the deconstructive 
movement to undermine the binary of inside/outside.
Another binary which is deconstructed is that of speech 
and writing. Derrida explores the inconsistencies in 
logic apparent in Plato's discussion of writing and his 
categorization of writing into good and bad writing.
These binaries fall apart as Derrida asserts that writing 
is always already a part of speech.
The second part of the discussion focuses on the idea 
of dlfferance and Saussure, again providing background 
material for an understanding of terms in subsequent 
chapters. Using peripheral material found in Cours de 
linquistique oenerale Derrida points out inconsistencies 
in Saussure's logic. The Saussure discussion provides the 
background for the analysis of dlfferance and a
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continuation of the place of neologisms in the work of 
Derrida. Finally, a brief Introduction to the notion of 
autobiography in Derrida is given with the example of his 
text on Ponge. In this section, it is demonstrated that 
reading through/with the signature is a productive way of 
drawing out the text's play of meaning without failing 
into the trap of intentionality.
In the second section of this first chapter Barthes' 
ideas are discussed again to serve as background material 
for subsequent more detailed discussions of these same 
issues. Parallels are drawn between the thought of 
Derrida and that of Barthes in terms of the deconstruction 
of logocentrism. The terms used are different, of course, 
but the outcome is the same. Barthes advocates the 
reworking of logocentrism though his notion of a plurality 
of meanings and the derogation of a will to power. This 
last idea is played out in the text which no longer 
depends on the author for its meaning, but rather on the 
reader who becomes the producer of the text.
The basic Barthesian terminology is discussed at 
length in this first introductory chapter. Terms such as 
writerly and readerly text and the text of pleasure and 
the text of bliss are defined in an effort to make their 
use more convenient to the reader when s/he encounters 
them in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, in terms of
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style, Derrida's emphasis on the periphery of the text, a 
strategy mentioned in the discussion of Saussure is 
countered with the Barthesian idea of fragmentation which 
prohibits any attempt to establish a totalizing system.
The final section of this chapter is devoted to the 
link between the ideas of Barthes and psychoanalysis, most 
specifically with the eroticization of the text which 
occurs in Le Plaisir du texte and Fragments. The 
structure of desire which arises from this process 
parallels that of play in the texts of both Barthes and 
Derrida in that there is a constant deferral involved, a 
movement which is manifested by the play of signifiers in 
the text.
In Chapter II, the parallels between the work of
Barthes and Derrida are continued with the discussion of
autobiography touched upon in the first introductory 
chapter. Using the fort/da story discussed in Bevond the
Pleasure Principle, the idea of repetition is analyzed in
its function as a strategy to problematize traditional 
notions of autobiography which rely on the authenticity of 
the signature. The theories of Lejeune and deMan are 
discussed in an effort to understand the differing 
viewpoints on this complex question of autobiography.
In terms of Derrida and Barthes, autobiography is 
viewed as play with a decentered subject rather than as
1 5
mastery by "the subject presumed to know." In order to 
illustrate this idea of fictional play with the subject, 
Derrida's "autobiography" is examined in an effort to 
understand his deconstruction of the traditional concept 
of authorial intentionality. The "autobiography" of 
"Envois", and the more recent text entitled 
Circonfession,14 which examines the communication 
between mother and son sets the stage for a discussion of 
the idea of adestination, which insists that a message may 
not reach its destination. Finally, Derrida's emphasis on 
"tourner autour" brings us back to the dreidel as a 
paradigm for the deconstructive process.
Barthesian autobiography is discussed through the 
examination of his last trilogy of texts, Fragments.
Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, and La Chambre claire. 
These texts rely heavily on the Lacanian theory of the 
mirror stage which is discussed at length in an effort to 
understand Barthes' relationship with his mother, most 
specifically, as portrayed in La Chambre claire. The 
absence of the Winter Garden photograph of Barthes' mother 
serves to confirm the discourse of desire as well as the 
discourse of autobiography as the quest for an always 
already absent, fictional or decentered subject.
Chapter III, focusing on Roland Barthes, makes 
explicit ideas of Barthes as a deconstructionist in an
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effort to continue the examination of deconstructive 
strategies used in his texts and give them an "historical" 
basis. Toward that end, the ideas presented in one of
Barthes' earliest texts, Critique et verite (1967) are
discussed and compared with the ideas prominent in a later 
text Le Plaisir du texte (1973).
It is my contention that there is no simple
progression of ideas from one text to another but rather a 
non-linear change in tone and structure. Writing, for 
Barthes, has always been seen as a process rather than a 
product. The structure of the texts changes from the 
traditional narrative to a more fragmented form, but the 
meaning of the text always remains plural. In this 
chapter these changes in tone and structure are documented 
in order to indicate parallels with the major ideas of 
deconstruction, ideas which have always already been 
present in Barthes' texts.
In the second half of this chapter the same Derridean 
notions of undecidability, adestination and dissemination 
are examined but this time in the context of the image as 
opposed to the text. This examination begins with a 
reading of three essays from L'Obvie et l'obtus and ends 
with a detailed study of the photographic image as 
analyzed in La Chambre claire. In terms of both sets of 
ideas, those on the text and those on the image, my point
is to present parallels with deconstruction in an effort 
to justify my contention that Barthes' views often 
coincide with those of Derrida although their style and 
tone are quite different. Some of these parallel points 
discussed in this chapter and subsequent chapters are the 
inside/outside dynamic, process rather than product, and 
an emphasis on the periphery of the text rather than its 
presumed essence.
Chapter IV, the second chapter to focus on the works 
of Roland Barthes, discusses Fragments in terms of the 
discourse of desire it attempts to affirm. The various 
figures presented in this text are explored in depth to 
reveal the structure of absence in desire as parallel to 
the absence which translates into the textual device of 
ellipsis. This important parallel is demonstrated through 
the deconstruction of the binaries of body and soul and 
male and female to arrive at a plurality of sexualities 
analogous to the Derridean "choreography" of non­
identified sexual marks. Furthermore, this discourse of 
desire functions within the realm of the Imaginary, a 
realm dominated by the relationship with the m/other. 
Barthes focuses on the mother/son relationship as one of a 
fetish for the always absent mother. Once again, the 
focus becomes the ever-important Winter Garden photograph 
in La Chambre claire. a symbol of the impossibility of the
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discourse of desire being anything more than absence or in 
rhetorical terms, ellipsis. Finally, a discussion of 
Barthes' article on Erte leads us to the last chapter of 
the text which concerns feminine writing and 
deconstruction. Erte has devised an alphabet made up of 
various stances of women's bodies in an effort to see 
woman as a mediator between the graphic and literal 
representation.
Chapter V, the last chapter, concentrates on the 
issue of women and deconstruction not only because it is 
of personal interest but because it involves undoing 
certain misconceptions of the place of women in 
deconstruction. Far from being a process of excluding 
women, deconstruction necessarily includes women in the 
dissembling of logocentric structures. The law of the 
father falls within these structures to be dissembled. I 
contend that the use of women's body parts to dissemble 
these structures is a celebration rather than an 
appropriation of woman and that "Feminine writing" helps 
to deconstruct the phallogocentric discourse. The complex 
issue of writing the body, begun in the preceding chapter 
on ellipsis and Barthes, will be the last issue to come 
into play. This last chapter will help to clarify various 
issues which have been set into spin in previous chapters.
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which the dreidel was wrapped. While in Paris, I combed 
the Marais, the Jewish section of the city, for 
information on this toy, and I was surprised to find very 
little was available, at least not in English or French. 
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20
13 This configuration of the binary was part of an 
interview with Derrida in David Wills and Peter Brunette, 
Deconstruction and the Visual Arts {Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1994), which I transcribed. Unfortunately this 
particular interchange was not included in the final 
version.
14 "Circonfession" is found in Derrida's Jacques 
Derrida (Paris: Seuil, 1991) co-authored with Geoffrey 
Bennington.
CHAPTER I: WRITING AS PLAY
What follows is a very straight-forward presentation
of the material that serves as the general groundwork for
this dissertation. Most of this information is taken from
two of the basic theoretical works of Derrida and Barthes;
they are De la arammatolooie and S/Z. respectively.
Writing is presented in both of these works in a
variety of different ways, but the overall strategy is
that of play, the play of the signifier, the play of the
various rhetorical devices presented, and most importantly
the interaction with playful overtones of the grand
institutions of contemporary thought. This interaction,
which I mentioned in the preface, is located at the
intersection of literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis,
and feminist studies.
Derrida's notion of writing as play emerges from the
deconstruction of the logocentrism of Western philosophy.
He thinks of play in a radical way, beyond the activity of
a subject manipulating objects which is the classical
philosophic position of logocentrism. In De la
arammatoloaie Derrida proposes the following:
L'avenement de l'ecriture est l'avenement du 
jeu; le jeu aujourd'hui se rend a lui-meme, 
effagant la limite depuis laquelle on a cru 
pouvoir regler la circulation des signes, 
entrainant avec soi tous les signifies 
rassurants, reduisants toutes les places-fortes, 
tous les abris du hors-jeu qui surveillaient la 
champ du langage. Cela revient, en toute
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rigueur, a detruire le concept du "signe" et 
toute sa logique.1
This rethinking of play removes the idea from the 
realm of philosophic or scientific space, and reworks it 
into the space of what Derrida calls grammatology, a "non­
science" which explores the movement of writing. When 
play is defined as a movement of writing, which is one of 
Derrida's many definitions of the term, the appeal to a 
central meaning or finality for it is avoided. Play 
describes the flexibility which negates the 
systematization of language while remaining within the 
system. Derrida comments on the impossibility of a 
totalizing system due to the concept of play:
Mais on peut determiner autrement le non­
totalisation: non plus sous le concept de 
finitude comme assignation a l'empiricite mais 
sous le concept de jeu. Si la totalisation 
alors n'a plus de sens, ce n'est pas parce que 
1'infinite d'un champ ne peut etre couverte par 
un regard ou un discours fini, mais parce que la 
nature du champ - a savoir le langage et un 
langage fini - exclut la totalisation: ce champ 
est en effect celui d'un jeu, c'est-a-dire de 
substitutions infinies dans la cloture d'un 
ensemble fini.2
Because of the notion of play the system is called into
question; totalization within language becomes an
impossibility. Furthermore, due to the impossibility of
totalization within language, the subject, who is
constituted through language, is called into question.
The metaphysics of presence in which the subject is seen
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as a unified entity is thus rendered problematic. In the
following paragraph, I am reading "presence" as a synonym
for the subject. This is a common equivalence in
deconstruction since the idea of the non-unified subject
indicates that the unity of the "presence" has been called
into question. Derrida comments on the effects of play on
the subject (la presence):
Tension du jeu avec l'histoire, tension aussi du 
jeu avec la presence. Le jeu est la disruption 
de la presence. La presence d'un element est 
toujours une reference signifiante et 
substitutive inscrite dans un systeme de 
differences et le mouvement d'une chaine. Le 
jeu est toujours jeu d'absence et de presence, 
mais si l'on veut le penser radicalement, il 
faut le penser avant 1'alternative de la 
presence et de 1'absence; il faut penser l'etre 
comme presence ou absence a partir de la 
possibility du jeu et non 1'inverse.
This formulation of play as an alternating movement of
presence and absence parallels the structure of desire
which is one of the central considerations in this
dissertation. However, at this point it is necessary to
present the "historical" context of the development of
writing as play which lays the foundation for my
subsequent discussion of the play of desire.
In an effort to illustrate how the Derridean notion
of play as writing deconstructs logocentrism, and to
provide a glimpse of the various forms of play which
Derrida performs, I will analyze his discussion of the
Phaedrus entitled "La Pharmacie de Platon", found in La
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Dissemination. and his discussion of Saussure, found in De 
la arammatoloaie.
I choose these two works because they illustrate an 
aspect of play which will be important later on in my 
discussion of Freud, that of wordplay; however, they also 
illustrate the more important aspect of play as 
participating in the deconstruction of the metaphysics of 
presence. In the article on Plato's Phaedrus the 
pharmaceutical metaphors extend beyond the limits of that 
text. This extension beyond the boundaries of the text 
indicates a strategy of play, more specifically a 
questioning of the limits of play. The Saussure 
discussion provides the background for the all-important 
analysis of dlfferance, and an introduction to the place 
of neologisms in the work of Derrida.
Plato advocates the privileging of speech over 
writing but when speech is seen as a transcendental 
signified or truth, it takes on an added dimension. No 
longer merely referential or in Plato's terms mimetic, 
speech becomes truth as aletheia, or truth which stems 
from inward revelation, reason which transcends the 
senses. Derrida's strategy in analyzing Plato's thoughts 
on writing, mostly found in the Phaedrus. begins with a 
questioning of the various binaries involved. The central 
binary to be deconstructed is that of speech/writing.
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Derrida explains in an elaborate argument which will be 
presented briefly here that Plato is condemned to writing 
even as he attempts to denounce its consequences. Indeed, 
this argument repeats itself whenever the question of 
philosophy and truth is raised. As Christopher Norris 
writes:
And this predicament repeats itself wherever 
philosophy refuses to acknowledge its own 
textual status and aspires to be a pure 
contemplation of truth independent of mere 
written signs. Far from standing out as a mere 
freakish episode, Plato's treatment of writing 
in the Phaedrus sets a pattern for similar 
encounters down through the history of Western 
thought. It is this pattern that Derrida will 
trace so intently in the texts of tradition, 
from Plato to Kant, Hegel, Husserl and other 
representative thinkers.4
However, Plato's argument has a strange twist to it.
Plato uses a myth to illustrate the priority of speech
over writing. This is an odd tactic since myth and
writing are considered to be on the same "bad" side
coexisting with forms of untruth, sophistry and fraud.
Derrida does not delve deeply into this strange choice of
material but rather treats it as yet another aspect of the
uncertainty of Plato's arguments concerning writing.
The myth involves the Egyptian Thoth (or Theuth) who
offers King Thamus writing as a gift. The king declines
the gift because he feels it substitutes signs for the
authentic living presence. Writing, he insists, will
break down communication between teacher and student and
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force the powers of memory to decline. In his
conversation with Phaedrus, Socrates recalls the king's
reaction to the gift of writing:
If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness 
in their souls; they will cease to exercise 
memory because they rely on that which is 
written, calling things to remembrance no longer 
from within themselves, but by means of external 
marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not 
for memory, but for reminder.5
The idea of writing from within introduces the second
major binary in Platonic thought on writing. Writing is
further divided into good writing, which comes from the
soul and bad writing, which exists only as inscription.
The following portion of the Phaedrus helps to explain
this paradoxical division:
Socrates: But now tell me, is there another sort 
of discourse that is brother to the written 
speech, but of unquestioned legitimacy? Can we 
see how it originates, and how much better and 
more effective it is than the other?
Phaedrus: What sort of discourse have you in mind, 
and what is its origin?
Socrates: The sort that goes together with knowledge, 
and is written in the soul of the learner, that can 
defend itself, knows to whom it should speak and to 
whom it should say nothing.
Phaedrus: You mean no dead discourse, but the living 
speech, the original of which the written discourse 
may fairly be called a kind of image.
Socrates: Precisely.6
It is important to understand the difference between good
writing and bad writing as set down (in writing) by Plato.
Good writing is the image of living speech, a mimesis
which represents the truth or logos. Bad writing is a
supplement, an assertion of the writer's independence in
which truth is no longer the goal. Another term for this
supplement in Plato's world is rhetoric, which is the
domain of the Sophists. Thus, two more pairs of binaries
are set up in the Platonic philosophy which Derrida
attempts to deconstruct; they are dialectic/rhetoric and
philosopher/sophist. The result of the deconstruction of
these various binaries is that opposition, one of the
structuring points of dialectical reason, is dissolved
into a process in which difference gets redistributed
across the oppositional boundaries.
In this particular case, Plato is unable to define
the philosophical use of language, memory and reason
without using the metaphors of writing. As Derrida
explains, when Socrates describes the good writing as "the
sort that goes together with learning and is written on
the soul of the learner," he is using a metaphor from the
process he is trying to exclude:
Or il n'est pas moins remarquable ici que la 
parole soi-disant vive soit tout a coup decrite 
par une "metaphore" empruntee a l'ordre meme de 
ce qu'on en veut exclure, a l'ordre de son 
simulacre. Emprunt rendu necessaire par ce qui 
lie structurellement 1'intelligible a sa 
repetition dans la copie, et le langage 
decrivant la dialectique ne peut manquer d'y 
faire appel.
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Thus, Derrida insists that writing is always already a 
part of speech and even those philosophers such as Plato 
and Socrates who attempt to separate the two are forced 
into situations where the boundaries between them become 
undecidable.
In all fairness it must be noted that in order to
lend force to his analysis Derrida takes certain liberties
in terms of a classical argument, which does not mean that
he sacrifices the logic of the argument. In the second
part of his discussion on Plato's pharmacy Derrida
exchanges one letter of the word pharmakon, which can mean
either poison or cure, with another to produce the word
pharmakos which means scapegoat.
Pharmakon as a metaphor for writing does appear in
the dialogue whereas pharmakos does not. Derrida's use
and analysis of the word depends on his radical notion of
textuality, and on the instability of meaning in a text.
By extending the pharmaceutical metaphor beyond the scope
of Plato's text, he extends the deconstructive movement to
undermine the binary of inside/outside. Derrida explains
the use of the absent term as follows:
Par exemple, "pharmakon" communique deja, mais 
non seulement, avec tous les mots de la meme 
famille, avec toutes les significations 
construites a partir de la meme racine. La 
chaine textuelle qu'il nous faut ainsi remettre 
en place n'est done plus simplement "interieure" 
au lexique platonicien. . . . En un mot, nous ne 
croyons pas qu'il existe en toute rigueur un
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texte platonicien, clos sur lui-meme, avec son 
dedans et son dehors.®
However, it must be emphasized that the use of pharmakos
rests upon the notion of intertextuality, and is not the
open-ended textual "freeplay" which critics of
deconstruction portray it to be. Derrida subscribes to
rigorous protocols of reading, but at the same time he
emphasizes the logic of exchange and substitution that
allows these "pharmaceutical" metaphors to extend beyond
the limits of a single text. He writes:
Non qu'il faille des lors considerer qu'il fait 
eau de toute part et qu'on puisse le noyer 
confusement dans la generalite indifferenciee de 
son element. Simplement, pourvu que les 
articulations soient rigoureusement et 
prudemment reconnues, on doit pouvoir degager 
des forces d'attraction cachees reliant un mot 
present et un mot absent dans le texte de 
Platon. Une telle force, etant donne le systeme 
de la langue, n'a pas pu ne pas peser sur 
l'ecriture et sur la lecture de ce texte.9
Instead of "freeplay" I would like to refer to the process
as "structural play" which is inherent to any system, and
which deters the system from achieving the stability of an
absolute truth or mastery of the situation. In other
words, the play, while undermining the system, works
within the system to problematize boundaries and attempts
at mastery. There is, however, nothing gratuitious about
the process or the play involved.
It would not be presumptuous to expand this idea to
an indefinite text beyond this Platonic text. One of the
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main tenets of deconstruction formulated in De la
arammatoloaie is "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte," which does
not suggest that the text is self-enclosed, but rather
that it always opens onto an infinite outside. This
inside/outside binary is one of the main components of
Derrida's argument on the signature which will be
developed in detail in the following chapter on Derrida
and autobiography. However I will explain the argument
briefly at this point as it relates to the general use of
play in deconstruction.
Derrida starts the section of "La Pharmacie de
Platon" entitled "Le Pharmakon" with the following
questioning of the role of the author, Plato, in the
production of meaning. He writes:
Le mot pharmakon y est pris dans une chaine de 
significations. Le jeu de cette chaine semble 
systematique. Mais le systeme n'est pas ici, 
simplement, celui des intentions de 1'auteur 
connu sous le nom de Platon. Ce systeme n'est 
pas d'abord celui d'un vouloir-dire. Des 
communications reglees s'etablissent, grace au 
jeu de la langue, entre diverses fonctions du 
mot et, en lui, entre divers sediments ou 
diverses regions de la culture. Ces 
communications, ces couloirs de sens, Platon 
peut parfois les declarer, les eclairer en y 
jouant "volontairement" . . . De meme, Platon 
peut, dans d'autres cas, ne pas voir les 
liaisons, les laisser dans 1'ombre ou les y 
interrompre. Et pourtant ces liaisons s'operent 
d'elles-memes. Malgre lui? grace a lui? dans 
son texte? hors de son texte? mais alors ou? 
entre son texte et la langue? pour quel lecteur? 
a quel moment?10
In the deconstructive strategy described in the quote, the
author, in this case, Plato, does not have complete
control over the text because he has signed it. His
signature indicates his presence but it does not establish
boundaries for the interpretation of the text. However,
the author is not dead in deconstruction; intentionality
has been rewritten to become a matter of reading in which
the author functions as one of the elements involved in
the play of the text. Peter Brunette and David Wills
explain this particular type of play in their analysis of
the role of Derrida in film as follows:
This particular brand of play— at least insofar 
as it is directly related to questions of 
intentionality— has become increasingly centered 
in the last fifteen years in Derrida's work in 
the concept of the "signature effect," a complex 
dynamic involving questions of the frame, 
concerning, for example, whether the author's 
(painter's, filmmaker's) "signature" is inside 
or outside the work.11
If the fact that there is no "outside" to the text 
means that there is no appeal to lived non-textual 
experience, then the signature of the author cannot 
function as the guarantee of meaning of a text. It should 
be treated as a play of signifiers as Derrida treats it in 
Siqneponqe.12 in which he points out that the signature 
effect is not equivalent to the death of the author, an 
idea which he feels has been exaggerated.
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Another corollary to Derrida's treatment of the 
author is the fact that he refuses to designate authorized 
or unauthorized versions of his texts.13 An official 
stamp of approval on a given analysis would be tantamount 
to admitting the "truth" of one interpretation over 
another. This return to logocentric thinking is exactly 
what Derrida would like to avoid in his discussion of 
signature.
The signature argument functions in the same way as
the argument about language. Just as speech cannot
function as the "controlling" mechanism neither can the
signature. The signature ostensibly designates ownership
just as speech ostensibly guarantees meaning. Since the
signature is held accountable for authenticity, it follows
that it also must be held accountable for a lack of
authenticity. This is manifested by the fact that it must
be easily duplicated in order to function, but this means
that it can also be counterfeited. Derrida explains this
idea in an essay entitled "Signature, evenement,
contexte", found in the volume Marges de la philosophie:
Les effets de signature sont la chose la plus 
courante du monde. Mais la condition de 
possibility de ces effets est simultanement, 
encore une fois, la condition de leur 
impossibility, de 1'impossibility de leur 
rigoureuse purete. Pour fonctionner, c'est-a- 
dire pour etre lisible, une signature doit avoir 
une forme repetable, iterable, imitable; elle 
doit pouvoir se detacher de 1'intention presente 
et singuliere de sa production.14
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When it comes to reading a text, the repetition of 
the signature can be seen as a play of signifiers which 
does not "explain" the meaning, but rather functions as- a 
proper name which becomes a common noun in the signifying 
chain. For example, the name "Ponge" lends itself to 
Derrida's analysis of the signifying chain it engenders.
It is particularly fertile in this respect since it can be 
reworked to become "eponge" or sponge, which has the 
qualities of both absorption and expulsion. This 
undecidability in the word itself parallels that of 
Ponge's work, and demonstrates that reading through/with 
the signature remains a productive way of drawing out the 
text's play of meaning.
Thus, the strategy in the signature argument, as in 
the general argument on writing, is to advocate a 
displacement of signifiers in order to avoid recourse to 
an ultimate truth, or in the case of the author, to 
intentionality.
As we have seen the avoidance of recourse to an 
ultimate truth is an integral part of Derrida's argument 
in deconstructing the logocentric and phonocentric forms 
of the Western metaphysical tradition. I would like to 
turn now to his treatment of Saussure found in De la 
qrammatoloaie in which he accomplishes this 
reversal/revision of metaphysics through a reworking of
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the conception of the sign. The argument begins with 
Saussure's concept of the sign as composed of signified 
and signifier.
Once again, as in the discussion of Plato, one of
Derrida's strategies is to find a problem with the 
interior logic of Saussure's argument. In this case, the 
problem is that while Saussure's system does suggest a 
treatment of the sign which accounts for radical 
difference, it also reveals a complicity with metaphysics 
which runs counter to a linguistics of difference. In
order to account for this seeming contradiction in 
Saussure and elsewhere Derrida develops the notion of 
dlfferance.
Even though Saussure advocates the arbitrariness of 
the signifier, a concept which constitutes a blow against 
the "sameness" which is one of the major principles of 
metaphysics, he fails to sustain this reasoning in his 
discussion of speech and writing.
In Cours de linquistique aenerale, Saussure treats 
writing as a secondary element in the binary pair.
Writing is seen as an intrusion upon the natural or spoken 
tradition and it is clear when Derrida compares Saussure's 
treatment of writing with that of Plato that the 
privileging of speech is a major component of the Western 
metaphysical tradition which thus comes under scrutiny.
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Derrida's strategy is to use the privileging of speech 
over writing to open up the discussion of his own ideas on 
writing and difference so as to challenge the logocentric 
tradition.
In order to resist the centralizing operations of
textual organization, deconstruction often turns its
attention to the peripheral text. For example, in
Saussure's text the references to writing that Derrida
takes into consideration are not a central part of the
discussion. Robert Strozier sees this move as a
misreading of Saussure. He explains his position:
. . . the Cours does, reluctantly and 
indirectly, speak to Derrida's version of 
metaphysics, but in a way that illuminates 
Derrida's method more than it does Saussure's.
That is part of the charm of Derrida, that he 
can turn the absolutely improbable upside down, 
that he can make the chapter on writing 
absolutely central to the Cours.13
Strozier suggests that Derrida is now privileging
writing by giving it such a prominent position in
Saussure's work. The charge that Derrida turns writing
into a transcendental signified is seconded by others.
Barbara Johnson makes a particularly convincing argument
on this topic in The Critical Difference. However, the
arguments presented by Strozier and Johnson are remiss in
that they refuse to acknowledge the idea that writing is
always already in speech, and thus neither can be
considered as transcendental. In short, if there is no
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original, natural speech there can be no transcendental
signified, not of speech nor of writing. Derrida writes:
Nous voudrlons plutot suggerer que la pretendue 
derivation de l'ecriture, si reelle et si 
massive qu'elle soit, n'a ete possible qu'a une 
condition: que le language "originel,"
"naturel," etc. n'ait jamais existe, qu'il n'ait 
jamais ete intact, intouche par l'ecriture, 
qu'il ait toujours ete lui-meme une 
ecriture.
The deconstruction of the binary pair of 
speech/writing also brings about that of
signified/signifier. Saussure explains that the signifier 
is not "derived" from the signified so it would logically 
follow that writing is not "derived" from speech.
However, Saussure insists on following the traditional 
metaphysical concepts when he speaks of writing and 
speech, thus he privileges speech as being primary. In 
short, he rejects metaphysics in the first relation 
between signifier and signified and upholds it in the 
second relation between speech and writing. The signified 
in Western metaphysics and in linguistics is given 
priority because it represents the concept of logos or 
truth. Derrida explains the equation of logos and 
signified by analyzing the binaries of intelligible versus 
sensible, and signified versus signifier. This binary 
leads into the connection between the intelligible and the 
absolute logos of God: "Ce logos absolu etait dans la 
theologie medievale une subjectivite creatrice infinie: la
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face intelligible du signe reste tournee du cote du verbe 
et de la face de Dieu."17
God is, then and now, the ultimate transcendental 
signified. He is the cornerstone of the logocentric 
tradition which Derrida is reconsidering in terms of what 
he calls differance. In terms of differance there would 
be no transcendental signified.
The neologism differance is explained in an essay by 
the same name contained in the volume Marges de la 
philosophic. In this text, Derrida explains the term in a 
number of different ways most notably by explaining what 
it is not:
Deja il a fallu marquer que la differance n'est 
pas, n'existe pas, n'est pas un etant-present 
{on), quel qu'il soit; et nous serons amenes a 
marquer aussi tout ce gu'elle n'est pas, c'est- 
a-dire tout; et par consequent qu'elle n'a ni 
existence ni essence. Elle ne releve d'aucune 
categorie de l'etant, qu'elle soit present ou 
absent.18
Furthermore, Derrida guards against the term becoming a
signified not only by insisting on its non-existence, but
by making it only one of many of the "signifiers" which
signal deconstruction. He writes:
Si l'on considere maintenant la chaine dans 
laquelle la "differance" se laisse soumettre a 
un certain nombre de substitutions non 
synonymiques, selon la necessite du contexte, 
pourquoi recourir a la "reserve", a l'"archi- 
ecriture", a 1'"archi-trace", a 1'"espacement", 
voire au "supplement" ou au "pharmakon", bientot 
a 1'hymen, a la marge-marque-marche, etc?19
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He answers this question with the idea of "espacement"
which indicates the status of differance as a movement
rather than a concept, which could be considered
logocentric. Writing too is considered as a movement
instead of a concept as we have seen. The use of the "a"
in differance is particularly pertinent to writing since
it signals the importance of considering writing on an
equal footing with speech since the distinction is not
heard in speech. Where speech is given priority, the play
of letters is lost.
Returning to our central trope of play, differance or
as it is elsewhere called trace constitutes the subject
who is caught up in the game of chance. This idea of the
non-self-identical subject will become very important to
our discussion of Freud's conception of the subject and
the unconscious in subsequent chapters. Derrida discusses
the subject and the necessity of play:
L'etre n'ayant jamais eu de "sens", n'ayant
jamais ete pense ou dit comme tel qu'en se 
dissimulant dans l'etant, la differance, d'une 
certaine et fort etrange maniere, (est) plus 
"vieille" que la difference ontologique ou que 
la verite de l'etre. C'est a cet age qu'on peut 
l'appeler jeu de la trace. D'une trace qui 
n'appartient plus a 1'horizon de l'etre mais 
dont le jeu porte et borde le sens de l'etre: 
jeu de la trace ou de la differance qui n'a pas 
de sens et qui n'est pas. Qui n'appartient pas.
Nulle maintenance, mais nulle profondeur pour 
cet echiquier sans fond ou l'etre est mis en 
jeu.20
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The constitution of the subject in deconstruction is an 
intricate, delicate process which will be discussed at 
length throughout this dissertation. More specifically 
the question of the desiring subject will be addressed.
The play which disrupts the system allows the subject to 
desire. In the following chapters the interaction of play 
and desire in the non-unified subject will be analyzed in 
detail. At this point let us move on to a general 
discussion of the question of play in Roland Barthes.
Barthes' works do not thematize the idea of play as 
explicitly as do those of Derrida. However, Barthes does 
advocate the reworking of logocentrism through his notion 
of a plurality of meanings. The notion of play helps to 
foster this plurality, as opposed to the linear 
development of a central meaning or truth. Barthes often 
writes of his horror of systems. Whenever possible, he 
consciously avoids entrapment in the logocentric systems 
of philosophy and science. As Derrida explains, closure 
within one or both of these two systems hinders the play 
of the text:
Chaque fois, on pourrait le montrer, chaque fois 
qu'une philosophie ou une science pretend 
constituer sa propre coherence, en quelque 
sorte, eh bien elles sont amenees a reduire 
1'element de jeu, ou a le comprendre, en lui 
assignant une place, a border le jeu en quelque 
sorte.21
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Barthes has kept the play of writing alive by
positing the reader as the producer of the text who takes
over the responsibility of producing meaning formerly
assigned to the author. Barthes, unlike Derrida, does
advocate the death of the author in a seminal article of
that name. However, it is my opinion that his views are
indeed close to those of Derrida, who states that the
author becomes a signifier among others in her/his text.
In Chapter III we shall explore what I see as a definite
Intersection of these ideas in the two authors.
Along with a relinquishing of the power over the
meaning of the text the author also disregards/rethinks
the values assigned by her/his culture. Through a process
of grafting her/his culture onto that of the author, the
reader produces a writerly text that has no pretensions to
an ultimate truth. Barthes explains his idea of the
"scriptible" as opposed to the "lisible" as follows:
Comment done poser la valeur d'un texte? . . . .
L'evaluation fondatrice de tous les textes ne 
peut venir ni de la science, car la science 
n'evalue pas, ni de I'ideologie, car la valeur 
ideologique d'un texte (morale, esthetique, 
politique, alethique) est une valeur de 
representation, non de production (I'ideologie 
"reflete", elle ne travaille pas). Notre 
evaluation ne peut etre liee qu'a une pratique 
et cette pratique est celle de l'ecriture. . . .
Ce que 1'evaluation trouve, e'est cette valeur- 
ci: ce qui peut etre aujourd'hui ecrit (re- 
ecrit): le scriptible. Pourquoi le scriptible 
est-il notre valeur? Parce que l'enjeu du 
travail litteraire (de la litterature comme
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travail) c'est de faire du lecteur, non plus un 
consommateur, mais un producteur du texte.22
The value of the text comes from not the text itself
but from the rewriting performed by the reader. Thus the
reader is allowed to select those parts of the text that
have particular relevance to her/his life, s/he is no
longer concerned with extracting the meaning of the text
for since s/he is only one of many readers, the text
necessarily has multiple meanings, which are created by
the individual readers. In her book entitled The
Ecstacies of Roland Barthes Mary Wiseman relates this
procedure to that of the patient in psychoanalysis. She
quotes Freud in the following passage to show the
parallels between the two processes:
. . . noticing and reporting whatever comes into 
his head and not being misled, for instance, 
into suppressing an idea because it strikes him 
as unimportant or irrevelant or because it seems 
to him meaningless. He must adopt a completely 
impartial attitude to what occurs to him, since 
it is precisely his critical attitude which is
responsible for his being unable, in the
ordinary course of things, to achieve the 
desired unraveling of his dream or obsessional 
idea or whatever it may be.23
The metaphor of unraveling that Wiseman notes in this
passage is appropriate for Barthes since he speaks of the
text as a tissu, and the reader as a spider spinning a web
of his own meanings. The following passage from Le Plaisir
du texte explains this important and extensive metaphor:
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Texte veut dire Tissu; mais alors que jusqu'ici 
on a toujours pris ce tissu pour un produit, un 
voile tout fait, derriere lequel se tient, plus 
ou moins cache, le sens (la verite), nous 
accentuons maintenant, dans le tissu, l'idee 
generative que le texte se fait, se travaille a 
travers un entrelacs perpetuel; perdu dans ce 
tissu - cette texture - le sujet s'y defait, 
telle une araignee qui se dissoudrait elle-meme 
dans les secretions constructives de sa 
toile.
The textures that the spider creates may be
considered work but in reality play is the guiding force
of the weaving involved. In a parallel movement to the
spider and his web, the act of writing as the act of love,
is an all-consuming act which results in the loss of the
subject. Again there is a strange combination of work and
play in the construction of a relationship; need I remind
the reader of the concept of foreplay which signals the
sexual act. The network is extended when writing as play
in Barthes is linked to the structure of desire which
exists between the reader/writer— author and her/his text.
Barthes explains:
L'ecriture est ce jeu par lequel je me retourne 
tant bien que mal dans un espace etroit: je suis 
coince, je me demene entre l'hysterie necessaire 
pour ecrire et 1'imaginaire, qui surveille, 
guinde, purifie, banalise, codifie, corrige, 
impose la visee (et la vision) d'une 
communication sociale. D'un cote je veux qu'on 
me desire et de 1'autre qu'on ne me desire pas: 
hysterique et obsessionnel tout a la fois.
This quote serves to introduce the connection between play
and desire which is a continuous "vas et viens" between
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hysteria and obsession. Because of their parallel 
structures, play and desire as metaphors of writing occur 
often in the later Barthesian texts. This passage also 
signals the extensive use of psychoanalytic terms in the 
work of Barthes.
However, my analysis of Barthes' treatment of play is 
working from the definition of play as a general movement 
of writing. The predominantly psychoanalytic model of 
desire as a form of play will become prominent in later 
chapters. For this analysis, since I would like to 
include some of Barthes' earlier works which do not 
emphasis the psychoanalytic aspects, I will use the more 
general definition of play as a movement of writing. 
Nonetheless, the play involved is often related to the 
physical body and thus eroticized.
In Le Plaisir du texte the two types of text referred 
to in S/Z are eroticized but with differing elements of 
force. The text of pleasure is a readerly text, while the 
text of bliss is a writerly one. The former is the 
traditional, classical text meant for the consumer, "celui 
qui contente, emplit, donne de l'euphorie, celui qui vient 
de la culture, ne rompt pas avec elle, est lie a une 
pratique comfortable de la lecture."26 The latter is 
the text ready to be rewritten by the reader, now 
considered the producer of the text, "celui qui met en
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etat de perte, celui qui deconforte (peut-etre jusqu'a un 
certain ennui), fait vaciller les assises historiques, 
culturelles, psychologiques, du lecteur, la consistance de 
ses gouts, de ses valeurs et de ses souvenirs, met en 
crise son rapport au langage."27
The status of the subject changes depending on the 
type of text. The text of pleasure confirms the place of 
the subject? the text of bliss loses the subject. The "I" 
which was established in the text of pleasure is 
deconstructed in the text of bliss. The reader/writer is 
lost in the act of reading as the subject is spent in the 
act of love. However, it must be remembered that the 
subject doing the reading is always already plural.
Barthes explains: "Ce "moi" qui s'approche du texte est 
deja lui-meme une pluralite d'autres textes, de codes 
infinis, ou plus exactement: perdus (dont 1'origine se 
perd)."28
The reader/writer finds meanings in the text as the 
dreamer finds clues to her/his dreams but in both cases 
the meanings are continually displaced. Again the 
parallels to Freudian dream theory are immediately evident 
since both follow a metonymic structure. Barthes 
explains:
Lire, c'est trouver des sens, et trouver des 
sens, c'est les nommer; mais ces sens nommes 
sont emportes vers d'autres noms; les noms 
s'appellent, se rassemblent et leur groupement
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veut de nouveau se faire nommer; je nomme, je 
denomme, je renorame; ainsi passe le texte: c'est 
une nomination en devenir, une approximation 
inlassable, un travail metonymique.
Following the Freudian model, metonymy takes on the 
name displacement in psychoanalytic theory which is one of 
the central tropes for Barthes. Another aspect of the 
parallel system from literature to psychoanalysis is the 
shift from metaphor to condensation. In both disciplines, 
meaning remains undecidable; the product of "une galaxie 
de signifiants.1,30
This undecidability was always a motif in the works 
of Roland Barthes. I would like to avoid the terminology 
of the new/old Barthes or the structuralist/post­
structuralist Barthes, even though the critics, such as 
Lavers and Culler,31 use these binaries to pinpoint his 
works at given times. The changes in his thought and 
vocabulary are to be noted, but they cannot be charted 
chronologically. The labeling of time periods for 
Barthes' work seems to me to be an attempt at mastery, a 
mastery he never advocated; in fact he worked against it 
at all times. For example, the following passage from his 
earliest work, Le Decrre zero de l'ecriture includes many 
aspects of the poststructuralist project which at that 
point could be seen as comparable to the modernist poet's 
project. Barthe's treatment of modern poetry in this 
quote sounds like a valorization of the kind of text that
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would later become the hallmark of poststructuralism.
Most notably as we shall see in the chapter on Fragments.
the idea of holes in the text, or ellipsis is emphasized:
Chaque mot poetique est ainsi un objet 
inattendu, une boite de Pandora d'ou s'envolent 
toutes les virtualites du langage; il est done 
produit et consomme avec une curiosite 
particuliere, une sorte de gourmandise sacree.
Cette Faim du Mot, commune a toute la poesie 
moderne, fait de la parole poetique une parole 
terrible et inhumaine. Elle institue un 
discours plein de trous et plein de lumieres, 
plein d'absences et de signes surnourissants, 
sans prevision ni permanence d'intention et par 
la si oppose a la fonction sociale du langage, 
que le simple recours a une parole discontinue 
ouvre la voie de toutes les Surnatures.
It is, of course, anachronistic to label Barthes/
work poststructuralist at that point; his interests were
elsewhere, and the passage could be read as a somewhat
uncritical celebration of modernist poetry. But it is
also a misreading to posit, as do a great number of his
critics, that "a discourse full of gaps” was unknown to
him before the publication of S/Z. Le Deare zero de
1'ecriture was written in direct response to Sartre's
Ou'est-ce que la litterature in which he encouraged an
"ecriture engagee," one which confirmed ideological
beliefs. Barthes rejects this idea in favor of what he
calls a neutral writing, one which starts from zero.
The main thrust and importance of this early work is
the division of literature into three dimensions:
language, style and writing. Language is the social
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aspect of literature; it is Saussure's langage, composed
of langue and parole. Style is individual, not social; it
is born of the body. Finally, writing lies somewhere in
between the two. Barthes writes: "Or toute Forme est
aussi Valeur; c'est pourquoi entre la langue et le style,
il y a place pour une autre realite formelle: 1'ecriture.
. . . langue et style sont des objets; 1'ecriture est une
fonction: elle est le rapport entre la creation et la
societe."33 Barthes returns to this relationship
between creation and society in Lecon. In that text he
defines the terms of literature and writing differently
than in Le Deere zero de 1'ecriture. Literature has been
narrowed down to the practice of writing:
J'entends par litterature . . . le graphe 
complexe des traces d'une pratique: la pratique 
d'ecrire. Je vise done en elle, 
essentiellement, le texte, e'est-a-dire le tissu 
des signifiants qui constitue 1'oeuvre, parce 
que le texte est 1'effleurement meme de la 
langue, et que c'est a l'interieur de la langue 
que la langue doit etre combattue, devoyee . . .
Je puis done dire indifferemment: litterature, 
ecriture ou texte. Les forces de liberte qui 
sont dans la litterature ne dependent pas de la 
personne civile, de 1'engagement politique de 
l'ecrivain . . . mais du travail de deplacement 
qu'il exerce sur la langue.34
The weaving of the text has an effect of
fragmentation which, as Barthes posits here would dissolve
any struggle for power. Power may be seen as akin to
Derrida's logos or truth; it is to be avoided in both
strategies. The fragmentation of the text which we will
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examine in Fragments. and which occurred much earlier in
his treatment of Sarrasine in S/Z. is a move away from the
power contained in a unified narrative. As with Derrida's
movement along the periphery of the text, Barthes'
fragmented text offers the reader/writer a radicalization
of the traditional text. Barthes describes this radical
text as follows:
Dans ce texte ideal, les reseaux sont multiples 
et jouent entre eux, sans qu'aucun puisse 
coiffer les autres; ce texte est une galaxie de 
signifiants, non une structure de signifies; il 
n'a pas de commencement; il est reversible; on y 
accede par plusieurs entrees dont aucune ne peut 
etre a coup sur declaree principal; les codes 
qu'il mobilise se profitent a perte de vue, ils 
sont indecidables (le sens n'y est jamais soumis 
a un principe de decision, sinon par coup de 
des); de ce texte absolument pluriel, les 
systemes de sens peuvent s'emparer, mais leur 
nombre n'est jamais clos, ayant pour mesure 
1'infini du langage. 5
The ingredients for this ideal text posited in S/Z are
given in the Inaugural Lecture to the College de France,
which was published in French as Lecon in 1978. This is
the text mentioned above as deconstructing the power plays
involved in teaching. Barthes plays with the terms
"savoir" and "saveur" in order to indicate the spice that
must be added to the infinity or plurality of knowledge:
. . . 1'ecriture se retrouve partout ou les mots 
ont de la saveur (saveur et savoir ont en latin 
la meme etymologie)... Dans l'ordre du savoir, 
pour que les choses deviennent ce qu'elles sont, 
ce qu'elles ont ete, il y faut cet ingredient, 
le sel des mots. C'est ce gout des mots qui 
fait le savoir profond, fecond.3®
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With the addition of this last ingredient, the recipe for 
what Barthes calls "sapientia" is complete. The formula 
is also appropriate for a definition of writing as the 
poststructuralists conceive it: "Sapienta: nul pouvoir,
un peu de savoir, un peu de sagesse, et le plus de saveur 
possible."37
Barthes, like Derrida is adamant against a view of
language as a means of power and yet he too has been
accused of viewing writing as a transcendental signified.
Not surprisingly, those who make such an accusation, among
them Annette Lavers, are the same critics who want to form
the binary of the early and late Roland Barthes. This
interpretation stems from her reading of one of his
earlier works, Critique et verite. in which the terms in
the title are ambiguous, creating an undecidability which
the critics refuse to acknowledge. Consider the following
closing passage of this work:
Ainsi tourne la parole autour du livre: lire, 
ecrire, d'un desir a 1'autre va toute 
litterature. Combien d'ecrivains n'ont ecrit 
que pour avoir lu? Ils ont rapproche les deux 
bords du livre, les deux faces du signe, pour 
que rien ne sorte qu'une parole. La critique 
n'est qu'un moment de cette histoire dans 
laquelle nous entrons et qui nous conduit a 
1'unite - a la verite de 1'ecriture.38
The thrust of two of these terms, unity and truth, would
be quickly dismissed by the poststructuralists, but in
this context truth should not be read as a transcendental
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signified, but rather as a process which engages both 
criticism and writing. In Critique et verite Barthes is 
positing the break-down of inside/outside boundaries 
between truth and fiction. The binary of inside/outside 
is deconstructed and is brought into relation with the 
opposition of speech/writing.
Thus a common strategy in both Barthes and Derrida is 
the reworking of the binaries. Barthes admits entrapment 
in a binary prison, but he tries to focus on the middle 
ground, what he will refer to as the erotic force of the 
gap in the garment. Derrida sees the reversal and 
rewriting of the binaries as a step in the deconstruction 
of logocentric patterns of thought. The gap in the 
garment in Derridean terms is best described by 
differance. Both use the deconstruction of the binaries 
as a means to undermine the will to power or mastery. 
Furthermore, they both use the idea of play as a means to 
avoid mastery and open up interpretation to a plurality of 
meanings.
Returning to the play of desire which started this
excursion into writing, Barthes supplies another layer to
the already extensive intersections:
L'endroit le plus erotique d'un corps n'est-il 
pas la ou le vetement bailie? Dans la perversion 
(qui est le regime du plaisir textuel) il n'y a 
pas de "zones erogenes" (expression au reste 
assez casse-pieds) ,* c'est 1' intermittence, comme 
l'a bien dit la psychanalyse, qui est erotique:
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celle de la peau qui scintille entre deux pieces 
(le pantalon et le tricot), entre deux bords (la 
chemise entrouverte, le gant et la manche); 
c'est ce scintillement meme qui seduit, ou 
encore: la mise en scene d'une apparition- 
dlsparition.39
The play of presence and absence is as important in 
reading as it is in desire. Reading becomes a perversion, 
the text the desiring force, and writing the result of 
their combination. "L'ecriture est ceci: la science des 
jouissances du langage, son kamasutra (de cette science, 
il n'y a qu'un traite: 1'ecriture elle-meme).40 "Des 
jouissances du langage" may be considered as yet another 
name for the play which undermines the system and allows 
for the dissemination of meanings throughout both 
literature and psychoanalysis. The idea of play also 
undermines the notion of the author who no longer has 
control over her/his text.
In both Barthes and Derrida the author loses her/his
power as s/he becomes one of many signifiers in the
"desiring text." Intentionality is rejected since s/he is
not the source of desire, but s/he is desired as a
signifier among others to be discovered and manipulated.
And finally, to round out the process, the reader too
comes to be included within the same play of desire:
Le texte est un objet fetiche, et ce fetiche me 
desire. Le texte me choisit . . . et, perdu au 
milieu du texte (non pas derriere lui a fagon 
d'un dieu de machinerie), il y a toujours 
1'autre, 1'auteur. Comme institution, 1'auteur
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est mort . . . mais dans le texte, d'une certain
fagon, je desire 1'auteur: j'ai besoin de sa
figure . . . comme il a besoin de la mienne.41
The structure of desire is the structure of the 
reader/writer— author relationship. The three entities 
become interchangeable in a constantly changing 
relationship of pleasure (jouissance) and its deferral 
(fetichisme).
The structure of desire parallels that of play in the 
texts of Barthes and Derrida which have been analyzed in 
that there is a constant deferral involved, a movement 
which is manifested by the play of signifiers in the text. 
In the works of Derrida the notion of play involves 
specific functions, such as those found in his discussion 
of the pharmakos, while play in Barthes is tied into the 
psychoanalytical discourse of desire, and discussed in 
terms of the theorization of the body.
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CHAPTER XI: AUTOBIOGRAPHY
Most autobiographical criticism involves identifying
the specificity of the genre and distinguishing it from
the other genres that may infringe upon it. Instead of
playing into what I read as this logocentric vision, I
would like to work from the basis of psychoanalysis and
philosophy in order to provide what I consider to be a
more productive context for the question of autobiography.
Psychoanalysis focuses on the discussion of mastery vs.
play in the discussion of the fort/da story which provides
one of the basic principles of Freud's field, and
philosophy, as presented by Derrida, questions the idea of
a self-identical subject.
Thus, I am proposing a Derridean conception of
autobiography in which play undermines the idea of mastery
and the subject is necessarily not self-identical.
Through a reading of the "autobiographies" of Derrida and
Barthes, we therefore arrive at a definition of the genre
which is grounded firmly in fiction. The idea of the
signature is rewritten so that it no longer guarantees the
authenticity of the subject, but rather because the
signature may be repeated, that authenticity is called
into question. Derrida explains:
La singularite absolue d'un evenement de 
signature se produit-elle jamais? Y-a-il des 
signatures? Oui, bien sur, tous les jours.
Mais la condition de possibility de ces effets
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est simultanement, encore une fois, la condition 
de leur impossibility, de 1'impossibility de 
leur rigoureuse purete. Pour fonctionner, 
c'est-a-dire pour etre lisible, une signature 
doit avoir une forme repetable, iterable, 
imitable; elle doit pouvoir se detacher de 
1'intention presente et slnguliere de sa 
production. C'est sa memete qui, alterant son 
identite et sa singularity, en divise le 
sceau.1
Repetition, in autobiographical scholarship and 
practice, is played out in the compulsion to tell one's 
own story. In criticism on autobiography, the author is 
said to be the master of his story, and thus the 
authenticity of the story is secure.2 In the Derridean 
scheme of things mastery is called into question because 
of the necessity of structural play which undermines the 
entire system and renders the idea of authenticity 
problematic.
The two main players in this autobiographical chess
board are Philippe Lejeune and Paul de Man. Lejeune makes
the distinction because autobiography and the
autobiographical novel. He writes:
Comment distinguer lfautobiographie du roman 
autobiographique? Il faut bien l'avouer, si on 
reste sur le plan de 1'analyse interne du texte, 
il n'y a aucune difference. Tous les procedes 
que 1'autobiographie emploie pour nous 
convaincre de 1'authenticity de son recit, le 
roman peut les imiter, et les a souvent imites.
Ceci etait juste tant qu'on se bornait au texte 
moins la page du titre; des qu'on englobe celle- 
ci dans le texte, avec le nom de 1'auteur, on 
dispose d'un critere textuel general, 1'identite 
du nom. Le pacte autobiographique, c'est 
1'affirmation dans le texte de cette identite,
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renvoyant en dernier ressort au nom de 1'auteur 
sur la couverture. Les formes du pacte 
autobiographique sont tres diverses: mais, 
toutes, elles manifestent 1'intention d'honorer 
sa signature.3
Once again, the signature becomes the justification for 
the authenticity of the text, a notion which Derrida calls 
into question through his discussion of the iterability of 
the signature. As we have seen, he insists that even 
though the signature or name may be repeated, it is never 
self-identical, thus the authenticity is always called 
into question.4 Lejeune's major opponent in this 
analysis of autobiography is Paul de Man whose classic 
essay, "Autobiography as De-facement," challenges all 
notions of referentiality and mimesis. For de Man, "the 
interest in autobiography . . .  is not that it reveals 
reliable self-knowledge— it does not— but that it 
demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of 
closure and totalization. . . of all textual systems made 
up of tropological substitutions."5
Mediating between these two supposedly diverse 
positions on the structure of autobiography is Nancy K. 
Miller, who detects a crack in the door of de Man's 
argument which allows Lejeune to quietly slip through.
She writes:
Having turned the mimesis of autobiography on 
its head, de Man opens the door a crack: 
perhaps, he writes, "the illusion of reference 
. . . (is) no longer clearly simply a referent
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at all but something more akin to a fiction, 
which, then, however, in its own turn, acquires 
a degree of referential productivity" (920-21; 
emphasis added). This opening onto the 
operations of reference ends up destablizing de 
Man's opposition to Lejeune through a chiasmus, 
a favored trope he shares with Lejeune.
The chiasmus is of course created when the two
"masters" of autobiography give each other sufficient
space to move and cross into each other's terrain: de Man
grants the fiction of autobiography a "degree of
referential productivity" and Lejeune, while still longing
for an "1" that coincides with itself, accepts the
possibility of a poststructurally decentered subject.7
The differences of opinion between these two
theorists of autobiography parallel the problem of mastery
and play in that Lejeune insists on the authority or
mastery of the subject whereas de Man emphasizes the
playful aspects which decenter the subject. Mastery, or
in Cartesian terms, cogito ergo sum, the thinking I that
coincides with itself, is part of Lejeune's formation,
while repetition falls into the de Manian promotion of a
world of pure figurality. As with the more general
problem of mastery and play the opposition set up between
de Man and Lejeune is a false one. Entrapment in the
binary prison must be avoided as should the paradigm of
mastery and play as mutually exclusive.
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I would now like to discuss mastery and repetition 
using as our model the child's play described in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle. The object of play in this 
analysis is a spool which is analogous to my use of the 
dreidel in this dissertation. As the dreidel is my 
conceptual and figurative object for the deconstructive 
process, the spool achieves the same function for the 
psychoanalytic process.
In the fort/da story as Derrida analyzes it in 
"Speculer sur Freud" in La Carte postale the style of the 
narrator, Freud, imitates the game he is describing.
Freud is thus equating himself with the grandson at play 
as he writes both of their stories. The game is a simple 
one of repetition which ostensibly represents the relation 
between the pleasure principle and the death drive. 
However, as Derrida is quick to point out, it actually 
describes Freud's writing style in which mastery of the 
game, in this case psychoanalysis, is not achieved even 
though Freud hesitates to admit this fact.
The autobiographic interlude occurs abruptly in the 
text of Bevond the Pleasure Principle, after Freud has 
just introduced the nature of the death drive. There is 
no explanation given for his need to interrupt his thesis 
regarding a compulsion to repeat, which identifies the
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death drive, and his compulsion to repeat an experience
from his own life. He writes:
At this point I propose to leave the dark and 
dismal subject of the traumatic neuroses and 
pass on to examine the method of working 
employed by the mental apparatus in one of its 
earliest normal activities— I mean in children's 
play.8
There are four fort/da games involving the spool; these 
four games parallel the instances in which Freud steps 
back from the writing project he has proposed on the death 
instinct. In order to understand the origin of the 
child's utterances involved, a preliminary scene is 
investigated. In this first scene, Ernst, Freud's 
grandson, throws any objects he can find out of his reach 
and the family members are expected to retrieve these 
objects. Freud indulges the child as does his mother, 
Sophie, by bringing the toys back to him. Most 
importantly, they interpret the child's response, a "long- 
drawn-out 'o-o-o-o'" as the German word fort (gone).
In the second game Ernst has a spool on a string 
which he throws behind the curtain or skirt of the bed and 
then retrieves it. These actions are represented by the 
sounds "o-o-o-o" for the sending away of the spool and 
"da" (here) for the retrieval.
The third game in the series is explained in a 
footnote. It involves only the child, who, when the 
mother returns, says "bebi o-o-o-o" which is presumed to
mean that he has discovered his reflection in a full 
length mirror, and considers himself gone. The fourth and 
final game occurs a year later. It consists of the child 
throwing away his toys as he exclaims "Go to the front!" 
The Oedipal complex is at work here since the father is at 
the front, and instead of mourning his absence Ernst seeks 
to banish him so that he might enjoy the possession of his 
mother. Thus the initial motive of mastering an 
undesirable absence has reversed itself, and the game now 
represents the prolongation of a desirable one.
What interests Derrida, apart from the 
psychoanalytical interpretation, is the fact that these 
four games are supplemented by Freud's complementary 
writing games. Instead of developing the theory of the 
death instinct in a linear fashion, on four separate 
occasions he interrupts this development. The first 
diversion was mentioned earlier when Freud opted for 
child's play as opposed to the trauma of war. The second 
is an apology for the lack of conclusive evidence to be 
acquired from the observations of a child's game: "No 
certain decision can be reached from the analysis or a 
single case like this."9 He then offers two possible 
interpretations only to further disregard the use of 
child's play as a deciding factor between the two: "Nor 
shall we be helped in our hesitation between these two
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views by further considering children's play."10
Derrida describes these four deferrals:
Nous n'avons pas avance d'un pas, seulement des 
pas pour rien dans la voie de la recherche 
manifeste. Qa se repete sur place. Et 
pourtant, dans ce pietinement, la repetition 
insiste et si ces repetitions determinees, ces 
contenus, especes, exemples de repetition ne 
suffisent pas a detroner le PP, du moins la 
forme repetitive, la reproduction du repetitif, 
la reproductivite meme aura-t-elle commence a 
travailler sans rien dire, sans rien dire 
d'autre qu'elle-meme se taisant, un peu comme a 
la derniere page il est dit que les pulsions de 
mort ne disent rien.11
Yet even if Freud cannot explicitly characterize the
death instinct, his tendency to repeat leads him to do so.
The inconclusive repetitive form of the essay functions in
the same way as the subject of his essay. His actual
words refuse to admit the death instinct but the form of
the essay confirms its existence.
Furthermore, the pattern of repetition without
conclusion is continued by Derrida's own reading of Beyond
the Pleasure Principle which imitates the movement of the
fort/da story. Following Freud's interpretation, Derrida
will make a comment only to retract it in the same
sentence. Derrida's strategy is not without purpose.
Brunette and Wills comment on his tactics:
He plays thus between the postal principle in 
what might be called the literal sense, 
concerning letters and correspondence, and its 
wider sense, concerning the transmission or 
communication of truth, attempts by the father 
of psychoanalysis to close or limit the effect
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of the openings his theories had created within 
our conceptual apparatus.12
This refusal of closure is evident in the following
example. When Derrida implies that there is a
relationship between Preud and Ernst, he quickly refuses
to confirm the statement: "Si Freud etait son petit-fils,
il faudrait etre attentif a la repetition du cote du geste
et non seulement du cote du fort/da de la bobine, de
l'objet. Mais ne brouillons pas les cartes; qui a dit que
Preud etait son propre petit-fils?"13
The importance of such speculation without conclusion
on Derrida's part is evident throughout "Speculer." This
textual play is one of the links to the essay by Freud.
The other link which directly involves the notion of
autobiography's involvement with repetition is the
tendency to introduce autobiographical information within
the space of a theoretical text. Derrida functions like
Freud in this context and although family members are not
involved there is a question of legacy. In this case, it
involves the legacy of deconstruction.
Freud has borrowed the notion of the dualism of
drives from Bering. One of these drives brings together,
while the other breaks down: "le premier en construisant
(aufbauend), le second en de-truisant {abbauend)".14
Derrida comments on the use of this word by the
Heideggerians: "Abbauen: c'est le mot que certains
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heideggeriens frangais ont recemment traduit par 
"deconstruire," comme si tout etait dans tout et toujours 
devant la caravane11.15 In Autobiographies in Freud and 
Derrida Jane Marie Todd interprets this statement in the 
following way: "This statement asserts Derrida's own 
desire for priority and for originality, denies his debt 
to Heidegger and suggests that "deconstruction,11 like 
Freud's "psychoanalysis" is a term that ought to retain 
its proximity to the object it names."16
I would have to disagree with this interpretation on 
the basis of the nature of the "autobiography" of Derrida 
entitled Circonfession which will be discussed at length. 
Derrida is not interested in preserving his name as the 
father of deconstruction. He does, however, want the 
ideas to continue to expand into other fields. In fact he 
enjoys the many directions it has taken in recent years.
He in no way intends to copyright the term, since any such 
attempt would work against the idea of dissemination. 
Furthermore, he would prefer to refer to deconstruction as 
an event, and as such something that happens rather than a 
method.17 The analogy with Freud is inaccurate since in 
the beginning of Bevond the Pleasure Principle he states: 
"It is of no concern to us in this connection to inquire 
just how far, with this hypothesis of the pleasure
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principle, we have approached or adopted any particular, 
historically established, philosophical system."18
Deconstruction, unlike psychoanalysis, is about the 
passage of the boundaries of the various disciplines. It 
involves the willingness to admit the undecidable, and to 
thus deny the necessity for set definitions.
The second aspect of the description of autobiography
I have formulated here involves the question of mastery
which was first broached in the preface. Freud attempted 
to sign psychoanalysis with his proper name and establish 
his reign as the father of the field. Derrida works 
against this form of mastery and would prefer to question 
the idea of an originator of the field. He plays with his 
signature as proper name, aware of its disseminative 
effect.
The impossibility of the mastery of deconstruction,
and thus of an ultimate father of the field is explored in
Derrrida's recent "autobiography" entitled merely Jacques 
Derrida. I will refer to this text as an autobiography 
despite the fact that it is co-authored with Geoffrey 
Bennington, because it is the first of Derrida's texts to 
make specific references to his childhood and in the 
traditional autobiographical fashion it includes a 
pictorial history of his life. Bennington's text does not 
concentrate on Derrida's biography but rather he attempts,
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in an effort that he understands must fail, to systematize
deconstruction in a user-friendly computer generated
schema. If this attempt had been successful, the idea is
that the thought of Derrida would have been rendered
accessible to all readers. Derrida's contribution, which
represents a glitch in the computerized system, is in the
form of a footnote at the end of each page. Interestingly
enough, the collaboration was the result of a bet, a game
of chance that the two men indulged in, which had as its
goal the element of surprise. The reader is told of the
necessity of the failure of the project:
L'idee directrice de 1'exposition vient de 
1'informatique: G.B. aurait voulu systematiser 
la pensee de J.D. au point d'en faire un 
logiciel interactif qui, malgre sa difficulty, 
serait en principe accessible a n'importe quel 
usager. Comme l'enjeu de J.D. est de montrer en 
quoi un tel systeme doit rester essentiellement 
ouvert, cette entreprise etait d'avance vouee a 
l'echec, et l'interet qu'elle peut avoir 
consiste a faire la preuve, la preuve de cet 
echec. 9
Also of interest here, although not my direct focus, is 
the introduction of technology into the study of 
autobiography. Bennington's idea of a "computerized 
Derrida," a Derrida that would be readily accessible to 
any audience is what Derrida is working against in his 
text which is entitled Circonfession.
Derrida uses a computer format, but his subject 
matter is such that it resists any attempt at computer
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access. Derrida's text consists of 59 passages written at
the bottom of the page as a huge footnote to the
Bennington text. One might assume that they correspond to
his 59 years at the time of writing. There is absolutely
no relation between the two texts in tone or content.
Derrida's text is determined by computer limits; he
continues each passage up to the maximum size of a
paragraph allowed by the Macintosh software he is using.
He reflects on the various technological machinations:
"Entre 1'aleatoire et le calculable [...] la 
chance et la necessite": la loi provisoire de 
Circonfession, une machine - avec laquelle il 
fallut calculer son soufflef ponctuer chaque 
periode, arreter le contour de la periphase, 
circoncire en un mot pour que 1'evenement defie 
ou surprenne 1 'autre machination. plus un signe 
apres 1'ayertissement: commande contre 
commande.
The format dictated by the mechanics of the computer in no 
way dictates the content of the text which as is expected 
deviates from the two main "systems" involved, philosophy 
and autobiography as seen in the conventional wisdom.
Derrida's autobiography brings us back to the dreidel 
effect, that of "tourner autour" and the entry into the 
realm of the m/other. The phrase "tourner autour" is 
first mentioned in the text which forms the basis for this 
dissertation on desire, the m/other and the use of the 
dreidel. It is entitled "Envois" and it is the first 
offering in the volume La Carte postale. In non-linear
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fashion, I shall start at the end of "Envois" in which the 
narrator poses the following question: 11 Je me demanderai 
ce qu'a signifie, des ma naissance ou a peu pres, tourner 
autour."21 One might assume since the narrative of 
"Envois" involves a love affair that the reference is to 
the whirling of desire that has occurred during the course 
of the affair which remains unresolved. This however is 
not the case or not the only case, since we learn in his 
autobiography that the phrase takes a more narcissistic 
direction.
Derrida's text focuses on two major events, his
circumcision and the illness and impending death of his
mother. The allusion to turning around becomes obvious in
this text (it remained obscure in La Carte postale), the
knife cutting the foreskin, the Jewish ritual performed on
all males shortly after birth. Derrida plays with the
verb "circoncire" and the participle derived from it, in a
passage in which he reflects on the impossibility of
intellectualizing the procedure:
. . . pour 1'avoir cherche a trouver autour d'un 
trope ou d'une ellipse que nous faisons semblant 
d'organiser, et depuis des annees je tourne en 
rond, cherchant a prendre a temoin non pour me 
voir etre vu mais pour me remembrer autour d'un 
seul evenement, j'accumule au grenier, mon 
"sublime", documents, iconographie, notes, les 
savantes et les naives, les recits de reves ou 
les dissertations philosophiques, . . . sur les 
circoncisions du monde, et la juive, et l'arabe, 
et les autres, et 1'excision, en vue de ma seule 
circoncision, la circoncision de moi, 1'unique,
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dont je sais bien qu'elle eut lieu, une seule 
fois, on me l'a dite et je la vois mais je me 
soupgonne toujours d'avoir cultive, parce que je 
suis circonciSj ergo cultive, une fantastique 
affabulation.22
Like deconstruction, and desire, circumcision takes on
many different forms in this text. It does not fall into
a neat package to be categorized in various documents.
Derrida connects the procedure to his mother, a mother in
the process of dying, who evokes feelings from the
narrator that cannot be intellectualized. It is important
to note that the mother is the one responsible for the
religion of the child in Judaism and she controls the
process of circumcision. Derrida explains his mother's
role:
. . . la survie presentement presente ou vie par 
provision de Georgette Sultana Esther, si vous 
preferez Maman, qui recoupe tout, synchronie 
risquant de cacher 1'essential, a savoir que la 
confession retenue n'aura pas ete de ma faute 
mais de la sienne, comme si la fille de Zipporah 
n'avait pas seulement commis le crime de ma 
circoncision mais un autre encore, plus tard, le
premier jouant le coup de 1'envoi, le peche
originel contre moi, mais pour se reproduire et 
m'acharner, me mettre a la question, moi, une 
vie entiere, pour la faire avouer, elle, en 
moi. 3
All has been called into question for the narrator who
must attempt to accept the inevitable death of his mother
and in the process his own death. The irony of the 
situation and one that Derrida is well aware of is the 
adestination of these reflections and as is the case with
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all reflections, one is never sure of the ultimate
destination of a message. The idea of adestination is
particularly poignant in the case of his mother since she
is no longer lucid. He reflects:
. . . peut-etre ma mere survivra-t-elle encore a 
la circulation du tour de monde, d'avance j'aime 
la triomphe de sa survie, avec des milliards 
d'autres a jamais elle ignore tout de ce que 
j'ecris, n'en ayant pu vouloir de sa vie lire la 
moindre phrase, ce qui donne a l'exercice auquel 
et dans lequel nous nous livrons, G. et moi, la 
juste dimension d'un chuchotement, l'aparte d'un 
confessional ou nous ne sommes pour personne, 
changeant de peau a chaque instant pour faire la 
verite, a chacun la sienne . . .24
Another aspect of this reflection on his ailing
mother involves the possibility that deconstruction will
be misconstrued after his death. "Tourner autour" becomes
the metaphor for this process of dissemination of his work
over which he understands that he will have very little
control. Derrida accepts this lack of control as an
integral part of the deconstructive process. He quotes an
excerpt from his notebooks:
"Circoncision, je n'ai jamais parle que de ga, 
considerez le discours sur la limite, les 
marges, marques, marches, etc., la cloture, 
l'anneau (l'alliance et don), le sacrifice, 
l'ecriture du corps, le pharmakos exclu ou 
retranche, la coupure/couture de Glas, le coup 
et le recoudre, d'ou l'hypothese selon laquelle 
c'est de ga, la circoncision, que, sans le 
savoir, en n'en parlant jamais ou en parlant au 
passage, comme d'un exemple, je parlais ou me 
laissais parler toujours . . . 5
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As we can see from this passage, circumcision can be added
to the long list of non-concepts which includes those we
have already discussed in Chapter I such as differance,
trace and pharmakos. At this point, and since the text
"Envois" started the discussion with its ending of tourner
autour, and since it too describes a situation in which
communication is problematic, I would like to analyze the
Derridean non-concept "adestination" which I mentioned
earlier in connection with Derrida's mother who has not
read his texts.
Adestination describes the situation in which
something which is sent, an "envoi" perhaps, may not
arrive at its destination. The path of the dreidel is an
adequate figure for this movement since it is constantly
shifting in an elliptical pattern and consequently has no
fixed center and stops at a random point of rest or
arrival. The term also describes the path of the postcard
which is the focal point of the section of La Carte
postale entitled "Envois" in which a series of postcards
are sent to a lover but it is never clear whether they
actually arrive at their destination. Brunette and Wills
define this Derridean notion as follows:
The paradox that the letter represents and that 
technology, however much it may overlook it, in 
fact depends upon, is the simple fact that a 
letter cannot arrive. Not just the possibility 
that it may not arrive, that it may be diverted, 
delayed, or irrevocably lost— which would
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suggest that these occurrences were accidents 
that befell the operation or threatened it from 
the outside— but the structural necessity of 
non-arrival built into the system of address.
What is insisted upon here is that the event of 
addressing and sending can in no way guarantee 
arrival, only arrival can do that. The event of 
sending is permanently divided, in its 
constitution, by its other event, that of non­
arrival .26
The postcard like the dreidel can be considered as 
another object-symbol of deconstruction. In order to 
justify this analogy between the postcard and the dreidel 
I am conflating ellipsis as a break in linearity 
(adestination via the rhetorical figure) and ellipsis as 
geometrical ellipse (the dreidel). I feel this strategy 
is justified since the ellipse, due to its shifting 
center, may be considered as a series of discontinuous 
points in a non-linear pattern.
In "Envois" a postcard reproduced from a Medieval 
manuscript depicting Plato dictating to Socrates (as 
opposed to the reverse situation which is the historical 
version of their relationship), acts as the catalyst for 
the discussion of adestination and a love story. Unlike 
other Derridean endeavors, there is a narrative here, a 
scaffolding for the theoretical discourse, albeit a simple 
one. It consists of the rewriting of the boy meets girl 
story. The narrator is courting in a rather strange 
manner. He has found in the Bodleian library at Oxford a 
stack of these postcards of Socrates and Plato which hold
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a particular fascination for him because the image 
portrayed is a reversal of the typical philosophic scene 
due to the fact that Socrates, the founder of Western 
philosophy, never wrote down his musings. Plato 
transcribed his thoughts.
Returning to the basic set-up, the first job of 
deconstruction is to reverse the hierarchies, then to 
rethink them. The postcard satisfies this first condition 
because the image is reversed. Socrates writing gives 
that act the same status as speech, thus the two acts are 
no longer hierarchized as speech over writing, but we are 
led to believe that speech is always already writing.
This also involves the rethinking of boundaries, or the 
inside/outside argument we explored earlier in "La 
Pharmacie de Platon". In "Envois" the inside/outside 
argument is expressed in terms of the front/back dilemma 
one is confronted with when a postcard is received.
Unlike a letter, in which the contents are usually more 
important that the packaging, the postcard presents a 
problem for the reader. Is the image on the front {or is 
it the back?) more important than the message which is 
usually brief and without consequence due to the lack of 
privacy the form implies? The postcard, as David Wills 
suggests, is often devalued, as writing was for Plato, in
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that it is seen as a mere substitute for the real thing.
He writes:
It inevitably becomes the apology and substitute 
for the real letter one never writes, being 
entrusted with the task of informing its 
addressee that one is still alive, conveyed in 
French by the vaguest of phrases which marks the 
limit of signification and the beginning of 
adestination— faire signe, to make a sign.27
However, there is a much bigger dilemma as far as the
postcard is concerned; not only does it often arrive after
one has returned home, but it often does not arrive at
all. In Derrida's argument this structure of the postcard
also covers that of the letter, and hence his idea of
adestination refers to communications or utterances in
general.
Adestination provides the segue necessary back into
the field of psychoanalysis which, as we have seen through
the fort/da story, often misses its mark. The story of
Freud's grandson is not told in a linear fashion but
rather in a series of repetitions in which the death
instinct is never explicitly characterized. In "Envois"
Derrida involves his own enterprise in a similar sort of
directional shift:
Moins pour tenter une psychanalyse de l'effet 
postal que pour renvoyer d'un singulier 
evenement, la psychanalyse freudienne, a une 
histoire et a une technologie du courrier, a 
quelque theorie generale de 1'envoi et de tout 
ce qui par quelque telecommunication pretend se 
destiner.
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The postal configuration for the dissemination of ideas is 
an interesting one, especially when the postman becomes a 
woman as Alec McHoul has postulated.29 However, whether 
male or female, this post(wo)man is not always "the 
purveyor of truth," which is the rather limiting English 
translation of the title of Derrida's text entitled "Le 
Facteur de la verite". S/he does not have a set route or 
even a set gender. In fact, there is nothing stable about 
her/him.
In "Le Facteur de la verite", Derrida's well-known 
analysis that is reprinted as the second part of La Carte 
postale. Derrida objects to Lacan's reading of Poe's short 
story "The Purloined Letter," because in it Lacan assumes 
that a letter, purloined or otherwise, always reaches its 
destination. Indeed, the last line of the seminar which 
contains this reading of the Poe tale is unequivocal on 
this point:
Elle etait deja contenue et facile a degager du 
titre de notre conte, et selon la formule meme, 
que nous avons des longtemps soumise a votre 
discussion, de la communication intersubjective: 
ou l'emetteur, vous disons-nous, regoit du 
recepteur son propre message sous une forme 
inversee. C'est ainsi que ce que veut dire "la 
lettre volee," voire "en souffrance," c'est 
qu'une lettre arrive toujours a destination.30
Furthermore, Derrida sees the letter that is supposed
to always arrive as a metaphor for the "psychoanalytic
cure," one in which the patient searches for a form of
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truth in consultation with her/his psychoanalyst.
"Envois" may be seen as a form of the talking cure in that
the narrator is talking himself through a love affair.
His addressee never answers although he often projects
"her" (I am assuming the addressee is a woman but it
should be noted that the gender is said to remain
undecidable). However, there is no presumption of arrival
at an ultimate truth and the reader is uncertain of the
outcome of this affair; Derrida has reworked the
traditional narrative of love. Like the letter, which
Derrida insists is divisible, he has left the love letter
fragmented. It is even seen as a corollary to the
appended postcard:
. . . n'oublie pas que tout est parti du desir
de faire de cette image la couverture d'un 
livre, le tout repousse dans les marges, le 
titre, mon nom, le nom de l'editeur, et 
miniaturise (je veux dire en rouge) sur le 
phallus de Socrates.31
Thus the love affair, which constitutes the narrative of
the love letters does not form a unified whole. It is
merely one among many signifiers, as though it were one of
many letters which may not arrive at their destination.
There is also talk of burning the letters, which would
leave only cinders, mere traces of a love affair. Traces
which are no longer the responsibility of the narrator,
since he has relinquished all control over his writing as
the last line of "Envois" indicates: "tu la bruleras, toi,
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faut que ce soit toi." The trace, an essential Derridean
term (discussed earlier in terms of differance) is now
transformed into cinders. In a later work, Feu la cendre.
Derrida makes this point quite clear:
J'ai maintenant 1/impression que le meilleur 
paradigme de la trace, pour lui, ce n'est pas, 
comme certains l'ont cru, et lui aussi peut- 
etre, la piste de chasse, le frayage, le sillon 
sur la sable, le sillage dans la mer, 1'amour du 
pas pour son empreinte, mais la cendre (ce qui 
reste sans rester de l'holocaste, du brule-tout, 
de l'incendie l'encens).
I would like to suggest that the notion of autobiography
be reconstructed in terms of the "burned" traces that the
author has decided to leave behind. However, like the
postcard there is no claim to authority or authenticity
since adestination is the necessary condition of any text
and it will never therefore "arrive" sufficiently to
constitute that authority.
As illustrated earlier in our discussion of the 
fort/da story, the field of psychoanalysis may be 
considered to be constituted in part in an 
autobiographical incident which could be interpreted as 
fictional play. Freud, although he understands that the 
text in question, Bevond the Pleasure Principle, is 
founded on speculation, still insists on turning that 
speculation into doctrine in much the same way that Lacan 
insists that a letter always arrives at its destination.
Unlike the author of "Envois" these "masters" of 
psychoanalysis have become blind to the power involved in 
positing an ultimate truth. As we have seen, the idea of 
play helps to undermine the will to power and mastery. 
Unfortunately Freud, while using the figure of the spool, 
does not see it as a means of undermining mastery but 
rather as a tool in the creation of part of an 
institution. Along the same lines, Lacan does not see the 
purloined letter as indicative of the "play" in the 
psychoanalytical system but rather as a means of asserting 
its ownership of the ultimate truth.
Autobiography remains in the realm of fictional play 
in which the truth-value of what is recounted is called 
into question since the movement of adestination works 
against the systematization of the subject's life. As we 
have seen Derrida problematizes the notion of any truth 
claims in autobiography by disturbing Bennington's attempt 
at systematization, even though it must be noted that 
Bennington's contribution does not consist only of 
biographical material but rather provides a summary of 
Derrida's work until 1990. The fact that Derrida adds his 
idea of an "autobiography" to the Bennington "biography" 
serves to problematize both genres.
Derrida also choses as his main topic the impending 
death of his mother, an event which cannot under any
circumstances be contained. Finally, the idea of 
adestination is appropriate in this context since there is 
a question of how to reach the mother who is no longer 
lucid, coupled with the general question of whether an 
author can ever "reach" his audience. The postcard serves 
as an appropriate paradigm to illustrate the problem of 
the author/reader relationship, and by extension, in this 
particular case the communication between mother and son.
I would like to move now into another radicalization 
of autobiography, that performed by Roland Barthes in 
three of his texts, Fragments. Roland Barthes par Roland 
Barthes. and La Chambre claire. The last selection was 
made because even though La Chambre claire is usually 
considered as a treatise on photography it is also an 
homage to Barthes' mother not unlike the one we just 
examined by Derrida. As I mentioned before, and what 
becomes even more evident in the Barthes texts, the 
movement into the realm of the preoedipal or Imaginary of 
the m/other is one of the focal points in my discussion of 
both authors. Far from representing a simple hierarchical 
reversal from the name of the father to the mother, the 
space of the m/other is one of differance or in Barthesian 
terms that of the middle voice where binaries are 
dissolved and the undecidable becomes possible. 
Furthermore, as I will show, the element of play as
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essential to the deconstruction of mastery, or will to 
power, is another point of connection between Barthes and 
Derrida. Like that of the father/m/other strategy, the 
strategy I am advocating for play instead of mastery
should not be seen as a mere reversal but rather as a
means of entry into a space of undecidability and 
dissemination where power structures are rewritten.
Barthes' final trilogy, as these three texts are 
often called, focuses on two main events, the movement
from corpus to corps and the death of his mother. This
strange juxtaposition of eroticism and maternal love 
produces an account of desire and lack that produces much 
pathos.
Following Lacanian reasoning which is a major 
emphasis of both Fragments and Roland Barthes par Roland 
Barthes [hereafter referred to as simply Barthes 1. the 
self cannot "really" exist because it comes into being in 
and through the m/other. The desire for the other entails 
a loss and a permanent alienation of the self. This does 
not mean that the subject stops desiring but rather that 
the search for the objet a (again Lacanian terminology is 
essential here) is never satisfied. In Lacan's theory, 
there are only others, never a self; even the self is an 
other to itself. Thus the subject must attempt to realize 
itself through the other(s) even though this fulfillment
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is an impossibility. Furthermore, the Barthesian subject 
(or non-subject, according to Lacan) is constituted 
through a (love) object-choice which originates in the 
identifications of the mirror-phase, an important 
component of the Imaginary. Following Lacan, there are 
three main identifications associated with the mirror- 
phase— with one's body image, with the body of the Mother, 
and with the objet a. Upon looking into the mirror, the 
infant is confronted with the visual Gestalt of her/his 
own body, which represents an ideal unity. The experience 
of joy that the infant attains at this first sight of 
her/himself as a unified being becomes the source of an 
idealization— the ego-ideal which the infant then projects 
into her/his behavior. A choice of love-object directed 
by this idealization is called narcissistic. Gregory 
Ulmer sees Barthes as a representation of this stage of 
development. He writes: "And Barthes is essentially a 
record of Barthes' ego-ideal, the exposure of his 
narcissism, itemizing the images of himself which he 
presents to the world."33
The second idealization that the mirror stage 
produces is the identification with the image of the 
mother who holds up the child before the mirror.
Anaclitic is the adjective that describes this object- 
choice based on the model of the parental figure (as
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opposed to narcissistic). This process gives rise to yet 
another idealization, that of the ideal ego. Barthes' 
ideal ego is represented in Barthes through the photos 
which feature himself and his mother, alluding to the 
mirror-stage.
Finally the third idealization which takes place in 
the mirror-stage is the encounter with the objet a. It is 
at this point that the Barthesian path differs from that 
of "normal" psychoanalytical development. The normal 
process of development is a passage from the Imaginary to 
the Symbolic through the intervention of the father— the 
third term (the name of the father, the law that is 
carried in the mother's speech) which mediates the mother- 
child relationship. The presence of the father 
constitutes castration or oedipalization, which signals 
that the child has accepted the incest taboo, defined 
briefly as the law of culture that separates her/him from 
the mother and thus indicates the acknowledgement of 
sexual difference. Barthes reveals that in the relation 
with his mother he has not been fully oedipalized. He 
then projects this situation onto the lover in Fragments:
11 L'amoureux manque sa castration? De cette ratee, il 
s'obstine a faire une valeur."34 Thus, Barthes depicts 
the lover in the following situation which Ulmer 
summarizes as follows:
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Barthes, in other words, presents the amorous 
subject as a fetishist, one who refuses 
castration (the authority of the Father) and 
denies sexual difference. The fetishist 
believes in the Mother's phallus,, the 
undecidable place of which is taken by the 
metonymic object— the objeb a (the "autre"—  
other— with a small a), the thing in respect to 
which the instinct seeks to attain its aim.35
The objet a continues the process where the ideal-ego
leaves off in the Imaginary third identification since it
concerns not the "gratifying" (present) mother, but the
silent (absent) mother, who is then seen as a figure of
death and the process of separation becomes a mourning
process.
Following this logic, autobiography may be read as a 
mourning process for the mother who is absent. Without 
the presence of the mother as an ideal ego, the 
unification of the self is an impossibility. Since the 
traditional notion of autobiography involves the ability 
of the subject to present a unified self, autobiography 
defined under this revised psychoanalytic structure 
becomes impossible. Since he holds the subject of self to 
be problematic Barthes does not attempt any such 
integration of self. Instead, in Barthes, he presents a 
parody of the process of autobiography and biography, then 
in La Chambre claire, he continues the mourning process 
for the mother in a strange incestuous twist of desire.
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Generally, this particular collection in which the
volume Barthes is published is written about dead authors
and thus the texts are considered biographies. Barthes
wanted to radicalize this system of writing the definitive
biography by writing his own biography, thus making it an
autobiography and furthermore problematizing the idea of
an authentic text. He explains:
Je ne cherche pas a mettre mon expression 
presente au service de ma verite anterieure (en 
regime classique, on aurait sanctifie cet effort 
sous le nom d 'authenticate), je renonce a la 
poursuite epuisante d'un ancien morceau de moi- 
meme, je ne cherche pas a me restaurer (comme on 
dit d'un monument). Je ne dis pas: "Je vais me 
decrire", mais: "j'ecris un texte, et je 
l'appelle R.B." Je me passe de 1'imitation (de 
la description) et je me confie a la nomination.
Ne sais-je pas que, dans le champ du sujeb, il 
n'y a pas de referent?36
The referent does not exist because the subject is
constructed through the eyes of the other, an other which
is itself fragmented. Thus in order to demonstrate this
fragmentation of the self or subject Barthes presents the
various pieces of text in alphabetical order which serves
to indicate the arbitrariness of the format. Given that
arbitrariness, a reading might well begin, as it did in
the case of Derrida's "Envois" with the last section. The
last section of Fragments is entitled "Le monstre de la
totalite" and it brings us back to the realm of play, this
time in relation to the body. Specifically, in this case,
Barthes plays with authority through the metaphor of the
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body as a skeletal clown which he further illustrates
through an image on the page opposite the passage. The
text reads as follows:
"Qu'on imagine (s'il est possible) une femme 
couverte d'un vetement sans fin, lui-meme tisse 
de tout ce que dit le journal de Mode . . . "
(SM, 53). Cette imagination, apparemment 
methodique, puisqu'elle ne fait que mettre en 
oeuvre une notion operatoire de 1'analyse 
semantique ("le texte sans fin"), vise en douce 
a denoncer le monstre de la Totalite (la 
Totalite comme monstre). La Totalite tout a la 
fois fait rire et fait peur: comme la violence, 
ne serait-elle pas toujours grotesque (et 
recuperable alors seulement dans une esthetique 
du Carnaval)?37
The body he describes is as unfinished as the text he is
writing in that it depends on the counter-signature of the
other to bring it to life. The caption under the picture
indicates this open structure (of the body and of the
text): "Ni la peau, ni les muscles, ni les os, ni les
nerfs, mais le reste: un ga balourd, fibreux, pelucheux,
effiloche, la houppelande d'un clown."38 The body is
the scaffolding on which the clothes hang, just as it will
become the figure for the texts that Barthes produces;
texts which produce jouissance or bliss for the writer and
the reader, or in the terms we have been using for the
subject and the other.
The body, as will be discussed at length in another
chapter, functions as a "mana word" for Barthes. However,
he is very quick to point out that this word should not be
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considered as part of an elaborate system which would then
pigeonhole his thought. He describes this tendency toward
systematization which he attempts to avoid in a passage of
Barthes entitled "La chambre d'echos":
Par rapport aux systemes qui l'entourent, 
qu'est-il? Plutot une chambre d'echos: il 
reproduit mal les pensees, il suit les mots; il 
rend visite, c'est-a-dire homage, aux 
vocabulaires, il invogue les notions, il les 
repete sous un nom; il se sert de ce nom comme
d'un embleme . . . et cet embleme le dispense
d'approfondir le systeme dont il est le 
signifiant. . . . le nom garde avec son systeme 
d'origlne un cordon qui n'est pas coupe mais qui 
reste: tenace et flottant. La raison de cela 
est sans doute qu'on ne peut en meme temps 
approfondir et desirer un mot: chez lui, le 
desir du mot l'emporte, mais de ce plaisir fait 
partie une sorte de vibration doctrinale.39
Thus, the implication is that he would like to keep the
word "body" in motion to the point of not even designating
a sex for the body but only concentrating on the ultimate
pleasure obtained through the process of theorization.
This reasoning can be applied to the system of
autobiography also, and as we saw in the autobiography of
Derrida, any attempt at systematization is doomed from the
start. There is no authoritative version of the life of
Derrida or Barthes; there are only fragments of knowledge,
or traces, associated with the two authors presented in a
specific format and a specific context. Indeed, Barthes
may be said to refuse to play into the authoritative view
in Fragments by omitting the "author's" name when he
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discusses the fort/da story which plays such an important
part in psychoanalytic theory. This important "absence of
a presence," merits further discussion since it helps to
support my argument concerning autobiography as outside of
power structures.
There is a noticeable "gap in the garment," in the
tissue that is the text of Fragments. It is an important
one for our purposes because it connotes an absence, the
absence of a presence that is essential for the
psychoanalytic make-up of the Barthesian text. Perhaps it
was a mere oversight, but I prefer to view it as a
monumental slip. The omission is that of the name of
Freud in the text which describes his grandson's play with
the spool. All of the other passages from Lacan and Freud
are dutifully annotated except this one. The passage
reads as follows:
L'absence dure, il me faut la supporter. Je 
vais done la manipuler: transformer la 
distorsion du temps en va-et-vient, produire du 
rythine, ouvrir la scene du langage (le langage 
na£t de 1'absence: 1'enfant s'est bricole une 
bobine, la lance et la rattrape, mimant le 
depart et le retour de la mere: un paradigme est 
cree).40
There are two possible reasons for this obvious 
omission. The first involves the refusal to conceive of 
autobiography as the text of a subject presumed to know.
As has been mentioned before in the context of Derrida, 
Freud's story, which is autobiographical, and prone to
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speculation, forms the basis for one of the main concepts 
in psychoanalysis. Barthes does not want to acknowledge 
the role of the founder of psychoanalysis in this context. 
In refusing to name the author of the story, he succeeds 
in undermining the mastery desired by the father of 
psychoanalysis. The other possible reason for the 
omission is that the scene is tied in with mourning for 
the lost mother, a topic which we will explore further in 
our discussion of La Chambre claire. The entry into 
language involves the loss of the mirror image relation 
with the mother. interestingly enough, the Penguin 
edition of A Lover's Discourse has portrayed on the cover 
of the book a young woman looking at herself in the 
mirror. Bookcovers are not necessarily based on well- 
informed readings of the text, but I would tend to agree 
with this representation. I am proposing here that the 
lover's discourse like the discourse of autobiography 
presented by Barthes takes place within the realm of the 
feminine; there is no question of the Lacanian name of the 
father in this context. In the case of both Derrida and 
Barthes the figures of authority have been rewritten and 
the subject finds him/herself forced to confront the realm 
of the m/other, which, as we have seen, involves an 
acceptance of her absence.
89
Lacan emphasizes that the fort/da game is not an
example of mastery, but rather of the alienation the
absence of the mother produces. He notes that in order to
grasp the radical articulation (the vowels fort and da)
the small boy needs the help of the spool, which in fact
functions as the objet a. While Lacan calls this the
"metonymic object" Winnicott, another psychoanalyst often
quoted in Fragments. refers to it as the "transitional
object." Winnicott explains that this object represents
the first use of a symbol and thus it becomes a metaphor
for a work of art. There is a direct line from the
transitional object through play to a cultural experience
such as writing. This model works well in the case of
Barthes as Ulmer explains:
In terms of this developmental process Barthes 
discovers (or reveals) that his desire to write 
is not a result of (normal) sublimation, in 
which the drives are desexualized and attached 
to socially approved practices, but that his 
writing is a practice of fetishism in which the 
erotic and the rhetorical are equally present.
In short, he relates to intellectual systems and 
to literature itself as a fetish, treating them 
as the objet a.41
The objet a in Fragments is represented by The Sorrows of
Young Werther [hereafter referred to as simply
Werther1.42 This novel by Goethe becomes the
transitional object. It is the model of romantic love
that Barthes is attempting to affirm in this work and it
is also an important reference for Lacan. Lacan uses
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Werther as the prime example of anaclitic love as it
operates in transference and Romantic love. In the schema
of transference that he presents, the analyst is in the
position of the objet a. He writes:
Or, dans cette convergence meme a laquelle 
1'analyse est appelee par la face de tromperie 
qu'il y a dans le transfert, quelque chose se 
rencontre, qui est paradoxe - la decouverte de 
l'analyste. Celle-ci n'est comprehensible qu'a 
1'autre niveau, le niveau ou nous avons situe la 
relation de 1'alienation. Cet objet paradoxal, 
unique, specifie, que nous appelons 1'objet a - 
le reprendre serait un rabachage. Mais je vous 
le presentifie d'une fagon syncopee, en 
soulignant que 1'analyse dit en somme a son 
partenaire, a l'analyste - Je t'aime, mais, 
parce gu'inexplicablement j'aime en toi quelque 
chose plus que toi - 1'objet petit a, je te 
mutile.43
The tendency to want to mutilate or at least disassemble
the lover is an important part of the lover's discourse.
This destruction (deconstruction) of the lover's body is
also seen as an intense curiosity aimed at finding out the
impossible, the essence of the lover's attraction to the
objet a. The following passage is taken from the figure
entitled "Le corps de 1'autre" in Fragments:
Parfois une idee foe prend: je me mets a scruter 
longuement le corps aime . . . Scruter veut dire 
fouiller: je fouille le corps de 1'autre, comme 
si je voulais voir ce qu'il y a dedans, comme si 
la cause mecanique de mon desir etait dans le 
corps adverse (je suis semblable a ces gosses 
qui demontent un reveil pour savoir ce qu'est le 
temps).44
The image of child's play expressed here is further
developed by Melanie Klein, another child psychologist
frequently quoted in Fragments. She relates it to the 
child's need to "know" the body of the mother which is 
frequently coupled with destructive tendencies. Referring 
to Freud's conclusions on this subject, she cites one of 
Freud's dreams in which he is led to assimilate his mother 
to all books. She analyzes Freud's attention to his 
father's bequeathing of his Bible to him as follows: "The 
unconscious wish to commit incest (to be a passionate 
discoverer of the mother) is sublimated, thanks to the 
gift of the Bible (from the father) and the scene of 
tearing up the book, into a passion for reading and 
scientific discovery."45
Like Freud, Barthes' passion for knowing, in 
particular understanding, the relationship with the mother 
in terms of his own desire leads him to a process of 
reading in which the erotic and the maternal coincide. 
However it is important to note that Barthes, due to his 
fear of totalizing systems, does not accept Freud's 
psychoanalytic "rules" as fact, since that would involve 
playing into the system. Instead he inserts Lacan into 
his texts as part of the collage effect, which switches 
the focus from Freud's conceptuality to a more undecidable 
textuality. This transition facilitates his writing of an 
affirmation rather than an explanation of the lover's 
discourse.
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Finally, the last book in the trilogy, La Chambre 
claire. confirms the relationship with the mother by 
positing an essential Winter Garden Photograph to which 
the reader does not have access. This absence serves to 
confirm not only the discourse of desire but the discourse 
of autobiography in general in that the subject 
constituted through the unconscious via the mother is 
never seen as a unified entity. Because of the importance 
of this text in the development of a maternal space of 
desire, it will be analyzed in further detail in another 
chapter.
In conclusion, in the texts we have examined of both 
Derrida and Barthes, I have analyzed a conception of 
autobiography in which play undermines the idea of 
mastery, and thus renders the subject non-self-identical. 
This fragmentation of the subject occurs within the 
preoedipal realm of the Imaginary in which the law of the 
mother takes precedence over the Lacanian law of the 
father. Barthes and Derrida, in their respective 
autobiographies, seek to write within this domain of non­
mastery in which play grounds the work in fiction, and 
thus the "subject presumed to know" is deconstructed. 
Authorial intentionality and authenticity are called into 
question in their works. The poststructural decentered 
subject is analyzed in this new notion of autobiography.
93
Notes
1 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Paris: Editions 
Galilee, 1990) 49.
2 To my knowledge, there is no such "masterful" 
autobiography of Jacques Derrida. Jean-Louis Calvet's 
Roland Barthes: 1915-1980 is assumed to capture the life 
and times of Roland Barthes. I contend as does Jacques 
Derrida that such capture is neither possible nor 
desirable.
3 Philippe Lejeune, Le Pacte Autobioaraphiaue (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1975) 26.
4 For a discussion of Derrida's signature effect in 
the works of Nietzsche, see "Roundtable on Autobiography" 
in The Ear of the Other, ed. by Christie McDonald.
5 Paul de Man, "Autobiography as De-facement," MLN 
94, 1979: 922.
8 Nancy K. Miller, "Facts, Pacts, Acts" Presidential 
Forum, Profession 92. New York: The Modern Language 
Association: 12.
7 Miller 13.
8 Sigmund Freud, Bevond the Pleasure Principle, 




11 Jacques Derrida, La Carte postale de Socrate a 
Freud et au-dela (Paris: Flammarion, 1980) 317. [hereafter 
referred to as La Carte postale 1
12 Peter Brunette and David Wills, Screen/Plav (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989) 190.
13 Derrida, La Carte postale 316.
14 Derrida, La Carte postale 285.
15 Derrida, La Carte postale 285.
94
16 Jane Marie Todd, Autobiographies in Freud and 
Derrida (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990) 179.
17 For further information on this particular 
formulation of the term deconstruction see Jacques 
Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend, tr. Andrew 
Benjamin, Derrida and Differance. ed. David Wood and 
Robert Bernasconi (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988) 3-4.
18 Freud 3.
19 Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques 
Derrida (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991) 3.
20 Derrida and Bennington, Jacques Derrida 37.
21 Derrida, La Carte oostale 273.
22 Derrida and Bennington, Jacoues Derrida 59-60.
23 Derrida and Bennington, Jacques Derrida 72-73.
24 Derrida and Bennington, Jacques Derrida 216-7.
25 Derrida and Bennington, Jacques Derrida 70.
26 Wills and Brunette 181 .
27 David Wills, "Post/Card/Match/Book/Envois/ 
Derrida," Sub-stance 43, vol. 13.2 (1984): 13.
28 Derrida, La Carte postale 6.
29 Alec McHoul, "Postmodern and the Post-Moral," LSU, 
Baton Rouge, November 1989.
30 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits I (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1966) 53.
31 Derrida, La Carte postale 268-69.
32 Jacques Derrida, Feu la cendre (Paris: Des femmes, 
1987) 27.
33 Gregory Ulmer, "The Discourse of the Imaginary," 
Diacritics. March 1980: 69.
34 Barthes, Fragments 273.
35 Ulmer 71.
36 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes 
(Paris: Seuil, 1975) 60.
37 Barthes, Roland Barthes oar Roland Barthes 182.
38 Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes
39 Barthes, Roland Barthes oar Roland Barthes
4  ̂ Roland Barthes, Fragments d'un discours amoureux 
(Paris: Seuil, 1977) 22. [hereafter referred to as 
Fragments 1
41 Ulmer 71.
42 Jonathan Wolfgang von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young 
Werther (London:Penguin, 1989).
43 Jacques Lacan, Le Seminaire XI: Les guatre 
concepts fondamentaux de la psvchanalvse (Paris: Seuil, 
1973) 241.
44 Barthes, Fragments 85.
45 As cited in Ulmer 72.
CHAPTER III: BARTHES AS DECONSTRUCTIONIST
I would argue that despite his structuralist roots, 
Roland Barthes has always already been a 
deconstructionist. Even though one of his first works, 
Critique et verite, borrows heavily from the structuralist 
movement popular at the time (1966), the truth Barthes 
proposes in his title is that of writing as process rather 
than product. This movement of writing becomes prominent 
in S/Z (1970), with the discussion of the writerly text. 
Finally, the idea is fully developed in Le Plaisir du 
texte (1973), an exploration of the movement of the text 
from corpus to corps.
I believe that Barthes is not the chameleon he is 
thought to be by many of his more conservative critics 
such as Annette Lavers and Philip Thody and that there is 
an obvious consistency in Barthes' thought from one text 
to another. Due to the influence of the publication of De 
la qrammatoloaie (1967), in Critique et verite (1966) 
Barthes focused on a logic analogous to the logic of the 
supplement although that Derridean term was never used.
In that and subsequent publications the structure of the 
texts changed from the traditional "narrative" to a more 
fragmented form, but the meaning of the text had always 
remained plural; by this I mean that Barthes did not 
envisage one "correct" interpretation of his texts. The
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structure may be either systematic as in S/Z. or arbitrary 
as in Le Plaisir du texte, but the fact of a plurality of 
meanings to be gleaned from the tissue of the text remains 
constant. For example the writerly text of S/Z becomes 
the text of jouissance (bliss) in Le Plaisir du texte.
What does change, and in a drastic manner, from 
Critique et verite to Le Plaisir du texte is the tone of 
the text. This change is evident in the titles. Barthes' 
early texts appear didactic while the later ones evoke a 
more ludic tone. The dry account of structuralism in 
Critique et verite takes on a playful slant when it is 
reworked in terms of desire in Le Plaisir du texte. There 
are valid reasons for this shift stemming from the 
circumstances at the time of the writing, such as the 
purpose of the text. The former text is a polemic against 
the traditional approach to criticism, and thus it takes 
on the rather austere tone of a debate, while the latter 
text aims at the eroticization of the text and the tone 
reflects that goal. I would now like to document this 
change in tone in order to indicate the parallels with the 
major ideas developed by Derrida in an attempt to show the 
proximity of the thought of these two major critical 
theorists.
The first part of Critique et verite was written as a 
reply to Raymond Picard's attack on Sur Racine, a work
grounded in psychoanalytic theory and structuralist 
anthropology which shocked the Academy. Barthes could not 
defend such a work in the ironic tone which became his 
trademark after the publication of Mythologies (1957).
What he sets forth is a clear analysis of the problems of 
upholding the standards of the traditional school of 
criticism. He attacks (in a very gentle manner) the 
ideology of traditional French criticism by pointing out 
the ambiguity of such terms as critical verisimilitude, 
objectivity, good taste and clarity. Barthes discusses 
these elements individually, shedding them of their common 
sense definitions. He believes that the rigor the French 
traditionalists insist on should come not from the choice 
of the code (literal or symbolic) but rather from a 
consistent reading once the code has been chosen.1
The explanation of codes leads us into the second 
part of the book which leaves behind the argument with 
Picard to give an account of the nature of the 
relationship of the reader to the text. There are three 
discourses to be adopted: science, criticism and reading.
Making the discourse a science moves the text away 
from its creator. The author is no longer the source of 
the meaning of the work as s/he is in traditional 
criticism. Because there are no longer any secret keys 
held by the author, the object of the discourse becomes a
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plurality of meanings. These ideas are developed further 
in his seminal article "La mort de 1'auteur"(1968).2
The lack of importance of the author's signature 
"fait de 1'oeuvre un mythe: la verite des anecdotes 
s'epuise en vain a rejoindre la verite des symboles."3 
Yet the use of the word "truth" here is misleading since 
it will later be described as an enigma in the following 
statement which is essential to my argument: "En effagant 
la signature de l'ecrivain, la mort fonde la verite de 
1'oeuvre, qui est enigme."4
The second discourse in this system is criticism 
which occupies the intermediate position between science 
and reading. The role of the critic is to derive meaning 
from the work but not just any meaning. Barthes, even at 
this early date which is signaled by the feud with Picard, 
is called upon to defend the charge of saying just about 
anything. As he explains, his thoughts are anything but 
random:
Non, si le critique est tenu a dire quelque 
chose (et non n'importe quoi), c'est qu'il 
accorde a la parole (celle de 1'auteur et la 
sienne) une fonction signifiante et que par 
consequent 1'anamorphose qu'il imprime a 
1'oeuvre (et a laquelle personne au monde n'a le 
pouvoir de se soustraire) est guidee par les 
contraintes formelles du sens: on ne fait pas du 
sens n'importe comment (si vous voulez, 
essayez): la sanction du critique, ce n'est pas 
le sens de l'oeuvre, c'est le sens de ce qu'il 
en dit.
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The formal constraint mentioned here is a logic of the 
signifier, which is in sharp contrast to the "delirium" 
which supposedly characterizes, at that time, new 
criticism, {again, Picard comes to mind as a major 
detractor) and more recently, deconstruction and post­
structuralism in general.
Furthermore, the form derived from the logic of the 
signifier takes on a special meaning for Barthes; it is 
created by difference, in Saussurian terms, and as such a 
unity or transcendental signified is not expected.
Looking ahead to Le Plaisir du texte. difference will 
translate easily into erotic terms as the space of the 
body where the garment gapes. Desire in this metaphor is 
manifested by absence, and this absence, in the textual 
trope of ellipsis, is as provocative in the text as it is 
in the theorization of the body. The thesis of Le Plaisir 
du texte is that the absence of the text or ellipsis 
produces desire, desire for the text as a fetish object. 
The desire for the text thus induced by the ellipsis 
produces the work of criticism. In turn the work of the 
critic is not to merely paraphrase what is already there, 
but rather to situate her/himself in the ellipsis. To use 
the Derridean framework, his desire for the text has 
produced a supplement. Following this argument, absence 
produces desire which in turn generates the supplement.
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Whatever is said of the work, Barthes tells us, "il y
reste toujours, comme a son premier moment, du langage, du
sujet, de l'absence."6
These absences or ellipses within the text provoke a
state of loss, which is one of the criteria for the "text
of bliss" described in Le Plaisir du texte. It is
appropriate here to elaborate on the distinction between
"text of pleasure" and "text of bliss" which is central to
the understanding of the later, supposedly hedonistic
work. Barthes explains:
Texte de plaisir: celui qui contente, emplit, 
donne de l'euphorie; celui qui vient de la 
culture, ne rompt pas avec elle, est lie a une 
pratique confortable de la lecture. Texte de 
jouissance: celui qui met en etat de perte, 
celui qui deconforte (peut-etre jusqu'a un 
certain ennui), fait vaciller les assises 
historiques, culturelles, psychologiques, du 
lecteur, la consistance de ses gouts, de ses 
valeurs, et de ses souvenirs, met en crise son 
rapport au langage.1
The S/Z schema of the readerly and the writerly text
erupts full force with these references to jouissance or
desire. The next question is how to read the writerly
(blissful) text. For an answer we can return to Critique
et verite. which states that the critic must distance
her/himself by moving into a state of irony in which
language is laid bare, thus creating the elliptic distance
or loss between the reader and the text. Irony is defined
as "la question posee au langage par le langage."8 This
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distance, which takes the form of loss or absence, as we 
discussed earlier, produces bliss, although it must be 
noted that "bliss" is not referred to in Critique et 
verite.
Before we are consumed by the erotic strategy in Le
Plaisir du texte. the last discourse presented in Critique
et verite needs to be explored. The final discourse is
that of the critic. S/he is defined as being a
commentator, a transmitter and "d'autre part, c'est un
operateur, il redistribue les elements de 1'oeuvre de
fagon a lui donner une certaine intelligence, c'est-a-dire
une certaine distance."9 The distance of the critic, who
is designated as a specialized reader as opposed to the
average reader, is reworked in sexual terms in Le Plaisir
du texte. The reader becomes a voyeur in her/his reading
of criticism:
Comment lire la critique? Un seul moyen: 
puisque je suis ici un lecteur au second degre, 
il me faut deplacer ma position: ce plaisir 
critique, au lieu d'accepter d'en etre le 
confident - moyen sur pour le manquer -, je puis 
m'en faire le voyeur: j'observe clandestinement 
le plaisir de 1'autre, j'entre dans la 
perversion; le commentaire devient alors a mes 
yeux un texte, une fiction, une enveloppe 
fissuree. Perversite de l'ecrivain (son plaisir 
d'ecrire est sans fonction), double et triple 
perversite du critique et de son lecteur, a 
1'infini.10
Thus we see that the central ideas have not changed 
so dramatically from one text to another, the absence
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described in Critique et verite has merely been reworked
into the voyeurism of Le Plaisir du texte. The act of
reading is more directly related to the play of desire in
the later text rather than the play of signifier and
signified which dominated the earlier text. In an article
entitled "Roland Barthes: The View from Here" Christopher
Norris takes up this matter. Although he does not discuss
desire specifically as I have done, he does note that the
central pair of signifier and signified has been displaced
by idiolect (or stereotyped language) and text. He quotes
Barthes who describes the text as "the region— airy,
light, spaced, open, uncentral, noble and free— where
writing spreads itself against the idiolect, as its limit
and fighting it."11
I would suggest that the displacement has not been
from signifier and signified to idiolect that Norris
documents but rather to signifers which in turn open the
system up to the play of desire. Near the end of Critique
et verite Barthes describes this process as follows:
Car du sens que la lecture donne a 1'oeuvre, 
comme du signifie, personne au monde ne sait 
rien, peut-etre parce que ce sens, etant le 
desir, s'etablit au-dela du code de la langue.
Seule la lecture aime 1'oeuvre, entretient avec 
elle un rapport de desir.12
Another concept touched upon in Critique et verite 
and fully developed in Le Plaisir du texte is that of the 
plurality of the text. The notion of plurality forces the
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reader to produce the text and thus to take the position
of the writer. The plural text is best described in s/z:
Dans ce texte ideal, les reseaux sont multiples 
et jouent entre eux, sans qu'aucun puisse 
coiffer les autres; ce texte est une galaxie de 
signifiants, non une structure de signifies; il 
n'a pas de commencement; il est reversible; on y 
accede par plusieurs entrees dont aucune ne peut 
etre a coup sur declaree principale; les codes 
qu'il mobilise se profilent a perte de vue, ils 
sont indecidables {le sens n'y est jamais soumis
a un principe de decision, sinon par coup de
des); de ce texte absolument pluriel, les 
systemes de sens peuvent s'emparer, mais leur 
nombre n'est jamais clos, ayant pour mesure 
1'infini du langage. 3
The notion of plurality is an intriguing one when 
viewed in terms of the reader/critic dichotomy. Barthes 
does not want to imply that either has access to an 
ultimate mastery of the text. He sees them on an equal 
footing trying to interpret codes which have no closure in 
the writerly text. He does however understand and analyze 
the tendency of both the critic and the reader to expect
closure. Isn't the nature of a code such that it strives
toward closure? The codes presented in S/z are plural, 
and yet they seem finite and often repetitious. As Ronald 
Bogue notes, the plural text notion has two faults. It 
reifies the text and it deifies the reader.14 Bogue's 
formulation is problematic, and thus it deserves further 
attention.
Bogue asks two pertinent questions which one must 
consider when reading Barthes: "How, then, can a text
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close interpretation— that is, enforce a mode of reading—  
unless that text is conceived as a fixed entity with a 
determinate meaning independent of any reader's 
interpretation of it?" and "How can a reader create an 
infinitely plural text without encompassing all codes 
himself."15
I would like to focus on what I see as a central 
misconception implied within Bogue's questions. I don't 
think Barthes is claiming that the "single" reader creates 
an infinitely plural text. The reader necessarily has a 
tendency to expect and crave closure. It is the idea of a 
"collective closure" that the writerly text is working 
against. Bogue continues his argument by saying that 
Barthes expects the reader to react as a god and that to 
produce the writerly text means to stand outside the codes 
and follow all meaning while privileging none. There are 
two alternatives: the reader may choose to stand outside 
the codes or s/he may decide to multiply the differences 
which the codes imply.
One way of understanding the non-closure of the codes 
is to view them in terms of absence, loss, or again, in 
erotic terms, as the gap in the garment. Christopher 
Norris explains the functioning of this absence in the 
text of s/z:
The text becomes a tissue of deceptive voices (a
'polyphony' as Barthes calls it, in one of his
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many musical allusions). It hints at an 
ultimate truth which can never be revealed, 
since the codes which promise to deliver it—  
depending as they do on logic, sequence, the 
'natural' outcome of events— are confronted with 
a paradox, a fundamental 'absence' to which the 
theme of castration inevitably leads them.16
In Le Plaisir du texte the trope of castration
changes to the trope of bliss but the sense of loss
operates just the same. As with castration, the text of
bliss imposes a state of loss; it is discomforting. All
"conventional" truths are called into question as the
reader's historical, cultural and psychological
assumptions are disrupted. Because of this difficulty,
Barthes discusses the text of bliss as the impossible
text. He states:
"Ce texte est hors-plaisir, hors-critique, sauf 
a etre atteint par un autre texte de jouissance: 
vous ne pouvez parler "sur" un tel texte, vous 
pouvez seulement parler "en" lui, a sa maniere, 
entrer dans un plagiat eperdu, affirmer 
hysteriquement le vide de jouissance (et non 
plus repeter obsessionnellement la lettre du 
plaisir)."*7
Thus, the reader is either in the position of voyeur, a 
state described earlier, or s/he attempts to become one 
with the texts in order to speak "in/with" them. This 
seems logical because the shift from a readerly to a 
writerly text gives the subject back to the reader and 
vice versa; s/he thus becomes part of the production of 
the texts.
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The reader becomes the subject and the author the
other in what is a sexual relationship in Le Plaisir du
texte. In that sexual relationship the text functions as
a fetish object which mediates the relation between the
two. Barthes elaborates:
Le texte est un objet fetiche et ce fetiche me 
desire. Le texte me choisit, par toute une 
disposition d'ecrans invisibles, de chicanes 
selectives: le vocabulaire, les references, la 
lisibilite, etc; et, perdu au milieu du texte 
(non pas derriere lui a la fagon d'un dieu de 
machineries, il y a toujours l'autre,
1'auteur. °
The problem with this type of relationship, is that, as in 
a sexual relationship, the rest of the world disrupts the 
transcendent state. Cultural constructs destroy the 
sexual relationship making it less than pure. How is this 
purity achieved on the level of the text? Barthes has an 
answer to this essential question but his response is 
problematic. In a strange circular motion the text is 
returned to "un nouvel etat philosophal de la matiere 
langagiere" which Barthes defines as follows: "cet etat 
inoui, ce metal incandescent, hors origine et hors 
communication, c'est alors du langage, et non un langage, 
fut-il decroche, mime, ironise."19
This statement appears to describe an extension of 
the structuralist plea for a return to language as the 
ultimate meaning of the text which would involve a triumph 
of the signifier over the signified. However, Barthes
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cannot get away from the idiolect completely. He 
explains: "Le texte a besoin de son ombre: cette ombre,
c'est un peu d'ideologie, un peu de representation, un peu
de sujet: fantomes, poches, traines, nuages necessaires
n20
These shadows, while attempting to close down the 
text, i.e., infiltrate the purity with a cultural 
construct, function as a means of elaborating on the texts 
in the form of intertexts. Barthes defines the intertext 
as "1'impossibility de vivre hors du texte infini,"21 
thus what seems to close down the text with the weight of 
the shadows actually opens it up at the same time. This 
structure is reminiscent of Derrida's notion of il n'y a 
pas de hors texte as well as his idea of the trace, a 
haunting differance which liberates the text.
A second parallel opposition not fully comprehensible 
unless one employs the Derridean non-binary logic is the 
one established between the effect of the new and the 
repetitive on the production of bliss. On one hand, bliss 
is only produced by the new, and on the other hand, bliss 
is created by repetition. And in homage to non-binary 
logic, on the third hand, the reader of this particular 
passage must simply accept the concepts with a certain 
irony.
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The obvious ironic tone is another rhetorical feature 
shared with Derridean strategy. In terms of content, the 
parallels with deconstruction are evident in that the 
edges of the text, for example the epigraph or the 
preface, replace the center as the focal point of the 
text. As with spider analogy introduced earlier, the 
edges or periphery of the text is often more appealing 
than the center.
The classic text becomes caught up in the traditional 
codes such as closure and unity that form a grid which 
produces its narrative. The grid thus restrains the text. 
But, as Barthes describes in Le Plaisir du texte. the 
reader can make the grid mobile. For example, he jokes, 
when Zola is read slowly, "le livre vous tombera des 
mains."22 The implication is that if the reader does 
not create his own grid with an author such as Zola the 
result will be sleep and not pleasure. The interest comes 
in digressing from the normal path. One form of 
digression is to allow the reader to produce her/his own 
narrative in the space of the textual ellipsis.
Yet even after this extensive discussion, one can 
continue to ask what is the nature of the shift from the 
classic text to the text of bliss, or in the earlier terms 
of S/z from the readerly to the writerly text. I have 
described this movement as one towards textuality and
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eroticism through the figure of ellipsis and the metaphor
of the gap in the garment* Margaret Eberbach takes
another approach:
As the anatomical body is to the grammatical 
(classic) text, so the erotic body is to the 
erotic (modern) text. The grammar of the first 
is presented in the form of a language of 
languages. The eroticism of the second lies in
its playing on languages: no logic, no
exclusions, but rather it admits the
cohabitation of as many languages as it desires.
It liquidates all metalanguage.
Metalanguage is eliminated because what is created is a
trace, the shadows, which are not systematized, but
personalized and eroticized through a deliberate effort to
avoid closure. Barthes' new philosophic state of language
as matter itself in which the text is the production of
this matter is extended to the reader's interpretation.
In effect, the reader resists the tyranny of a
metalanguage. Barthes describes his procedure for
avoiding such limitations. Again, following Derridean
discourse, he is at once inside and outside the system:
. . . j'etais moi-meme un lieu public, un souk; 
en moi passaient les mots, les menus syntagmes, 
les bouts de formules, et aucune phrase ne se 
formait, comme si c'eut ete la loi de ce 
langage—la. Cette parole a la fois tres 
culturelle et tres sauvage etait surtout 
lexicale, sporadique; elle constituait en moi, a 
travers son flux apparent, un discontinu 
definitif: cette non-phrase n'etait pas du tout 
quelque chose qui n'aurait pas eu la puissance 
d'acceder a la phrase, qui aurait ete avant la 
phrase; c'etait: ce qui est eternellement, 
superbement, hors de la phrase.24
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"Cultural, savage and discontinuous"— that is a good 
description of the technique used in Le Plaisir du texte. 
The fragmentation evident in this later text as opposed to 
the earlier continuous logical progression of Critique et 
verite is not an indication that the ideas presented are 
not continuous. While the tone has indeed changed from 
the earlier text to the later one, the proposal remains 
the same, both texts adhere to one "truth," the truth of 
writing itself.
The last line of Critique et verite is a reflection 
which remains constant throughout Barthes' works. He 
states: "La critique n'est qu'un moment de cette histoire 
dans laquelle nous entrons et qui nous conduit a 1'unite - 
a la verite de 1'ecriture.1,25
Both Critique et verite and Le Plaisir du texte are 
committed to a plurality of meanings and an ultimate truth 
of writing as a process rather than a product, in which 
the shadows are often more important than their source, 
and the gap in the garment is more erotic than the actual 
body.
However, I am not suggesting that Barthes' ideas have 
not been modified over the years, but rather that his 
thought does not reflect a linear progression from the 
earlier works to the later works. Moving from his 
thoughts on writing to his thoughts on the photographic
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image, this lack of a linear progression becomes obvious.
I shall continue with an analysis of the photographic 
image. Barthes' ideas are expressed in the first three 
essays of L'Obvie et l'obtus and in La Chambre claire. Of 
the three essays this analysis will concentrate on 
"Rhetorique de 1'image" written in 1964. This essay 
provides the guidelines for a semiological analysis of the 
image. When it is juxtaposed with La Chambre claire. 
written in 1980, it becomes obvious how Barthes' ideas, 
have been reformatted from his supposed structuralist days 
to his more experimental entry into poststructuralism. As 
I emphasized in the discussion of writing in Barthes, the 
process always supersedes the product; in the case of the 
image, the referent is seemingly so immediate that Barthes 
is tempted to posit an essence but he quickly recants when 
he realizes the impossibility of capturing an essence even 
when the referent is "real” as he assumes it to be in 
photography.
In order to analyze the photographic image, Barthes 
begins by breaking it down into three parts: the 
linguistic message and the iconic, which is further 
divided into the denoted image, and the connoted image.
The linguistic message has two functions, anchorage and 
relay. These functions keep the reader/viewer from being 
bombarded by the "floating chain of signifieds" which make
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up the polysemic image. Barthes explains: "Ainsi se 
developpent dans toute societe des techniques diverses 
destinees a fixer la chaine flottante des signifies, de 
fagon a combattre la terreur des signes incertains: le 
message linguistique est l'une de ces techniques."26
The literal message, in the form of a title, caption, 
or the like, anchors the possible (denoted) meanings of 
the object through the use of language. The language 
helps to ground the reader. It keeps her/him from 
floating in a sea of possible interpretations. Thus 
Barthes makes the point that it is not appropriate to talk 
of a civilization of the image, since we are still "une 
civilisation de l'ecriture, parce que l'ecriture et la 
parole sont toujours des termes pleins de la structure 
informationnelle.1,27
The second function, relay, occurs when text and 
image are in a complementary relationship. This procedure 
becomes important in film, a medium Barthes does not 
discuss in detail and one which will not enter into this 
particular argument about his ideas on the photographic 
image.
Before attempting to describe Barthes' binary of 
denotation and connotation, a major premise must be 
mentioned. The photographic image has a special status as 
a message without a code which constitutes its
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classification as a photographic paradox defined as
follows by Barthes:
Le paradoxe photographique, ce serait alors la 
coexistence de deux messages, l'un sans code (ce 
serait 1'analogue photographique) et 1'autre a 
code (ce serait l""art", ou le traitement, ou 
1'"ecriture", ou la rhetorique de la 
photographie); structurellement, le paradoxe 
n'est evidemment pas la collusion d'un message 
denote et d'un message connote: c'est la le 
statut probablement fatal de toutes les 
communications de masse: c'est que le message 
connote (ou code) se developpe ici a partir d'un 
message sans code. 8
The main import of this passage is that the relationship 
between the image and reality is not arbitrary as it is in 
literature, but rather analogous due to the resemblance 
between the referent and the image. The image is not the 
reality but it is the perfect "analogon" and the denoted 
message, often expressed as the literal message is the 
analogon itself.
The preceding ideas are expressed in the essay 
entitled "Le message photographique"(1961). The leap from 
these ideas to those expressed in La Chambre claire is 
problematic. The gap thus produced is mitigated by 
another essay on the photographic image entitled "Le 
troisieme sens"(1970). In it, the entire post­
structuralist movement is foreshadowed:
Cet accent (dont on a dit la nature a la fois 
emphatique et elliptique) ne va pas dans le sens 
du sens (comme le fait l'hysterie), il ne 
theatralise pas . . . il ne marque meme pas un 
ailleurs du sens (un autre contenu, ajoute au
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sens obvie), mais le dejoue - subvertit non le 
contenu mais la pratique tout entiere du sens. 
Nouvelle pratique, rare, affirmee contre une 
pratique majoritaire (celle de la 
signification), le sens obtus apparait 
fatalement comme un luxe, une depense sans 
echange; ce luxe n'appartient pas encore a la 
politique d'aujourd'hui. mais cependant deja a 
la politique de demain. 9
The obtuse meaning in this essay is very close to the
punctum of La Chambre claire. It is described as follows:
Enfin le sens obtus peut etre vu comme un 
accent, la forme meme d'une emergence, d'un pli 
(voire d'un faux pli), dont est marquee la 
lourde nappe des informations et des 
significations. S'il pouvait etre decrit 
(contradiction dans les termes), il aurait 
l'etre meme du haiku japonais: geste anaphorique 
sans contenu significatif, sorte de balafre dont 
est raye le sens (l'envie de sens) . . .30
The movement away from a fixed meaning and toward the
realm of the "empty sign" is continued in detail in
L'Empire des sianes.31 Barthes' study of Japanese
culture, which appeared in the same year as this essay,
1970.
Another characteristic of the obtuse meaning which
defines the photographic image in general is the play of
presence and absence. The photograph establishes the idea
of death implied as a new space-time category:
... car le type de conscience qu'elle (la 
photographie) implique est veritablement sans 
precedent; la photographie installe, en effet, 
non pas une conscience de 1•etre-la de la chose 
(que toute copie pourrait provoquer), mais une 
conscience de 1'avoir~ete-la.32
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This play of presence and absence haunts the reader of La 
Chambre claire. which we shall now discuss in detail with 
regard to the photographic image, since as we know from 
the previous chapter on autobiography, the Winter Garden 
photograph of Barthes7 mother on which the discussion 
comes to be centered is not reproduced in the text.
Instead the reader is asked to imagine the photo as the 
reader of the writerly text is asked to change from 
consumer to producer of the text. Another explanation of 
the absence of this crucial photo is given by Stephen 
Ungar, who returns to S/Z for a theoretical explanation of 
the missing photo. He views its absence as a tactical 
move: "Fully consistent with the confessional strategy
used to articulate the note in fragmentary form, the 
unrevealed truth of the photo also functions dynamically 
to prolong the narration by the very kind of unresolved 
question Barthes describes in S/Z as the hermeneutic 
code.1,33
I would agree with Ungar's use of S/Z as the 
theoretical basis for La Chambre claire. In the 
traditional way of categorizing Barthes' texts, La Chambre 
claire is said to be one of the main texts in the 
poststructuralist period. Following this logic, S/Z is 
the appropriate theoretical tool to use since it is said 
to mark the turning point for Barthes from structuralism
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to poststructuralism. However, as I have tried to point
out, many of the "new" ideas presented in S/Z are merely
rewritings of his "old" arguments in more sophisticated
terms. What does change radically, as has been mentioned,
is the form or style used. As Ungar tells us:
Since 1973 the orientation of Barthes' final 
writings no longer extends the structural 
narratives of the mid-1960s, but moves instead 
toward self-analysis with debts on one side to 
Gide and Proust and on the other to Freud and 
Lacan.34
He views La Chambre claire as an example of such self- 
analysis .
The fragmented style used complements the
psychoanalytic mode which involves an excursion into the
self. In his Lecon Barthes describes this process, which
he suggests for both writing and teaching:
Et je me persuade de plus en plus, soit en 
ecrivant, soit en enseignant, que 1'operation 
fondamentale de cette methode de deprise, c'est, 
si 1'on ecrit, la fragmentation, et, si l'on 
expose, la digression, ou, pour le dire d'un mot 
precieusement ambigu: 1'excursion.35
Due in part to this loosening method, the terms to be
defined become less dogmatic. Hence, if we return to the
pairs used to describe the image, denotation and
connotation, we find that they slide into studium and
punctum, respectively, as the form of the essay changes
from the tightness of the structural analysis to the
fragmented poststructuralist endeavor. The latter borders
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on fiction and it is often said that the second part of La 
Chambre claire constitutes Barthes' novel, one fashioned 
after Proust. Much of Barthes' later work has a 
novelistic approach. He begins his autobiography, which 
we discussed in the preceding chapter, with the following 
inscription: "Tout ceci doit etre considere comme dit par
un personnage de roman."36
The first part of La Chambre claire is referred to as 
an ode, but it has less of a poetic quality than the 
second part which Barthes calls his palinode. Part one 
consists of a series of lists about the image, which gives 
it a rather phenomenological flavor. The triad of 
participants in the process of photography includes the 
operator (photographer), the spectator (viewer) and the 
spectrum (referent).
Operator and spectator are fairly common terms. 
Spectrum as a term for referent is of more importance. 
Barthes explains: ". . . ce mot garde a travers sa racine 
un rapport au "spectacle" et y ajoute cette chose un peu 
terrible qu'il y a dans toute photographie: le retour du 
mort."3  ̂ The idea of death is highly developed in this 
essay whereas it was merely intimated in "Le Rhetorique de 
1'image" which introduced the phrase "avoir-ete-la."
The photograph offers the opportunity for the subject 
to become object (a movement which will be discussed in
119
detail in the following chapter on desire), or in more
dramatic terms, for the "Tout-Image" to become "la Mort en
personne."38 The process involves a vision of death:
Imaginairement, la Photographie (celle dont j'ai 
1'intention) represente ce moment tres subtil 
ou, a vrai dire, je ne suis ni un sujet ni un 
objet, mais plutot un sujet qui se sent devenir 
objet: je vis alors une micro-experience de la 
mort (de la parenthese): je deviens vraiment 
spectre.39
Although he later returns to Death as the eidos of 
the photographic image, at this point he does not posit it 
as the essence he searches for, nor does he admit the 
existence of such an essence. The paradox is clear:
"d'une part l'envie de pouvoir enfin nommer une essence de 
la Photographie, et done d'esquisser le mouvement d'une 
science eidetique de la Photo; et d'autre part le 
sentiment intraitable que la Photographie n'est 
essentiellement, si l'on peut dire (contradiction dans les 
termes), que contingence, singularity, aventure . . ,"40 
On one hand, the use of the word "essence" is odd in 
this poststructuralist context, in fact, the definition of 
the paradox parallels one of the problems with the 
movement from structuralism to poststructuralism. On the 
other hand, as 1 have suggested, Barthes posits the text 
as a phenomenological inquiry, hence the references to 
essences (eidos, noeme).
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The analysis continues with the binary of stadium and
punctum. The studium allows the spectator to say "I like,
1 don't like;" it is linked with the photographer's
intentions and the cultural value system. The punctum is
of more interest and although the definition is sporadic
and progressive, the following passage merits
reproduction:
Le second element vient casser (ou scander) le 
studium. Cette fois, ce n'est pas moi qui vais 
le chercher (comme j'investis de ma conscience 
souveraine le champ du studium), c'est lui qui 
part de la scene, comme une fleche, et vient me 
percer. Un mot existe en latin pour designer 
cette blessure, cette piqure, cette marque faite 
par un instrument pointu; ce mot m'irait 
d'autant mieux qu'il renvoie aussi a l'idee de 
ponctuation et que les photos dont je parle sont 
en effet ponctuees . . . Ce second element qui 
vient deranger le studium, je l'appellerai done 
punctum; car punctum, c'est aussi: piqure, petit 
trou, petite tache, petite coupure - et aussi 
coup de des. Le punctum d'une photo, c'est ce 
hasard qui, en elle, me point (mais aussi me 
meurtit, me poigne).41
Barthes leaves the application of this over—charged 
definition to the imagination of the reader. Connotations 
abound; "a cast of the dice" is reminiscent of the 
Mallarme poem, or of the gaming which I am constantly 
trying to insert into the poststructuralist schema. The 
arrow which pierces could be interpreted as Cupid's 
instrument since the absence/presence dynamic of the 
punctum closely parallels that of desire as we shall see 
in the following chapter. Barthes does not explain this
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elaborate poetry, rather, he illustrates it with the 
example of the Winter Garden Photograph which we discussed 
previously, and to which we shall shortly return.
The punctum is the means through which desire 
functions in the photograph; desire that is always already 
there but still remains a supplement because it goes 
beyond the self. Barthes seems to emphasize the necessary 
connection between eroticism and desire when he writes 
about the erotic photograph: "Le punctum est alors une
sorte de hors-champ subtil, comme si 1'image langait le 
desir au-dela de ce qu'elle donne a voir: pas seulement 
vers "le reste" de la nudite, pas seulement vers le 
fantasme d'une pratique, mais vers 1'excellence absolue 
d'un etre, ame et corps meles."42 The photograph 
Barthes uses to make this point about the nature of desire 
is Robert Mapplethorpe's "Young man with arm extended." 
Even though the eroticism escapes me, it serves to make 
the point that desire is never anything other than 
ambiguous.
In La Chambre claire these problematic references to 
desire inspire the "fiction" of the second part of the 
text, Barthes' recantation, his palinode. Another 
ambiguity arises: what is he recanting? Alec McHoul and 
David Wills offer the following response:
Recant on what? In practice this recanting will
explain itself in terms of a search for the lost
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essence of his dead mother in a particular 
photograph, and in terms of understanding that 
essence, that truth, to be equivalent to the one 
discovered through a more disinterested 
approach, a discovery which was in fact 
published in Communications in 1964 as 
"Rhetorique de 1'image," in the same volume as 
"Elements de semiologie.1,43
McHoul and Wills are referring to the structure of death
that is identified in photography in the earlier essay and
which gets reworked through the Winter Garden image. With
reference to the essay "Rhetorique de 1'image" there must
now be more to the punctum presented in La Chambre claire
than the basic idea presented early on that the importance
of the referent lies in its personal connotations for the
viewer. Nonetheless, the acceptance of this "basic idea"
is tempting, since the second part of the work borders on
"pure" subjectivity. But this subjectivity, far from
being simplistic, serves as the punctum for the reader who
is pierced by its intensity. It also has other than
purely romantic origins as Steven Ungar points out:
. . . the pendulum swing away from the object of 
critical activity toward the subject is itself a 
remainder of sorts, a holdover from the 
subject/object associated with the structures of 
intentionality and a phenomenological tradition 
Barthes acknowledges by dedicating La Chambre 
claire to Sartre's 1940 study on 
imagination.1,44
It must be noted that the question of a romanticism of the
subjective in La Chambre claire is a complex one which
necessitates careful argumentation, argumentation which,
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if conducted in the service of valorizing his self- 
indulgent side, is quickly discredited by the post­
structuralist move of not presenting the Winter Garden 
Photograph.
However, I do think that the debt to the 
phenomenological tradition is less visible than the debt 
to the romantic tradition. Barthes acknowledges the 
latter, albeit in very vague terms: "J'avais compris
qu'il fallait desormais interroger 1'evidence de la 
Photographie, non du point de vue du plaisir, mais par 
rapport a ce qu'on appellerait romantiquement 1'amour et 
la mort."45
Returning to the text itself, in the final passages, 
swept away by what can only be romantic notions of love 
and death upon viewing the Winter Garden Photograph, the 
poet, for that is what Barthes has become in this second 
part of the work, is at a loss for words: " . . .  enfin la
Photographie du Jardin d'Hiver, ou je fais bien plus que 
la reconnaitre (mot trop gros): ou je retrouve: eveil 
brusque, hors de la "ressemblance," satori ou les mots 
defaillent, evidence rare, peut-etre unique du "Ainsi, 
oui, ainsi, et rien de plus."
To remain true to the fiction Barthes should have 
stopped there. He did not, of course, for the analyst in
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him forced a move back into the binary realm with this
last reflection:
Telles sont les deux voies de la Photographie.
A moi de choisir, de soumettre son spectacle au 
code civilise des illusions parfaites, ou 
d'affronter en elle le reveil de 1'intraitable 
realite.*®
Barthes is caught in an ellipse of styles and ideas. 
He fluctuates between the plurality of meanings advocated 
by poststructuralism and the Sartrian quest for essence, 
which implies a certain regression to a romantic 
subjectivity. There is no linear progression from the 
earlier works to the later ones.
One gets the feeling that Barthes wants desperately 
to break out of his Cartesian background of signs and 
systems, just as Sartre constantly tries to disavow his 
bourgeois upbringing. Essences appeal to Barthes, and yet 
the punctum of the Winter Garden Photograph is not a 
universal essence, but rather a personal reflection like 
those found in his autobiography, fragmented and 
unencumbered by the structuralist demands for systematic 
thought. Furthermore, due to the absence of the 
photograph the reader is left with an elliptic view of the 
situation, one that s/he can not possibly relate to except 
in an objective context unlike the subjectivity that 
Barthes describes in relation to his mother. In the terms
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he has set up, she can only interest the reader in terms
of the studium. He explains the absence:
(Je ne puis montrer la Photo du Jardin d'Hiver.
Elle n'existe que pour moi. Pour vous, elle ne 
serait rien d'autre qu'une photo indifferente, 
l'une des mille manifestations du "quelconque"; 
elle ne peut en rien constituer 1'objet visible 
d /une science; elle ne peut fonder une 
objectivite, au sens positif du terme; tout au 
plus interesserait-elle votre studium: epoque, 
vetements, photogenie; mais en elle, pour vous, 
aucune blessure.)47
And all of that is presented in parentheses, which serve
to separate the passage from the main text as if the very
memory of his mother has now become marginal and relegated
to a secondary position or secreted and protected from the
reader.
However, if this text is read in a deconstructive 
mode, which, as I have suggested, focuses on the 
undecidability of the text, the aspects in the shadows or 
textual ellipses, the absence of the Winter Garden 
photograph dominates the writing, and moves the text into 
the poststructural realm where I am asserting the texts of 
Barthes have always already belonged.
Finally, the analyses presented on both the image and 
the text in the works of Barthes have pointed to parallels 
with Derridean deconstruction in an effort to justify my 
contention that the views of Barthes and Derrida often 
coincide although their styles and tones are obviously 
quite different. The emphasis on the inside/outside
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dynamic, absence, and the margins of a text or context are 
major points of intersection in the work of these two 
writers. These points of contact take the form of a 
chiasmus, a textual device which will play a significant 
role in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER IV: ELLIPSIS 
In Fragments Roland Barthes has presented a 
simulation of the lover subject in discourse. In doing 
so, he has constructed a discourse whose figures (scenes) 
"ne peuvent se ranger: s'ordonner, cheminer, concourir a 
une fin (a un etablissement): il n'y a pas de premieres ni 
de dernieres."1 Along with this lack of classification, 
Barthes has created a new definition of the figure. It is 
not to be understood in the conventional rhetorical sense 
"mais plutot au sens gymnastique ou choregraphique."2 
Thus, the figures are to be seen as bodies in movement 
which constitute a process and not a static unity.
The policy of not forcing a unity is central to 
Fragments. In order to discourage any attempts by the 
reader to find a cohesive narrative or "love story" in the 
text, Barthes has arranged the figures alphabetically to 
indicate the arbitrary nature of the love relation. In an 
interview reprinted in Le Grain de la voix he explains his 
reasoning:
J'ai respecte le discontinu radical de cette 
tourmente de langage qui deferle dans la tete 
amoureuse, C'est pourquoi j'ai decoupe 
1'ensemble en fragments et mis ceux-ci dans un 
ordre alphabetigue. Je ne voulais a aucun prix 
que ga ressemble a une histoire d'amour.
The avoidance of the traditional narrative form gives the
lover the freedom to construct the discourse of the other,
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as the reader is given the freedom to construct or 
(re)construct the text.
Since there is no beginning, middle or end to the 
discourse of the lover, I have chosen as a starting point 
the last figure in the text entitled "vouloir—saisir."
This particular figure is important because the analogy it 
describes represents the lover who is reacting to the 
amorous situation in the absence of the "beloved object" 
as Barthes has termed the other. in the quote that 
follows the desired object is likened to a wine one cannot 
drink:
Accent mystique: "Vin le meilleur et le plus 
delectable, comme aussi le plus enivrant [...] 
duquel, sans y boire, l'ame aneantie est 
enivree, ame libre et ivre! oublieuse, oubliee, 
ivre de ce qu'elle ne boit pas et ne boira 
jamais 1"4
The absence of the "beloved object," a term Barthes 
uses to avoid classification of the other according to 
gender, frees the lover subject and allows her/him to 
construct the other's discourse. This structure of 
absence in desire parallels that of the reader confronted 
with a text in which absence translates into the textual 
device of ellipsis. There is a desire to possess that 
which is inaccessible as textual signifier, to attain and 
obtain that which the text keeps to itself. In his 
autobiography Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes he 
comments on the use of ellipsis:
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Quelqu'un l'interroge: "Vous avez ecrit que 
1'ecriture passe par le corps: pouvez-vous vous 
expliquer?" Il s'apergoit alors combien de tels 
enonces, si clairs pour lui, sont obscurs pour 
beaucoup. Pourtant, la phrase n'est pas 
insensee, mais seulement elliptique: c'est 
1'ellipse qui n'est pas supportee. A quoi 
s'ajoute ici, peut-etre, une resistance moins 
formelle: 1'opinion publique a une conception 
reduite du corps: c'est toujours, semble-t-il, 
ce qui s'oppose a l'ame: toute extension un peu 
metonymique du corps est tabou.5
The problem with ellipsis is thus that it threatens
the reader since there is always the undecidable element
of being situated within the gap in the writing.
Furthermore, in this particular quote Barthes implies that
the conventional view opposes body to soul using the
binary logic in which we, as readers, are imprisoned. Any
attempt to equate the body with anything but its opposite
implies a freedom that is threatening due to the fact that
this liberty lies outside the realm of convention and
therefore less accessible or acceptable. Barthes
deconstructs the binary of body/soul in order to arrive at
a process of displacement in which ellipsis creates a new
form of writing which is dependent on the body as the mana
word. Again, in his "autobiography" we read:
Dans le lexique d'un auteur, ne faut-il pas
qu'il y ait toujours un mot-mana, un mot dont la
signification ardente, multiforme, insaisissable 
et comme sacre, donne 1'illusion que par ce mot 
on peut repondre a tout? Ce mot n'est ni 
excentrique ni central; il est immobile et 
porte, en derive, jamais case, toujours atopique 
(echappant a toute topique), a la fois reste et 
supplement, signifiant occupant la place de tout
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signifie. Ce mot est apparu dans son oeuvre peu 
a peu; il a d'abord ete masque par 1'instance de
la Verite (celle de l'Histoire, ensuite par
celle de la Validite (celle des systemes et des 
structures); maintenant, il s'epanouit; ce mot- 
mana, c'est le mot corps.6
Through this manifestation of displacement which is 
articulated in the ellipsis, the lover's discourse is 
affirmed rather than analyzed. The use of ellipsis 
eliminates the possibility of a fixed meaning or 
transcendental signified which would explain or complete
the text since the metonymic sequence formed by the
elliptical structure is in the form of a series of 
supplements (as is the mana word, body) rather than a 
metaphor. The use of ellipsis allows the reader to form 
her/his own text in the absences which are necessarily 
left by the author who has relinquished control of the 
text, in a similar way to that in which the lover can 
possess the beloved object only as an absence. In writing 
the body Barthes necessarily writes a text structured by 
the gaps and absences that characterize desire. This 
structure of desire, which is articulated through 
functions of absence, is central to Lacan's thought. His 
ideas, in particular the concept of the Imaginary as it 
relates to Barthes' work, will be discussed in some detail 
as this chapter progresses.
The poststructuralist production of a text, rather 
than its traditional consumption, is a process which
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brings about pleasure. In this production of pleasure
writing serves as a site of pleasure as does the body.
The pleasure is not derived from a goal in mind, such as
procreation in love, or truth in writing but rather from
the act itself. Admittedly, orgasm may be considered a
goal in the act of love, although the pleasure is often
derived from its deferral. Despite the fact that both
situations, writing and love-making often involve more
complex situations and reactions, in theory, the writer
and the lover concentrate on the process rather than the
outcome. Barthes extends this analogy even further when
he advocates the acceptance of a plurality in love that
parallels the plurality of writing. This does not
necessarily indicate multiple lovers, but rather a
plurality of approaches to love, in which the binary of
man/woman is reconsidered. He writes:
Qui sait si cette insistance du pluriel n'est 
pas une maniere de nier la dualite sexuelle? II 
ne faut pas que 1'opposition des sexes soit une 
loi de Nature; il faut done dissoudre les 
affrontements et les paradigmes, pluraliser a la 
fois les sens et les sexes: le sens ira vers sa 
multiplication, sa dispersion (dans la theorie 
du Texte), et le sexe ne sera pas pris dans 
aucune typologie (il n'y aura, par exemple, que 
des homosexualites, dont le pluriel dejouera 
tout discours constitue, centre, au point gu'il 
lui apparait presque inutile d'en parler).'
As we have seen the use of ellipsis moves the 
emphasis away from the customary "constituted, centered"
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discourse; in other words, the narrative form is
deconstructed through the use of these rhetorical tools.
An interesting parallel here is Derrida's development of
the gender question summarized in "Choreographies" an
interview conducted by Christie McDonald. In this
interview, two sexually marked terms, hymen and double
invagination, are examined and the result is the same
vision of pluralities of sexual possibilities which
deconstructs the man/woman binary. As ellipsis symbolizes
a return to the body through the figure of the "gap in the
garment" thus eroticizing the process of writing, Derrida
uses sexually charged terms which he insists are not only
limited to women but fall into the general category of
undecidability. He writes in response to Christie
McDonald's questioning of the terms:
. . . "hymen" and "invagination," at least in 
the context which these words have been swept, 
no longer simply designate figures for the 
feminine body. They no longer do so, that is, 
assuming that one knows for certain what a 
feminine or masculine body is, and assuming that 
anatomy is in this instance the final recourse.
What remains undecidable concerns not only but 
also the line of cleavage between the two sexes.
. . . One could say quite accurately that the 
hymen does not exist. Anything constituting the 
value of existence is foreign to the "hymen."
. . . How can one then attribute the existence
of the hymen properly to woman? Not that it is 
any more the distinguishing feature of man, or 
for that matter, of the human creature. I would 
say the same for the term "invagination" which 
has, moreover, always been inscribed in a 
chiasmus, one doubly folded, redoubled and 
inversed, etc. From then on, is it not
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difficult to recognize in the movement of this 
term a "representation of woman"?8
However, the relationship thus created is not an asexual 
one but rather one which admits the multiplicity of 
sexually marked voices. Derrida states: "I would like to 
believe in the masses, this indeterminable number of 
blended voices, this mobile of non-identified sexual marks 
whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of 
each 'individual,' whether he be classified as 'man' or as 
'woman' according to the criteria of usage."9
The choreographies that Derrida speaks of are 
parallel to the figures which Barthes has created in 
Fragments. They are a series of fragmented bodies moving 
in an elliptical fashion through the dance of desire, 
which classifies the gender as undecidable. The question 
of Derrida and gender will be discussed at length in the 
last chapter on writing the body as the chiasmus of 
deconstruction and feminism. At this point, it is 
important to keep in mind the intersecting constructions 
of gender and writing between the two authors.
Returning to the more specific case of Fragments. I 
do not assume that because Barthes has written a non­
narrative text, he necessarily excludes all 
systematization of the lover's discourse. He includes 
many allusions to the various "authorities" in his text. 
However he does not privilege them. By placing their
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names in the margins along with the initials of friends he 
minimizes their authority and questions their "truths." In 
the same way that he is affirming, or acknowledging the 
lover's discourse, he is acknowledging the contributions 
of others to the discourse and allowing the reader to make 
her/his own choices. The inclusion of the -knowledge of 
the supposed masters in the main body of the text is not 
condemned, it is merely not considered as very useful, the 
implication being that there are no masters of the lover's 
discourse, merely players in the game of desire. Barthes 
explains:
Aujourd'hui, cependant, de 1'amour il n'y a nul 
systeme: et les quelques systemes qui entourent 
l'amoureux contemporain ne lui font aucune place 
(sinon devaluee): il a beau se tourner vers tel 
ou tel des langages regus, nul ne lui repond, 
sinon pour le detourner de ce qu'il aime.10
The three systems of thought that he targets here as not
being adequate for the lover's discourse are Christianity,
psychoanalysis and Marxism. Christianity and Marxism are
rapidly dismissed as being too constrictive, while the
psychoanalytic discourse will be appropriated in a very
liberal fashion to accommodate the needs of the lover.
The most common source of information in Fragments is
Goethe's Werther. which serves as a prototype of romantic
love. Other sources of information are not restricted to
one particular text. They include the writings of Plato,
psychoanalysis, Zen, German lieder, conversations with
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friends and anecdotes from Barthes' life. Of the various 
systems he alludes to, the most useful one, as I mentioned 
before, is the psychoanalytic one, which he admits 
adequately describes the lover's state yet "1'engage a 
faire le deuil de son Imaginaire."11 This comment needs 
explanation, because the Imaginary, a Lacanian term we 
were introduced to in the chapter on autobiography, is a 
recurrent theme in the text. In fact the use of the term 
is so prominent that one commentator, Gregory Ulmer, has 
entitled his text on A Lover's Discourse "The Discourse of 
the Imaginary."
Stephen Heath, another of Barthes' commentators 
defines the Imaginary as follows: "the imaginary is a dual 
relation of I and my other, the other I put as my image 
for me: intrasubjectively, the narcissistic relation of 
subject to ego, the formation of the ideal ego; 
intersubjectively, the repetition of the relation of the 
mother, the fullness of the one relation which the 
symbolic as Other, interrupts."12
Barthes' discourse on the lover's state agrees with 
this definition in that the lover is a subject confronted 
with his own discourse due to the absence of the other.
He attempts (yet fails) to recreate the oneness he felt 
with the mother. The Imaginary, for Barthes, is filled 
with personal and cultural memories of childhood and
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youth, and as such it is presented as a positive entity.
As Ulmer suggests, by placing the discourse in the realm
of the mother, Barthes is attempting to subvert the "name
of the Father (the law) that is inherent in the Symbolic
order of language, to show how the Master's speech is
punctured, in other words, it "runs away from him" no
matter how he tries to take it down with the authority of
science or politics."1^
Barthes' intention is to devise a discourse that
agrees to practice the Imaginary. The problem is that the
discourse created does not function entirely in the
Imaginary since he is required to move it into the realm
of the Symbolic by writing it. He explains (with the help
of Frangois Wahl who is quoted in the margin of this
section of Fragments):
Ce que l'ecriture demande et que tout amoureux 
ne peut lui accorder sans dechirement, c'est de 
sacrifier un peu de son Imaginaire, et d'assurer 
ainsi a travers sa langue l'assomption d'un peu 
de reel. Tout ce que je pourrais produire, au 
mieux, c'est une ecriture de 1'Imaginaire de 
l'ecriture - me laisser travailler par ma 
langue, subir les injustices (les injures) 
qu'elle ne manquera pas d'infliger a la double 
Image de 1'amoureux et de son autre.14
As I am suggesting, it is precisely this power of
language that Barthes tries to counter with the textual
device of ellipsis. Through the use of this device the
power is displaced from the author, no longer in control
of the text, to the reader who assumes that control. The
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reader can thus agree to practice within the Imaginary as
Barthes has suggested, thus resisting the authoritarian
demands of the Symbolic. In this new form of reading, the
reader is no longer a passive consumer of the text, s/he
becomes a producer of the text. In S/z Barthes describes
the process as a metonymic labor of language in which
systems are coupled according to their plurality, not
their finite quality.15
As I have posited, this move from consumer of one
meaning or transcendental signified to producer of
meanings or signifiers, involves the relegation of the
author to a less powerful position as guest in the text.
The author no longer has control over the meaning of the
text and the reader is free to consult his/her own
Imaginary for an interpretation. The reader actively
participates in the production of the text, which Barthes
then considers to be a writerly rather than a readerly
text. He explains this new reading procedure as it
relates to Fragments:
Ce code, chacun peut le remplir au gre de sa 
propre histoire; maigre ou pas, il faut done que 
la figure soit la, que la place (la case) en 
soit reservee. C'est comme s'il y avait une 
Topique amoureuse, dont la figure fut un lieu 
(topos). Or, le propre d'une Topique, c'est 
d'etre un peu vide: une topique est par statut a 
moitie codee, a moitie projective (ou 
projective, parce que codee). Ce qu'on a pu 
dire ici de l'attente, de l'angoisse, du 
souvenir, n'est jamais qu'un supplement modeste, 
offert au lecteur pour qu'il s'en saisisse, y
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ajoute, en retranche et le passe a autres: 
autour de la figure, les joueurs font courlr le 
furet; parfois, par une derniere parenthese, on 
retient l'anneau une seconde encore avant de le 
transmettre. (Le livre, idealement, serait une 
cooperative: "Aux Lecteurs - aux Amoureux - 
Reunis.")16
As this quotation indicates, the text Barthes 
presents is meant to be a supplement to the reader's 
thoughts on love, not a centralized discourse of truth 
explaining the plight of the lover. As such the reader is 
free to construct her/his own discourse and consequently 
make her/his own allusions. We have already seen how the 
lover confronting the other parallels the reader 
confronting the text. It is also meant to be a game as 
the last sentence of this passage indicates; a game in 
which the players pass the handkerchief from one to the 
other in a frenetic endeavor.
Another parallel, and a supplement that I would like 
to add to the chain of supplements on this topic is that 
of the teacher confronted with a student. I mentioned 
this relationship in the preface, so I will not discuss it 
in detail at this point, but I do feel that it deserves 
further elaboration in terms of its connection with 
psychoanalytical discourse. Barthes explores this topic 
in his Inaugural Lecture to the College de France. In it 
he advocates a reversal of the psychoanalytic model of the 
analyst and patient in which the former is in the position
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of "the one who is supposed to know." He is thus 
rejecting the idea of objectivity which states that the 
scholarly article is merely reporting truths arrived at 
through research. Barthes clarifies the two choices 
available to the scholar as far as style is concerned; 1. 
a plain style which entails "clarity, suppression of 
images, respect for the laws of reasoning" (ecrivance) and 
2. the rhetorical, that is writing (ecriture): "to enter 
himself into the play of the signifier, into the infinity 
of the enunciation . . .  to withdraw the self, which 
protects but also deludes, in a word to throw the subject 
across the blank page, not to "express" it (nothing to do 
with subjectivity) but to disperse it: which is to break 
out of the regular discourse of research."17
The subject is no longer constituted in the 
discourse, it is dispersed. This process of writing that 
pluralizes the subject is expressed in Fragments to some 
extent but it is also repressed in that the subject in 
love is constantly trying to achieve an impossible unity 
with the "beloved object," which refers back to the unity 
with the mother achieved in the Imaginary. Far from 
trying to disperse his subjectivity he continues to 
construct it by attempting to incorporate the other into 
this ideal, though impossible union.
On the other hand, another interpretation of the 
relationship with the "beloved object" is that in seeking 
a union the lover is allowing her/his subjectivity to be 
dispersed into that of the other so that as a consequence 
the sense of self is lost. Thus we have two conflicting 
views on the position of the subject: s/he is confronted 
with either the loss of self resulting from the union or 
the constitution of self resulting from the union.
However, because the union does not occur, the lover is 
left in the position of fetishist, worshipping an object 
of desire which is always absent. Again we return to the 
trope of absence as a crucial determinant in the 
construction of the lover's discourse.
In Le Plaisir du texte Barthes explains that the 
writer, like the lover, is in the position of fetishist, a 
situation that is contrary to the accepted psychoanalytic 
practice of the sublimation of desire in work, in this 
case, writing. Ulmer describes Barthes' relation to his 
text as follows: "Barthes discovers (or reveals) that his 
desire to write is not a result of (normal) sublimation, 
in which the drives are desexualized and attached to 
socially approved practices, but that his writing is a 
practice of fetishism in which the erotic and the 
rhetorical are equally present."18
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As we have seen, absence creates the erotic for the
lover as ellipsis creates the erotic (the site of writing)
in the rhetorical. Both absence and ellipsis produce
a type of fetishism (a practice of perversion) in which
the "gap in the garment," "the appearance as
disappearance" and the blank page are erotic, and function
to fuel the imagination of the lover and writer in her/his
creation of the lover's discourse and the text.
Furthermore, following Barthesian reasoning, the
lover's discourse takes place within the maternal realm of
the Imaginary thus denying the power of the father in this
particular relation. The father is doubly denied in that
the subject in love is feminized. This idea is expressed
in one of the most important figures in Fragments
(important in terms of my argumentation on desire,
otherwise, I would hesitate to hierarchize the
choreographed figures) entitled "Absence." We are once
again confronted with the game of presence and absence in
which the subject is constituted by the absence of the
other, who ironically enough seems to have usurped the
power position from the subject. Barthes writes:
L'absence amoureuse va seulement dans un sens, 
et ne peut se dire qu'a partir de qui reste - et 
non de qui part: je, toujours present, ne se 
constitue qu'en face de toi, sans cesse absent.
Dire 1'absence, c'est d'emblee poser que la 
place du sujet et la place de 1'autre ne peuvent 
permuter: c'est dire: "Je suis moins aime que je 
n' aime.
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This figure of absence also denies any possibility of an 
ultimate union with the beloved other since the 
permutation of one into the other is an impossibility. We 
are reminded of the Lacanian dictum which insists that 
there is no sexual relation possible.
This figure continues with the observation that the 
one who waits is a feminized figure in the historical 
context of the term. The typical male/female binaries are 
evoked in this section; for example the woman is sedentary 
while the man is active; the woman is faithful while the 
man is constantly on the prowl; yet the outcome does not 
play into this phallocentric discourse. Barthes insists 
that the lover's discourse functions as a great leveler in 
this undecidable domain of male/female relations. He 
concludes:
II s'ensuit que dans tout homme qui parle 
1'absence de 1'autre, du feminin se declare: cet 
homme qui attend et qui en souffre, est 
miraculeusement feminise. Un homme n'est pas 
feminise parce qu'il est invert!, mais parce 
qu'il est amoureux.20
The lover's discourse, through this function of the one
who waits, moves outside the standard power structures
seen in phallocentric male/female relationships.
In Barthes' mind, the structure of absence is not
just feminizing but also a sign of the maternal which
serves to eroticize the relationship with the mother, a
common trope in his work. Childhood memories mingle with
the eroticism as he seems to conflate the lover's
discourse with that of the mother: "Enfant, je n'oubliais
pas: journees interminables, journees abandonnees, ou la
Mere travaillait loin; j'allais, le soir, attendre son
retour a 1'arret de 1'autobus Ubis, a Sevres-Babylone; les
autobus passaient plusieurs fois de suite, elle n'etait
dans aucun."21 Once again, we are confronted with the
impossibility of the unity with the mother that is the
desire of the Imaginary and which parallels the lover's
dilemma. As we discussed briefly in the preceding chapter
on the image, the culmination of this fetishistic
relationship with the mother occurs in La Chambre claire.
As Lawrence Kritzman describes it, the Winter Garden
"photo becomes the object of intense affective investment
that symbolically consecrates the union of mother and son
as the only Nature acceptable to the amorous subject."22
Furthermore, as is the case with Derrida, the relationship
with the mother necessarily activates reflection on the
subject's mortality. Barthes writes:
Elle morte, je n'avais plus aucune raison de 
m'accorder a la marche du Vivant superieur 
(l'espece). Ma particularite ne pourrait jamais 
plus s'universaliser {sinon, utopiquement, par 
l'ecriture, dont le projet, des lors, devait 
devenir l'unique but de ma vie). Je ne pouvais 
plus qu'attendre ma mort totale, 
indialectique.22
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As he indicates in this passage, it is once more writing 
(in a utopian situation) that displaces his nostalgia for 
the lost object of love.
Returning to our analysis of the figures in 
Fragments. complementing the figure of absence is the 
figure of waiting; both result in the hallucinated 
creation of the loved one or the acceptance of their 
absence or death. What strikes the lover in both 
instances is the non-reality of the beloved object. Again 
the structure parallels that of a primary relation to the 
mother, in this case in a metonymic move, to her breast: 
"Tel le sein de la mere pour le nourrisson, 'je le cree et 
je le recree sans cesse a partir du besoin que j'ai de 
lui': 1'autre vient la ou je 1'attends, la ou je l'ai deja 
cree. Et, s'il ne vient pas, je l'hallucine: l'attente 
est un delire.rt24
In a different formulation Barthes refers to the lost 
or dead beloved object in terms of the amputation of a 
limb. It is almost as if a prosthetic device has been 
installed to remind the subject of his lost love: " . . .  
je suis un mutile qui continue d'avoir mal a sa jambe 
amputee.1,25
The final paragraph of the waiting figure provides 
what is the best allegory for the structure of desire in 
that it is in the form of a fairy tale, thus the Imaginary
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of the infantile and fictive is evoked, and it emphasizes
the adage "it is not whether you win or lose but how you
play the game," in this case the game of desire:
Un mandarin etait amoureux d'une courtisane.
"Je serai a vous, dit-elle, lorsque vous aurez
passe cent nuits a m'attendre assis sur un 
tabouret, dans mon jardin, sous ma fenetre."
Mais, a la quatre-vingt-dix-neuvieme nuit, le 
mandarin se leva, prit son tabouret sous son 
bras et s'en alia. 6
As with the fetish object, the actual object is 
inconsequential, it is the process of fetishization that 
is important. In the above passage, the woman was merely 
a pretext for the process of waiting. When she became 
available, she was no longer desirable. This point is 
best expressed in an early article (1972) by Barthes on 
Erte, which was reprinted after Barthes' death in a volume 
entitled L'Obvie et l'obtus. in it, Barthes comments on 
how the law of gender determination produces the female 
body as writing in Erte's alphabet of costumed women.
Erte used pictures of women in various positions to 
imitate the forms of the letters of the alphabet. Again, 
the emphasis is not on the female body, but rather on the 
construction of the alphabet using her body, thus making 
her the object of semiotic play.
Writing the body has become a poststructuralist 
fetish; different authors play with this theme and the 
resulting texts often involve the use of various body
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parts, male and female. We mentioned Derrida's use of the 
hymen and the vagina during our discussion of his stance 
on the gender issue. In La Chambre claire Barthes was 
writing the body of his mother as an absence, an absence 
that created desire, in this case incestuous desire.
As I will develop in the following chapter, in 
general, the female body and the feminine writing which 
various woman writers have described, has been celebrated, 
not appropriated by the deconstructionists. Barthes has 
merely begun to explain this process in a move away from 
phallocentrism through the theorization of the female 
body, which is not meant to be exploitative.
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CHAPTER V: THE CHIASMUS OF FEMININE WRITING
Erte's use of the female body provides the necessary 
segue into our discussion of the chiasmus of feminine 
writing. It is my contention that in using the female 
body to form the various letters of the alphabet, Erte 
effectively desexualizes and degenders it. In fact, as 
far as most of the letters are concerned, it is hard to 
determine the gender of the figure. The feminine figure 
is in the mediatory position between the graphics and the 
symbolism involved as Barthes states: "Enracinee dans cet 
art, la lettre, detachee du son, ou du moins le 
soumettant, 1'incorporant a ses lignes, libere un 
symbolisme propre dont le corps feminin devient le 
mediateur."1 In what follows I would like to discuss the 
idea of the woman as a mediator in terms of her strategic 
importance in reconciling the often feuding theoretical 
camps of deconstruction and feminism. That debate is 
something of a corollary to that between psychoanalysis 
and deconstruction.
These interconnections, for example between Freudian 
psychoanalysis and Derridean deconstruction, might be 
understood visually in terms of the capital X. The 
capital letter, in the paradigm of the letter that I am 
constructing in this dissertation, when coupled with the 0 
works in association with the signature in love letters to
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connote love and kisses. The term and the configuration 
of the chiasmus is appropriate for the relation I am 
describing since it represents a non-oppositional 
intersection. To the extent that the XXOO signals a 
particularly intimate relation between the signatory and 
the addressee it almost can be said to form part of the 
signature or indeed at times to replace it completely thus 
putting the proper name under a literal and figurative 
erasure.
Due to computer restraints I am unable to form the X
as it should be represented, which is as the Greek letter
chi, an asymetric X with a tail on one side. The 
*rhetorical figure called the chiasmus, in which one part
of a sentence is "crossed over" by another part running in
the opposite direction, derives from the Greek letter.
Derrida draws on the unevenness of the chi to make the
chiasmus a more complex configuration. He explores
explores this configuration in La Verite en peinture an
important text which I do not have the space to analyze in
any detail at this junction. However I would like to
quote from an essay, "+ R", found in that text:
Croisement privilegie par tous les textes que 
j'ai vendus sous mon nom et que, pour les bonnes 
raisons que j'ai dites, je n'hesite plus a la 
surface, en bulles ou bandes legendaires. 'Nous 
sommes dans un chiasme inegal... Selon le X (le 
chiasme) (qu'on pourra toujours considerer, 
hativement, comme le dessin thematique de la 
dissemination), la preface, en tant que semen,
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peut aussi bien rester, produire et se perdre 
comme difference seminale que se laisser 
reapproprier dans la sublimite du pere.' Hors 
livre.
In a move akin to the configuration described by Derrida 
my purpose here is to relate an intersection of different 
discourses of these figurative and literal devices to the 
problematic of desire. As we have seen, the chi can be 
represented in three ways: graphically, rhetorically and 
as a figure for dissemination. A further graphic 
consideration would be my coupling of the X and 0 to 
represent the sexual act, which gives rise to the semen 
mentioned in the above quotation. The sexual act is then 
further described by the spinning of the dreidel which, as 
has already been explored, is portrayed graphically as an 
ellipsis with a constantly changing center, whose 
successive revolutions cross over one another, in which 
the delirious frenzy feeds the desire as the 
"dissemination’1 occurs.
The XXOO structure therefore depicts a topology that 
may be compared with the two movements which characterize 
the toy. Each new revolution describes an arc that 
crosses the previous one in a movement both elliptical and 
chiastic and this is especially evident when it swings 
back and forth in the delirium of the very end.
My project has been to portray two moments of this 
"love" configuration through the works of Derrida and
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Barthes. These moments of intersection between Barthes 
and Derrida have been expressed through rhetorical or 
literary figures. The figure used for Barthes was the 
ellipsis, which figuratively translates into the geometric 
"ellipse," an altered circle, which characterizes the 
kisses3 part of this XXOO formation that can appear as 
the signature of the love letter. I have chosen the
chiasmus or X (the Greek chi) for Derrida for two main
reasons,
In the first place I have chosen to focus on 
relations between feminism and deconstruction in this 
chapter, a subject that explores the theorization of the 
body through the use of such terms as invagination and 
hymen, which, I argue, signal chiastic structures as well
as "feminine" symbols. These two Derridean terms will be
examined at length in this last section of the 
dissertation.
Second, although Barthes' references to 
psychoanalysis are elliptical, Derrida's are more specific 
in that the whole of La Carte oostale constitutes a 
rewriting of the Freudian institution of psychoanalysis. 
However, this chapter will focus on a second major 
chiasmus, closely connected to Freudian and Lacanian 
theories, which, as with the first chiasmus of 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis we explored, is more
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fully developed in Derrida's writings than in those of 
Roland Barthes. I refer here to that between 
deconstruction and feminism. In order to delve further 
into this complex chiastic intersection, we will continue 
the discussion of writing the body which we touched upon 
at the end of the preceding chapter on Barthes.
In the case of Barthes, and more specifically through 
his essay on Erte, woman was seen as the mediator between 
the figural and the symbolic meaning. In the case of 
Derrida, I would like to suggest that the relation is 
further developed and that woman becomes the medium for 
the rewriting of logocentrism, and more specifically 
phallogocentrism.4 Phallogocentrism is a term coined by 
Derrida which indicates the privileging of the phallic 
discourse which in Lacanian terms becomes "the Law of the 
Father," and is interpreted in Derridian terms as the 
"Name of the Father."
Derrida describes and occasionally practices what 
might be called a feminine writing (as we will discuss 
"Envois" would be an example of this "feminine" writing) 
which is the logical consequence of his desire to rewrite 
logocentrism since phallogocentrism is necessarily 
inscribed in logocentrism. The problem comes in trying to 
define "feminine writing," a term which, although I will 
continue to use the singular form, should always be viewed
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in terms of a plurality. There has been much discussion 
of this term, particularly since the writings of Cixous, 
Irigaray, and Kristeva began to be discussed by English- 
speaking critics.5 For the sake of argument and clarity 
X will attempt to relate some of the characteristics of 
the term and to limit the discussion to the matters at 
hand.
This type of writing begins with a question: "How to
write without using the 'old' 'male' language?" As argued 
by Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray, male language (again, 
these are necessary generalizations) is language that 
submits to the rules of logic, syntax, linearity, 
homogeneity, and realist representation. Furthermore, in 
the interest of this dissertation, I would underline the 
fact that typical male language privileges mastery (of the 
subject at hand, of the language used) over play. The 
impossibility of this mastery, both of the subject and of 
language, is one of the main thrusts of feminine writing. 
Male language or phallogocentric language does not 
privilege laughter, except for perhaps sadistic laughter, 
and in general mastery is no laughing matter. As we know, 
Helene Cixous, one of the leading French promoters of 
"l'ecriture feminine" has an essay entitled "Le Rire de la 
Meduse," which advocates the use of laughter and play in 
writing. In the Derridean scheme of things, laughter is
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often the prelude or "postlude" to jouissance, a term we
encountered in earlier chapters, which I am using in the
sexual sense of sensual enjoyment. Before analyzing the
more specific topic of feminism and play, it is necessary
to review many of the most prominent questions as
presented by Cixous in the following passage:
Are we going to be the equal of men, are we 
going to be as phallic as they are? Or do we 
want to save something else, something more 
positive, more archaic, much more on the side of 
jouissance, of pleasure, less socializable? If 
so, what is the price?6
The jouissance she speaks of here originates in the
Imaginary, but it does not stem from the unity or
homogeneity of the subject but rather from the split
subject, which is the product of the unconscious we
discussed earlier in relation to Barthes' reworking of
desire. Cixous writes of the impossibility of coding the
unconscious or woman in general:
. . . il faut dire, avant tout, qu'il n'y a pas,
aujourd'hui meme, et malgre l'enormite du 
refoulement qui les a maintenues dans ce "noir" 
qu'on essaie de leur faire reconnaitre comme 
leur attribut, une femme generale, une femme 
type. Ce qu'elles ont en commun, je le dirai.
Mais ce qui me frappe c'est l'infinie richesse 
de leurs constitutions singulieres: on ne peut 
parler d'une sexualite feminine, uniforme, 
homogene, a parcours codable, pas plus que d'un 
inconscient semblable. L'imaginaire des femmes 
est inepuisable, comme la musique, la peinture, 
l'ecriture: leurs coulees de fantasmes sont 
inouies.7
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In this quote, she raises the question of the polymorphous 
perversity of the unconscious which incorporates the 
multiple subject who is not afraid to recognize in him- or 
herself the presence of both sexes, and the circulation of 
multiple desires.
This acceptance of the multiplicity of the self and 
thus a bisexuality is not the exclusive realm of woman.
It is important to recall the quotation presented earlier 
by Derrida from his interview with Christie MacDonald in 
Choreographies concerning the multiple voices of 
sexuality. The use of the terms hymen and invagination 
has been commented upon at length by various feminist 
factions, as has the more general question of the 
interaction of deconstruction and feminism. The questions 
posed, mostly criticizing deconstruction as falling into 
phallogocentric traps while purporting to avoid them, 
often indicate an unwillingness to accept the 
demystification of presence or identity which 
characterizes Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics.8 
In other words if the feminists accept the antihumanist 
premises of deconstruction, they are required to question 
the "unitary self," and the autonomy they strive for; to 
relinguish any singular identity for woman in favor of the 
plurality Cixous speaks of. Derrida posits that identity 
as relational; as such, "woman" is only a position that
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gains its definition from its placement in the binary with 
man.
Because of the interdependence of the terms "woman" 
and "man" neither can be autonomous, and both of them take 
their definition relationally within a chain of signifiers 
rather than in terms of a transcendental signified. It 
follows that none of the members of the linguistic chain 
has priority, and that a chain of substitutions is set up 
in which identity, truth, and being have no authority as 
such. These "essences" are replaced by deferral and 
endless play.
A feminism that bases its practice on an individual
woman's experience, her essence, becomes, in the
deconstructive scheme of things, humanistic and complicit
with the phallogocentric culture it purports to oppose.
As Mary Poovey explains:
To take deconstruction to its logical conclusion 
would be to argue that "woman" is only a social 
construct that has no basis in nature, that 
"woman," in other words, is a term whose 
definition depends upon the context in which it 
is being discussed and not upon some set of 
sexual organs or social experiences. This 
renders the experience woman have of themselves 
and the meaning of their social relations 
problematic, to say the least. It also calls 
into question the experiential basis upon which 
U.S. feminism has historically grounded its 
political programs.9
An answer to this problem has been offered by Derrida,
among others. In Eperons and La Double Seance Derrida has
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explored the possibility that "woman" and in particular 
"feminine writing" (he uses the term hymeneal writing 
which we will discuss shortly) can subvert the entire 
metaphysics based on presence and identity. Basically, he 
sets up a strategy to subvert the binary opposition 
through the movement called, among other terms, 
differance, which was introduced in an earlier chapter as 
the play of substitution or the trace. The term 
differance is more appropriate to Derrida's work than to 
Barthes', since it does not designate a space in the 
middle but rather a process, whereas "middle voice" works 
in the texts of Barthes since it represents a mediating 
force. In terms of my argument, the two terms serve a 
similar purpose: this middle voice or differance resembles 
the "ecriture feminine" which Cixous and Irigaray 
advocate. Again, it is important to remember that this 
feminine writing is not the sole domain of women, although 
it seems to derive from a theorization of the female body 
and female sexuality in particular.10 Cixous and 
Irigaray have both been accused of essentialism because of 
this "writing the body." In "The Laugh of the Medusa" we 
spoke about earlier, Cixous associates the writer's ink 
with "mother's milk," although in all fairness I must say 
she also problematizes the literal connection between 
female biology and the kind of writing the ink produces.
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As in the case of Derrida and his use of the hymen and
invagination the reader must necessarily accept these
ideas as complicated textual and figurative practices
rather than any attempt to essentialize the female body.
Irigaray, like Cixous, has also been charged with
essentialism and reverse sexism because she rewrites the
myth of female desire basing her "feminine language" on
the physical properties of the female genitalia and the
multiple forms of jouissance they provide. She writes:
Woman's desire most likely does not speak the 
same language as man's desire . . . Woman finds 
pleasure more in touch than in sight . . . The 
value accorded to the only definable form (by 
the dominant male imaginary) excludes the form 
involved in female autoeroticism. The one of 
form, the individual sex, proper name, literal 
meaning— supersedes, by spreading apart and 
dividing, this touching of at least two (lips) 
which keeps woman in contact with herself. *
In a phallogocentric society, woman are relegated to
the position of other and as such are rendered silent.
The project of the French feminists is to devise a
different language which does not fall into the old
patriarchal patterns. Merely playing into the existing
language will produce the same worn out patterns. In an
essay entitled "Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un" in the book
of the same name, Irigaray celebrates woman in general and
feminine jouissance in particular:
"Elle" est indefiniment autre en elle-meme. De 
la vient sans doute qu'on la dit fantasque, 
incomprehensible, agitee, capricieuse... Sans
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aller jusqu'a evoquer son langage, ou "elle" 
part dans tous les sens sans qu' "il" y repere 
la coherence d'aucun sens. Paroles 
contradlctoires, un peu folles pour la logique 
de la raison, inaudibles pour qui les ecoute 
avec des grilles toutes faites, un code deja 
tout prepare. C'est que dans ses dires aussi ~ 
du moins quand elle l'ose - la femme se re­
touche tout le temps. Elle s'ecarte a peine 
d'elle-meme d'un babillage, d'une exclamation, 
d'une demi-confidence, d'une phrase laissee en 
suspens... Quand elle y revient, c'est pour 
repartir d'ailleurs. D'un autre point de 
plaisir, ou de douleur. II faudrait l'ecouter 
d'une autre oreille comme un "autre sens" 
toujours en train de se tisser, de s /embrasser 
avec les mots, mais aussi de s'en defaire pour 
ne pas s'y fixer, s'y figer. Car si "elle" dit 
ga, ce n'est pas, deja plus, identique a ce 
qu'elle veut dire. Ce n'est jamais identique a 
rien d'ailleurs, c'est plutot contigu. ga 
touche (a). Et quand ga s'eloigne trop de cette 
proximite, elle coupe et elle recommence a 
"zero": son corps-sexe.
This passage stresses the importance of another language
outside of the traps of binary thinking and the unified
subject. It is important also to note parallels with
Barthes' depiction of writing in S/Z in which he
celebrates writing as weaving with the spider image and
relates it back to women. Furthermore, I quote this
passage at length because I contend that this evokes the
Derridean idea of "invagination" with its idea of the
enfolding of woman's "essence." Invagination, far from
being Derrida's appropriation of a specifically female
body part, indicates rather the doubling of meaning
through the inside/outside dilemma which is an integral
part of the deconstructive strategy. One can argue that
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with this term Derrida has not usurped women's style, he
has merely described it, as Irigaray has done with this
discussion of woman's writing. Both authors serve to
demystify the dominant mode of writing which is based on
identity and binary oppositions, two entities which help
to define the symbolic or patriarchal economy.
Along with a deconstruction of the patriarchal
economy, the process reveals the artificial nature of the
ideology that produces gender identities.13 Because of
this idea, the categories of "nature" and "gender" are
ripe for deconstructing. When these categories are
analyzed in this manner, as we have done with the
categories of man and woman, the artifice they rely on is
exposed. As Poovey demonstrates, feminists can use this
procedure to reveal the contradictions within
institutional definitions of woman, which often work to
their advantage. She offers the following example of the
advantage of working within the contradictions in a
political system:
The fact that'the nineteenth century legal 
principle of "couverture," for example, 
institutionalized the married woman as the 
normative "woman" meant that unmarried women 
enjoyed rights which "naturally" belonged to 
men. Despite other institutional and 
ideological constraints upon their behavior, 
this contradiction within the category "woman" 
facilitated the entry of increasing numbers of 
(middleclass) women into waged work, and it 
helped expose the artificiality of an opposition
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that aligned legal and property rights with
sex.14
Furthermore, within the political system, deconstruction 
serves to open to scrutiny the limiting effects of binary 
oppositions and thus open the door to an understanding of 
the multiple voices in the women's movement. Positing a 
"unified subject" actually works against women in that 
they are all treated in the same way. On a very real 
level, to provide only one example, women of color in a 
white dominated society have very different problems than 
those of white women in society. These differences must 
be acknowledged, and each individual deserves specific 
attention in a given context. If one treatment is 
prescribed for the "unified woman as subject" justice is 
not done, and the power structures already in place which 
privilege the white male perspective will continue to 
dominate.
Finally, an undoing of essentialism is inherent in 
the deconstructive strategy. A refusal to subscribe to 
already existing categories such as man/woman, 
mastery/play and subject/other liberates the feminist 
discourse and opens the door to acceptance of these 
divisions as social and linguistic constructions rather 
than biological ones.
As a supplement to what I have said about desire 
early on it is worthwhile examining Derrida's essay "La
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loi du genre," which considers the consequences of viewing
the word "genre" according to the French definition which
designates categorical differences ("kind") that are not
necessarily biological, as in the case of sexual
differences. In his essay Derrida plays with the two
French meanings of the word, and links this wordplay with
further explanation of his use of the words "hymen" and
"invagination." He writes:
La question du genre litteraire n'est pas une 
question formelle: elle traverse de part en part 
le motif de la loi en generate, de la 
generation, au sens naturel et symbolique, de la 
difference de generation, de la difference 
sexuelle entre le genre masculin et le genre 
feminin, de 1'hymen entre les deux, d'une 
identite et d'une difference entre le feminin et 
le masculin.15
Thus, through the use of wordplay with "genre" Derrida
provides the terms for the linguistic chiasmus of feminism
and deconstruction which is part of the focus of this
chapter. "Envois" is appropriate as a model for this
chiasmus since it effectively breaks down the law of
literary classification and the law of gender. We are
left with a mixture of classifications, which necessarily
become entangled, and a mixture of genders among senders
and addressees, which out of the same necessity, become
plural. Furthermore, "Envois" illustrates the structural
play inherent when these laws of gender and genre are
deconstructed.
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The first sign of the deconstruction of gender/genre
is the fact that a man is writing in the epistolary genre,
a genre, which, although dominated by women writers, is
known traditionally to foster the subjugation of
women.16 Shari Benstock gives this brief summary of the
role of women in the epistolary genre:
The epistolary genre sentenced woman to a 
literary fate in which she was created by the 
male author, made to write under his dictation, 
made to serve his fictional purposes (as object 
of man's desire) existing as a male fiction, 
written into the text in translation, her 
creativity simultaneously appropriated and 
denied by the literary form. Denied the right 
to write by her own hand, woman was present in 
these fictions as the inscription of man, her 
letters proceeding under the sign of patriarchy, 
the writing of the epistolary genre a form of 
rape.17
Furthermore, as Benstock describes, this type of 
epistolary fiction leaves woman only two possibilities, to 
be consumed by her lover through marriage, or to deny 
herself in order to live. Instead of locking the woman 
into these two possibilities, and thus closing down the 
narrative structure, Derrida, taking the place of the 
woman writing love letters, disrupts the system by 
positing an "adestination" of meaning in which the letters 
may not reach their destination, and thus the outcome of 
the situation would be undecidable as opposed to 
predetermined. To question the destination of the letter, 
or in this case, the postcard, is also to question the
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woman's rape and eventual death within the phallocentric
system. In order to rewrite this system, Derrida posits
an alternative version to the traditional law of genre.
In "La loi du genre" he writes:
Avant d'en venir a l'epreuve d'un certain 
exemple, je tenterai de formuler, de maniere 
aussi elliptique, economique et formelle que 
possible, ce que j'appellerai la loi de la loi 
de genre. C'est precisement un principe de 
contamination, une loi d'impurete, une economie 
du parasite. . . . Le trait qui marque 
1'appartenance s'y divise immanquablement, la 
bordure de 1'ensemble vient a former par 
invagination une poche interne plus grande que 
tout, les consequences de cette division et de 
ce debordement restant aussi singulieres 
qu'illimitables.18
Part of the disruption of the system involves a role
reversal. Instead of the typical scenario of a woman
trapped waiting for a man, Derrida presents in "Envois" a
man in the position of the woman, a man waiting for a
woman's "determination," which, as Barthes has remarked,
feminizes the man. Derrida creates his desire through the
writing; writing becomes the fetish object. As we
commented in the chapter on Barthes and the ellipsis,
desire is created in the space of the absence of the
lover.
The writing of this desire is what I have designated 
as "feminine writing" or in more specifically Derridean 
terms, hymeneal writing. Hymeneal writing affirms the 
feminine and expresses its desire. Hymeneal desire denies
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the patriarchal forces which set up the traditional 
scenario in which the woman waits, succumbs and eventually 
dies. As Benstock describes, the hymen rewrites the 
familiar pattern of female oppression found in the 
epistolary genre, and I will add, in phallocentric society 
in general:
Hymeneal writing exposes the fallacious claims 
made by epistolary fiction by outwitting the 
dialectical oppositions that support the genre.
. . . In particular, the hymen outwits the
tautological structure of its narrative which 
would make the heroine's beginning (her gender, 
her femaleness) the mark of her end (her death 
in desire), that would force her submission to 
patriarchal forces denying her the right to 
(write) her desire. 9
The hymen is first discussed by Derrida in the essay
"La double seance" in La Dissemination, in a detailed
manner that I do not have the space to do justice to here.
Suffice it to say that it involves an analysis of
Mallarme's hymeneal writing, which again enforces one of
my main points that this type of writing is not specific
to women. Brunette and Wills comment on this process of
"hymenization:"
But Mallarme's texts do not merely speak of the 
hymen, they in fact "hymenize" if such a word 
could exist. They put into effect their own 
suspension. Then, in the final analysis, so do 
Derrida's texts and Rousseau's, and Plato's, and 
so on. For none of these names can be credited 
with discovering this practice, even if in 
Mallarme's case it seems to lie so close to the 
surface . . . and even if Derrida has analyzed
it more systematically than his predecessors.
What is at work here is nothing other that a
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fact of language, the fact of its double effect, 
its simultaneous will to coherence and the 
overstepping of its own boundaries; the mime of 
its sameness— always with a difference— and the 
pirouettes of its performance.20
The double effect mentioned in this passage is also played
out in "Envois" through the use of the postcard depicting
Plato dictating to Socrates. This not only indicates a
doubling of the historical process in which the reverse is
true and Socrates dictated to Plato but it also allows for
a doubling of the lover's discourse, this time with a
different configuration of genders. Thus not only the
historical but the biological processes are deconstructed
and reconstructed throughout the writing of the lover's
discourse which constitutes "Envois".
The idea of double writing, one that repeats with a
difference, is central to the discourse of deconstruction
as it is to the discourse of desire. The discourse of
desire is always already double due to the role of the
unconscious which acts as the elliptical space for the
unraveling of the discourse and as the site of the
polymorphous perversity which allows for the choreography
of multiple voices. Double writing also insures that
adestination will occur since the discourse of desire
created by the unconscious is never guaranteed to reach
its addressee. The paradigm for this play with
adestination is the postal system in which there is always
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the possibility that a letter will lose its path and 
arrive at yet another non-destination, the dead letter 
office, thus being inevitably divided.
In both systems, that of desire and the postal 
system, there is never any possibility of closure to the 
extent that nothing "really" arrives. Desire leaves 
traces such as the vestiges of the Imaginery, or in the 
case of "Envois", the ashes of the love letters which 
either rekindle or remain as a remainder of the lost love. 
The burning of the letters threatened by the lovers only 
serves to keep the desire and the recreation of that 
desire alive. This "love story" is constituted by relays 
which represent the constant deferral and displacement of 
the message. These gaps or ellipses allow the discourse 
to create itself but they also allow for the constant 
motion to continue.
As we say in our discussion of writing the discourse 
of desire is feminized since it is written out in the 
Imaginary, the site of the m/other which allows for the 
flow of the white ink of the breast rather than the sperm 
of the pen(is) to constitute it through the lack of 
linearity, refusal of power plays, or authoritative 
gestures. There is no absolute truth expected or 
received, only a double gesture of writing and laughter as 
the whirling inscription, as produced during the spinning
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of the dreidel, and the discourse of the woman continues 
to deconstruct the phallogocentric system in which it is 
created.
This last chapter has perhaps raised more questions 
than it has answered, not an uncommon result in the 
deconstructive frame of things. Drawing on Cixous and 
Irigaray, I have posited a/my version of "feminine 
writing" which I have attempted to define, although any 
type of definition leads to a closure which runs counter 
to the movement of such a writing. This new type of 
writing is one which takes the structure of invagination. 
It is folded into the phallogocentric system and yet seeks 
to rewrite the system it inhabits. It is a system in 
which a multiplicity of voices can be heard to rewrite the 
major metaphysical binaries of male/female, 
subject/object, and mastery/play in order to arrive at a 
middle voice, a term which works in terms of Barthes' 
writing, but which may be inappropriate for Derrida. For 
Derrida, the middle voice may be understood as differance, 
a term we discussed earlier. This middle voice or 
differance opens up a space of questioning which is not 
focused on the mastery of knowledge, but rather in its 
dissemination. In literary terms, this dissemination 
takes the form of intertextual cross-fertilization, and in
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the discourse of desire it takes the form of various 
choreographies of genders.
I find it important to read deconstruction as a 
"feminist” movement in which the subjugation of women is 
undermined by the basic tenet of the event which states 
that the system will always be broken down from the 
inside. This phallogocentric system, as this dissertation 
has attempted to show, is broken down by structural play 
which necessarily hinders its closure. Furthermore, this 
play takes the form of a "feminine writing" which serves 
as the medium to rework the system. We have seen how 
"Envois" rewrites the traditional love narrative through 
the use of this feminine writing. By presenting the 
discourse of desire through the eyes of the object of 
desire rather than the subject of desire, or through 
Socrates' writing rather than Plato's writing, Derrida has 
feminized or, using the term coined by Brunette and Wills, 
"hymenized" the text. This hymenization of the lover's 
discourse and the play involved in such a process is the 
main thrust of this dissertation. The play has been 
embodied by the figure of the dreidel, always in motion, 
creating the dervish of desire through its whirling 
inscription. The traditional discourse of desire has thus
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been rewritten in order to disseminate information in a 
more radical gaming which overrides all gender boundaries.
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CONCLUSION
The time has come to let the dreidel stop 
spinning just long enough to figure out what it is I have 
attempted to tell the reader, my other, the other who has 
helped me to formulate this discourse, about Barthes, 
Derrida, play and desire. I have based this text on play, 
the play of writing, the play of desire, and the literal 
play with a dreidel which parallels these two 
textual/sexual plays.
After an introductory chapter which presented the 
basic ideas of deconstruction as practiced by Barthes and 
Derrida, I have attempted to incorporate those ideas into 
my inquiry into the deconstructive practice and the 
necessity of play within that practice through the 
incorporation of the dreidel. Emphasis has been on the 
gaming process and the laughter, in other words, the 
sexually charged jouissance resulting from the process, 
which is ever infinite, or in the case of the dreidel, 
made to be spun time and time again.
We have seen how the subject in play, as in love, is 
always divided by the other, whatever form that other may 
take, whether in the form of another person, lover or 
parent, mother or father, or the unconscious which haunts 
us all and prohibits any hope of a unified subject 
"presumed to know." We have also examined how this non—
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binary structure of subject/object parallels that of 
writing/speech which is divided by adestination.
As we discussed in Chapter II on autobiography in 
specific works of Derrida and Barthes there can be no 
recourse to authorial intent, in fact, one cannot know a 
subject or a(n) m/other for that matter and one should not 
presume to know anything. The positioning of the search 
for knowledge within the realm of the Imaginary, Lacan's 
term for the preoedipal state of union or lack thereof 
with the mother, preempts any will to mastery since the 
law of the father does not come into play. Furthermore, 
to the extent that the Imaginary remains inaccessible in 
any totalizing sense the will-to-knowledge is always 
frustrated.
Knowledge can indeed be "gained," or approached, and 
I have imparted some of my "wisdom" here, but it is never 
absolute, never falling into the realm of a transcendental 
signified, and, as I have just said, always coming under 
the auspices of the idea of adestination which insists on 
undecidability in the process of acquiring knowledge. 
Knowledge purported to be passed on, as if through the 
postal system may never reach its destination, or else in 
a rewording of the same idea, once at that destination the 
"truth" intended by the sender may not be the same "truth" 
that the addressee reads. The systematic conveyance of
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knowledge is a fantasy, an impossibility since there will 
always already be a glitch, a delay, a relay, or a virus 
in the system that will impede any sense of closure.
As we have seen in both Fragments and La Carte 
postale adestination figures in a similar manner in the 
play of desire. Through the examination of Fragments in 
Chapter IV we examined the subject in love who is always 
unsure of how his lover's discourse will be perceived by 
the other, an other who is expected to complete the 
correspondence, by situating her/himself in the ellipsis 
that defines the dialogue and parallels the absence which 
creates the desire. The lover's discourse is one of 
constant displacement from the subject to the other and 
vice versa. The discourse of the lover is not gender 
determined; the roles change according to the context. At 
this point, it is important to recall Barthes' words, "Un 
homme n'est pas feminise parce gu'il est inverti, mais 
parce qu'il est amoureux."1
The lover and the lover's discourse is 
"polymorphously perverse," a term I borrow from Freud and 
use to indicate undecidability in gender issues with 
regard to the divided subject. This paradigm in which the 
roles of subject and object are interchangeable, carries 
over into the question of whether writing can be 
characterized as feminine or masculine, a topic we have
1 77
examined at some length in the last chapter. The 
possibility of a "feminine" writing can be summarized as 
one in which the binaries of man and woman are rewritten 
to produce a "middle voice" (Barthes) or differance 
(Derrida) which does not advocate mastery but rather 
linguistic and structural play with a multiplicity of 
voices. Barthes and Derrida both practice this feminine 
writing in which the binaries are deconstructed and 
undecidability is accepted as a structural necessity.
Certainly the figures used to describe this writing, 
such as hymen and invagination, like all the examples of a 
theorization of the body I have attempted to analyze, are 
not the domain of one gender, and as such they are not 
unfairly appropriated. The key word here is theorization, 
used in this context as a literary construct to help 
analyze certain morphologies, and definitely not meant to 
insult or annoy as some critics of the figures used by 
Derrida have assumed.
In the last chapter, taking the cue from preceding 
insights on Barthes and writing the body, I have examined 
the question of deconstruction and feminism and the 
problematic aspect of their intersection, as well as the 
beneficial aspects of such a chiasmus.
In order to investigate this configuration, various 
texts of Cixous and Irigaray were analyzed wih relation to
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women's writing and women's Sexuality. They argue that a 
woman is able to write her body and express a multiplicity 
of signifiers, which stems from the rewriting of the 
binary of man and woman. I have argued that Barthes and 
Derrida are in tune with this feminine writing of the body 
which arises from the Imaginary in the texts I have 
examined, Fragments and "Envois" in La Carte postale.
Deconstruction, as a movement away from logocentrism, 
and thus away from phallogocentrism, can be read as a 
feminist movement, whether in the United States or France, 
in that the binary opposition of man and woman is 
deconstructed and reworked in a non-logocentric movement 
working from within (the structure of invagination comes 
into play here) to rewrite the logocentric system. This 
internal work is not restricted to women attempting to 
deconstruct the patriarchy; there are men involved in that 
movement also. It is a movement which deconstructs 
another logocentric binary, that of mastery and play, 
which results in a text such as Fragments or "Envois". 
These texts revel in play while coming to the important 
conclusion that play, wordplay, structural play and the 
recognition of such play are fundamental aspects of 
literary texts.
Let us now return to the dreidel, the beginning of 
this exploratory adventure, this gaming, but never the
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end, and the tradition that I have related to this 
spinning around the various discourses of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, deconstruction and feminism using Barthes 
and Derrida as textual markers. The toy represents part 
of the traditional Jewish system but it has been used in a 
dissertation where I have played at disrupting what is 
most systematic in the binaries of man/woman, mastery/play 
and the traditional discourses of desire. The necessity 
of setting the stage, giving the background information 
essential to understand the type of deconstruction I am 
describing and trying to play my part in, has perhaps 
frustrated the effort, or rendered it tedious at times, 
but the enthusiasm is there as is the need to laugh about 
any attempt to master the information.
My writing situates itself in the ellipsis that 
Barthes and Derrida have left to the readers of Fragments 
and La Carte postale. I have brought to that ellipsis the 
play of the textual and the sexual, play which I consider 
the motivation behind the movement of writing that is 
deconstruction.
Finally, I leave you with the dreidel, still in 
motion, still creating whirling inscriptions which I'll 
leave to the next reader who wants to "play" with desire, 
deconstruction, and the texts of Barthes and Derrida.
Notes
* Roland Barthes, Fragments d'un dlscours amoureux 
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